We seem to have sparked a debate here about the LRA, and I invite everyone to contribute. This is a complex issue fraught with implications for human rights, sovereignty, and regional politics, and I think it would behoove us all to carefully unpack and analyze each component.
To begin with, commenter "Caroline" raised some excellent points about the desirability of a military approach and other alternatives, and I would like to highlight her thoughts and respond to here.

Caroline:

Dave, Thanks for writing about this important topic on your blog. I generally agree with your arguments here but have to disagree on a few points.

First, you say "America has the power to catch Kony, but not the will." I agree with you that the US will never deploy troops to capture or kill Kony. No matter how many human rights organizations jump up and down decrying the abuses of the LRA, the US will never deploy troops to capture or kill Kony. I am less certain, however, that the US actually has the power to do so -- effectively. Granted, I am not an expert on the tactics and capabilities of US Special Forces, but if faulty US intelligence was one of the reasons why the attack on Kony in December 2008 failed so catastrophically, I am not confident that the US is the best candidate for capturing him. In order to carry this out, the US would have to spend a significant amount of time gathering intel on a region of northeastern Congo and southeastern CAR that I am almost certain they are not familiar with. I highly doubt the US would commit Special Forces to spend the required amount of time gathering this intel if they did decide to launch an operation. And if they don't gather the intel, the operation will no doubt fail. Again.

This leads me to my second point. I believe discussing the military option surrounding the LRA is not a constructive debate. Neither the US nor the EU will commit the time or troops needed to capture Kony, so any operation they launch would likely fail. Continuing the debate on the military option, in my opinion, is not the direction the debate should be going. I realize there are strong vested interests in Uganda that encourage this debate, but it is a dangerous one. One glance through the Human Rights Watch reports on the consequences of the December 2008 operation should lead readers to understand that pursuing this route is both foolish and highly irresponsible given the civilian costs.

What then is the solution? I don't have an easy one. I would advocate for a return to the negotiating table, an increase in MONUC deployments (with contingents ready to use force to defend civilians) to areas at risk from LRA attack, an increase in Ugandan and possibly Rwandan deployments to Obo in CAR, and strong US, EU, and AU pressure on Khartoum to stop its recently renewed support to the LRA. All of these efforts should be focused on the protection of the civilian population, not on killing Kony. Pursuing the military option is entirely irresponsible and disregards the reality of civilian life that is lost in its wake.

Thanks in advance for considering my comments.

First of all, thanks for reading. You make some insightful and important points, and I think you and I agree on most aspects here.

Your first point, about the necessity of good intel to catch Kony, is absolutely true. It's one of the many reasons I believe the U.S. won't become more heavily involved. As you point out, gathering intel requires personnel, time, and money, and I don't believe the Obama Administration is prepared to commit those resources for a sustained effort. The difference between the U.S. and the regional governments is in capacity. The U.S. could put together the required intel if so inclined, whereas the Ugandan, Congolese, Sudanese, and CAR governments simply don't have the ability to undertake such a large, complex operation.

Your second point is also quite astute - I agree that the military option holds little promise so long as the US and EU are not willing to commit. Not only is the military option unlikely to catch Kony, but it also comes with severe human rights consequences, as you point out. This unfortunately is not a new aspect to the campaign against the LRA; the Ugandan military was responsible for despicable human rights violations in northern Uganda when pursuing Kony.

I disagree, however, with your conclusions.

In case you're just tuning in, a few weeks ago Michael Wilkerson wrote a piece for FP entitled "Why Can't Anyone Stop the LRA."  I quibbled with a few points, and wrote up my objections here on D&D.  Michael got wind of my response and wrote a supremely cogent rebuttal on his own blog, at which time the sheer hell of finals derailed me from ever posting a response.  Here, slightly belatedly, is my answer (could we call it a re-re-response?).

While it's tempting to allow this to degrade into a snarky blog-war, (because, let's face it, that's fun) I prefer more serious analysis, and in fact Michael and I agree on most points.  And even where our opinions differ, I wouldn't say we disagree so much as we have slightly different interpretations.

We agree (and Michael, please correct me if I err here) that the regional governments, South Sudan, CAR, and DRC, are extremely weak.  Michael notes that "regional governments are working together - at least on paper" and I agree, and it seems as though we concur in our analysis that this coordination is, practically speaking, essentially worthless.


We also share the belief that if the U.S. was seriously committed the LRA would soon be eliminated.  He has a great line here about the level of American commitment:

But that’s akin to saying if Congress really wanted to balance the budget it would eliminate corn subsidies. There may be a lot of truth there but that doesn’t put it very far within the realm of political possibility.

I agree wholeheartedly here; and Michael I would like to eventually discuss the merits of the increasing U.S. military presence in Africa.  My point in raising the specter of greater U.S. involvement in the chase for Kony is to critique those very factors that make it an infeasible outcome - America has the power to catch Kony, but not the will, and this must be considered among the sad reasons the LRA is still at-large.

But we do have our disagreements.  At the end of his rebuttal, Michael objects to my characterization of the Ugandan forces as "rag-tag" and points to the presence of former LRA fighters in their midst to substantiate his point.  I respectfully disagree.  Perhaps the term "rag-tag" is altogether too vague.  I take the point that these are not bottom-of-the-barrel troops - certainly these Ugandan units are superior to their Congolese colleagues.  And they appear to be better behaved than other branches of Ugandan military, which committed innumerable human rights violations in the campaign to chase the LRA from Uganda.  The Gettleman article Michael cites even quotes a representative from Human Rights Watch praising their behavior, a welcome change from the past.

But talk about damning with faint praise - those are some weak comparisons.  Militarily, perhaps the best way measure of the competence of the Ugandan troops is to look at their results, and they are not positive.  Kony is still roaming free, and reportedly has popped up everywhere from the DRC to Darfur.  And even with logistical aid from the U.S., as Michael touts, and intel contributions prior to Operation Lightning Thunder, they have been unable to corral Kony.

This is where Michael and I differ most sharply, though on a theoretical rather than practical level.  I believe that part of the reason the LRA remains at large is a failure to accurately conceptualize and analyze them as an organization.  The LRA lacks serious political goals (Kony occasionally pays lip service to the idea of ruling Uganda, but his actions belie that goal).  Nor do they have the support of the populace, on ethnic or ideological lines, to conduct a classic Maoist Peoples War.  But, on the other extreme, they don't seem to be engaged in criminal trafficking except to support their own existence.  In short, who the hell are the LRA?  If they aren't traditional insurgents or guerrillas, but they aren't criminals, who are they?

This is not simply an academic question.  How can you effectively target a group if you don't understand their motives and goals?  Overlooking the nature of the LRA is one of the reasons Operations Lightning Thunder was such a spectacular failure.  The Ugandan military (and, presumably, their U.S. supporters) were stuck in the old RMA mindset about the superiority and universal applicability of air power.  The massive bombing raids that characterized the operation would have been appropriate for the skies over Nazi Germany, but not for finding and eliminating a small group of fighters.  New enemies call for new tactics, and that lesson has gone unheeded.

There is some promise of innovation in the Ugandan's use of former LRA members as trackers, but it is an incredibly risky move and I think it also speaks to the paucity of ability among Ugandan units.  I have seen no coherent attempts to understand the existence of the LRA as anything but a band of cult killers and their brainwashed followers.  Even if that is their raison d'etre, there needs to be some work done on utilizing that information to form a coherent strategy.  Simply hunting Kony across such a vast area with little idea of where he will go next, or why, is an awfully tall task.

I don't pretend to know how to understand the LRA, and so I'll bounce that (possibly impossible) question back to Michael.  But I do think it's important to become familiar with the enemy, otherwise any strategy risks being misguided. 

In the final tally, Michael and I seem to see eye-to-eye on most aspects of the LRA.  But, Michael, what do you make of the LRA, and can we use that information to better formulate a strategy for stopping them?

Apologies to all for my absentee blogging.  I'd like to come up with a detailed and sophisticated explanation, but quite simply finals are kicking my ass and I have no free time to sleep, let along blog.

I have quite a list of topics to tackle, starting with my long-overdue response to Mike Wilkerson about the LRA and some thoughts on the latest RAND study.  With any luck I'll be back in the flow next week. 

Until there, here are is a bizarre, insane, and utterly fascinating Vanity Fair story about a born-again American Hells Angel, roaming Sudan and trying to kill Joseph Kony.

(A belated analysis of the Obama Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, released on April 5, 2010)

The Obama Nuclear Posture Review is a profoundly political document whose main effect is diplomatic. It makes no major strategic changes to US nuclear doctrine, and the changes it does make are hedged by reservations. The document’s major departure from its predecessor, the Bush Administration’s 2002 NPR, is that of tone. As one reviewer noted, President Obama is no longer brandishing “a nuclear sword in every direction," which is the main legacy of this review.

First to the details. The review eschews a policy that the “sole use” of nuclear weapons is for deterrence, instead declaring that

“The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.

The NPR sends a message to North Korea and Iran, declaring that

"the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations."

While the US will not use nuclear weapons to counter a chemical weapons attack, the review includes an exception for biological weapons, stating that

"the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat."

Regarding the contentious issue of the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the NPR states that

"The United States will consult with our allies regarding the future basing of nuclear weapons in Europe, and is committed to making consensus decisions through NATO processes."

In essence, although abandoning the bluster of the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration still maintains the right to use nuclear weapons outside of the context of a nuclear attack on the United States, and clearly describes North Korea and Iran as countries for which any assurances do not apply. Although this represents a shift in tone from the Bush years, its strategic impact is minimal. In fact, Stephen Walt has gone so far as to declare that “from a purely strategic perspective, this new statement is largely meaningless.”

Now to the politics. (more after the jump)

Beka Feathers
Demagogues and Dictators Afghanistan Parliamentary Analyst

As the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated over the past two years, the public narrative has increasingly resembled a litany of failure: the central government is full of corrupt warlords who are tied to the drug trade, violate human rights with impunity, and are interested in the idea of governance only insofar as they can profit from it. The Afghan National Police are brutal, biased and uninterested in upholding the rule of law. Corrupt officials are becoming more prevalent than opium poppies. As a result, establishing legitimate government has become critical to success in all other areas of the mission in Afghanistan.

In all the fuss about the failures of the central government, however, a surprising success story is being overlooked. The Afghan National Assembly, the country’s highest representative institution, has begun, quietly, to govern. This is a surprise not only because the parliament has long been the forgotten stepchild of the Bonn Process, but also because Karzai and his international allies have done everything possible to prevent the parliament from becoming a strong check to the presidency.

Afghanistan is one of the most centralized countries in the world, and almost everything leads back to Karzai sooner or later. Consider: In Afghanistan, the President has the power to make the budget, pass decrees, hire governors and police chiefs, even to appoint teachers to local schools. Electoral law makes it almost impossible for political parties to operate by forbidding them to organize along any of the nationally recognized identity lines. The international community has largely supported Karzai’s attempts to further consolidate power in his person. The parliament, meanwhile, has lagged behind other government institutions in funding, resources, and capacity.

But starting this year, the parliament seems to have found its feet. Since January, it has challenged Karzai to appoint qualified ministers instead of warlords and cronies, rejected his attempted takeover of the independent Electoral Complaints Commission (the same body that found a third of his votes fraudulent in the election last fall), and refused to serve as a rubber stamp for decrees. In fact, it's been doing what so many outside observers have said is necessary to keep the government from collapsing entirely: serving as a legitimate, Afghan-led check on Karzai's administration.

I have just returned from an exhausting weekend in the woods as a participant in the 2010 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative field simulation.  It was quite a weekend, and between conducting rapid assessments on refugee camps and being ambushed by "militia" I didn't have much time for anything else.

In the next few I days I hope to catch up on the news (and my sleep), and I'm starting with a new report from RAND - How Insurgencies End.  I'll check back in when finished.  Anybody out there with thoughts on this study?

A few months back, we reported here at D&D on the crisis surrounding artillery barrages fired by North and South Korean forces into the highly contested maritime zone along the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Western Sea.

That escalation has continued, though our coverage of it has not. I have been hesitant to speculate on the swirling crisis around the suspicious sinking of the South Korean Corvette Cheonan on March 26, that claimed the lives of 46 sailors.

I was hesitant, mainly because there was little more than speculation around the causality of the Cheonan's sinking. Tonight, it appears that our wait may be over.

Whispers have been leaking from the South Korean defense establishment all day today, as the South Korean navy raised the sunken half of the Cheonan from the bottom of the Western Sea -- looking for answers.

Yonhap news has begun publishing, and then removing, some of these whispers:

"It is the military intelligence's assessment that the North attacked with a heavy torpedo."

Chosun Ibo, a South Korean Daily, has run with the story.

The inference is that the North Koreans have made the first combat-effective use of their rumored suicide torpedo units. The units have been, to this point, mythic -- a boogie man brought out in the debriefings of high-value North Korean defectors, who describe a unit of 13 specially trained special forces members, and modified midget submarines. The Telegraph reports now that sources claim these men were responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan.


(more after the jump)