Showing posts with label Abdul Ghani Baradar. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abdul Ghani Baradar. Show all posts
Monday, August 23, 2010

We here at D&D are still enjoying our August recess, but fear not, we shall return soon.  In the meantime, the NYT featured a story today from Dexter Filkins about how the ISI used the CIA and American resources to arrest Mullah Baradar for their own, self-serving ends.

“We picked up Baradar and the others because they were trying to make a deal without us,” said a Pakistani security official, who, like numerous people interviewed about the operation, spoke anonymously because of the delicacy of relations between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States. “We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians.”
Well that's discouraging.  And who could have ever imagined that was the case?

       

Monday, March 15, 2010

News from the AP tonight that Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban second-in-command who was captured by the ISI with U.S. support several weeks ago, was deep in secret negotiations with the Afghan government.  At the time of his arrest, the news seemed to portend an abrupt about-face in Pakistan’s strategy.  It was hailed as a signal that Islamabad was reordering its strategic priorities, and would finally become an honest partner to the U.S. in fighting Islamic extremists.


Now that assertion sounds hollow and naïve. 

I greeted the news of his capture with a healthy dose of skepticism, unable to believe that the ISI would reorient itself so quickly and decisively.  The story didn’t quite make sense.  If this AP story is true, and it certainly appears to be, all the pieces now fall into place.

Mullah Baradar was engaged with President Karzai in secret backchannel negotiations.  Since he is well known as a “moderate” amongst the Taliban, it is entirely plausible that these were good faith negotiations aimed to bring about a real peace.  However, as a “moderate,” Mullah Baradar’s position was probably not in tune with most of his Taliban colleagues. 

Furthermore, reconciliation between the Taliban and the Karzai government would produce one major loser – Pakistan. 

Thursday, February 18, 2010

Fascinating new story from the New York Times about the capture of Mullah Baradar earlier this week.  According to this story, it was an accident!  The Pakistanis had no idea that Baradar was at the meeting they raided, and only realized later that he was in custody.

The story briefly mentions the potential ramifications; most notably that Pakistan has NOT reoriented its strategic preferences and has NOT decided to crack down on the Afghan Taliban, which has been the meme in most analysis of the story.  Instead, perhaps this was a rather embarrassing mistake - an attempt to arrest a low-level suspect to appease the U.S. accidentally net the big fish that was supposed to be protected.  Or perhaps the Pakistanis who conducted the raid - noted only as "Pakistani counterterrorist officers" in the NYT - were not in contact with the ISI and therefore unaware that Baradar was receiving covert support.

This is all idle speculation, of course, but it warrants mention.  The biggest benefit from the Baradar capture was the perceived shift in Pakistani strategy and cooperation, but identifying it as a mistake means that the presumptive strategic breakthrough could be completely bunk.  And the fact that the CIA was not permitted access for two full weeks should certainly cast doubts on any claim of increased cooperation.

Tuesday, February 16, 2010

From the Christian Science Monitor:

The Afghanistan Taliban's chief military commander was captured in a joint
operation between Pakistani and American spy agencies near Karachi. Agents from
the two countries nabbed Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in the Pakistani commercial
capital of Karachi 10 days ago. News of his arrest broke Monday night. Mr.
Baradar is said to be the Taliban's No. 2, working underneath Mullah Omar as the
organization's top military commander for southern Afghanistan.

This may be the biggest story coming out of the Af/Pak region since the battle of Tora Bora. The capture of Mullah Baradar may have far reaching consequences, and may provide an intelligence coup for both Pakistan and ISAF forces. As the head of the Quetta shura, Military Commander for Southern Afghanistan, and generally bad guy, taking Baradar out of play (especially during the Marjah offensive) will lead to confusion and disorder among the Afghani Taliban -- as well as possibly exposing actionable intelligence on the Afghani Taliban network.

At worst, his aprehension will force top AQ agents (including OBL), and Taliban leadership like Mullah Omar and his lieutenants to take to ground and go black -- at best, it may lead to their capture as well. Either way, the arrest of Baradar will have far reaching consequences. It also marks a change in Pakistan's approach to the Afghani Taliban -- a group they have largely ignored, instead using their ISI to target Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP) within their own borders. Should the ISI cooperate with US Intelligence, we may see quite a few major arrests in the next few months.

For the moment, it appears that the ISI has taken the lead on the inprisonment and interrogation of Abdul Ghani Baradar, with US Intelligence taking a more observatory role. More analysis to come soon!

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