Demagogues and Dictators

The "Active Response" Dilemma

2010-10-21T13:31:00.000-04:00

Michael Chertoff, former US Secretary of Homeland Security, recently emphasized that establishing rules of engagement regarding cyberwar should be a top priority. Dealing with the issue of active defenses is an important component of this initiative.

“Preemption” is a loaded word. The right of a nation to act in self-defense against imminent threats is protected by Article 51 of the UN Charter, but cyberspace adds a different dimension to the issue. If the government discovered potentially malicious code on a computer, code that could disable a US power grid, or shut down military command and control centers, preemptive action to destroy the virus would necessitate a delicate hand.

The code could be on another country’s computers, on a civilian’s computer, or within the government network. Eliminating the code could have unintended effects on target computer or computer system, and accessing it might violate the owner’s civil liberties. In order to respond in "real time" to cyber threats, should the United States develop more automated response systems? If this was the case, cyber threats could be countered without a single human involved. Efficient, but scary.

Sanctioning unchecked cyber preemption is a problem. From a government standpoint it means revealing defense capabilities, as well as the priorities about what assets are important to us. At worst, it means taking a first, possibly aggressive action, that could have inadvertent negative effects on targeted systems, or even provoke an enemy to retaliate. On the other hand, if no preemptive action is taken, one could end up with an "embarrassed executive problem." Somewhere in the aftermath of a cyber attack, an official will have to sit in front of Congress and say the equivalent of "Yes, we knew the oil rig had safety issues, but we didn't fix them." And that, as we all know, is frustrating.

A Return to Fortress America?

2010-10-18T20:36:00.000-04:00

When Robert Pape writes something on terrorism, I pay attention. He always adds something to the discussion, and usually it's something valuable. But his recent article on FP.com, "It's the Occupation, Stupid" delivers research results and leads the reader to an uncertain conclusion. His argument holds that terrorism, especially suicide terrorism, is motivated by foreign occupation. These findings, based on his research at the University of Chicago, make logical sense: of course people in an occupied territory resort to violence when all other means have been exhausted. His conclusion from this study, however, is problematic. Taking these findings to their logical end, Pape says

The research suggests that U.S. interests would be better served through a policy of offshore balancing.

This is true, but interpreted incorrectly can lead to a dangerous isolationism. Pape is right that the War on Terror is self-defeating, and that having boots on the ground overseas can often be counterproductive. He is also right that occupying foreign territory provokes deadly blowback. But there are two important nuances to this argument:

1) Avoiding foreign occupation is not the same as withdrawing into isolation
2) Offshore balancing requires U.S. involvement and action in foreign countries, which could also instigate blowback.

First, it is important to recognize the difference between offshore balancing and isolationism. It is tempting to extrapolate from Pape's argument that retreating into "Fortress America" is the wisest course. But withdrawing from the world would not make America safer, and furthermore, in this global age, is impossible.

Secondly, offshore balancing implies U.S. power projection overseas and involvement in the affairs of other states, and that doing so is in the best interests of Washington. This could take the form of drone strikes, Special Operations raids, or even 1990's-style cruise missile attacks. But this involvement could have a similar effect as foreign occupation: motivating terrorists. This is a hole in Pape's data, and until further investigated remains a concern.

There is no question that Pape's overall point is correct: foreign occupation is a major driver of terrorism, and removing boots from the ground is preferable. But he would be wise to avoid leaving open the possibility of interpreting his findings to support isolationism.

Don't Ask, Don't Tell: The Law and Politics of Military Personnel Policy

2010-10-16T22:46:00.006-04:00

On Tuesday, a federal judge in California issued a worldwide injunction against execution of Section 654 of Title 10, or as it is more commonly known, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. The injunction by Judge Virginia Phillips of the Central District of California follows her September 9 ruling in Log Cabin Republicans v. United States of America that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is an unconstitutional infringement on servicemembers’ rights of substantive due process under the 5th Amendment and freedom of speech under the 1st Amendment. The ruling was the first to declare the law unconstitutional.

First to the law surrounding Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. The various federal courts that have addressed DADT in 2009 came to different conclusions. In Witt v. U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, the Ninth Circuit upheld parts of DADT and deferred judgment through remand on the issue of substantive due process. In Pietrangelo v. Gates a federal judge in Massachusetts rejected all three arguments against DADT. The decision was upheld by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, which based its ruling on “the special deference we grant Congressional decision-making” in the area of military policy. The case was then declined by the Supreme Court.

As is usual in court cases with significant public interest, cases challenging DADT have several elements, some of which have attracted more attention than others. The most-publicized element of DADT rulings has been the policy arguments surrounding the “unit cohesion” issue – whether the presence of gay and lesbian servicemembers makes a military unit less effective. This issue is important, but far from the only one raised in legal challenges to DADT. It has been challenged by various groups on several grounds: it violates the 5th Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process, it violates the 1st Amendment’s guarantee of free speech, and it violates the equal protection clause.

The substantive due process claims argue that DADT violates servicemembers’ right, identified in a 2003 case invalidating a law prohibiting sodomy in Texas, to “autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.” The issue hinges on what level of scrutiny courts apply to the right of “intimate conduct. A challenge to a “fundamental right” is reviewed with “strict scrutiny” and can only be outweighed by a “compelling” government interest. A challenge to a right that is not fundamental is reviewed with a “rational basis” test where the government’s hurdle is merely rationally related to a legitimate state interest. In essence, if the Supreme Court says a particular right is fundamental, then it makes it much more difficult for government restrictions to withstand a constitutional challenge. It’s in this area of the law that the issue of unit cohesion is argued.

The free speech claims argue that since part of the evidence proving a servicemember’s homosexuality under DADT can be statements and not conduct, these regulations unconstitutionally restrict free speech. The counterargument is that the “evidentiary use of speech” has never been prohibited and can be used to prove a variety of things, including motive and intent.

Lastly, the equal protection argument is that gays and lesbians deserve equal treatment under the Constitution. The counterargument is that sexual orientation is not a “suspect class” (whereas gender and race are) and that the government has a rational basis for the legislation, similar to the argument under substantive due process.

In Log Cabin Republicans, the Judge found that there was no rational basis for prohibiting gay and lesbian servicemembers from serving openly. More importantly, rather than just rejecting the government’s claim, Judge Phillips actually found that the reverse is true – prohibiting gays and lesbians from serving openly actually harms unit cohesion and decreases readiness. In making this finding, Judge Phillips pointed to discharges of highly trained Arabic linguists and other experts, as well as the increasing rate of obesity, criminal records, and lower education among new recruits.

Judge Phillips also found that DADT restricted speech “more than reasonably necessary to protect the Government's interests.” Because the speech relates to content, rather than a location or circumstance, it must be held to a higher standard. This higher standard asks if the restriction is truly necessary given the governmental interests at stake. Judge Phillips found that there was not a “substantial governmental interest” at stake because of the harm DADT does to military recruiting and readiness.

Importantly, Judge Phillips’ listed extensive findings of fact about DADT and its effects in her opinion. The Ninth Circuit resolves disputes about law, not facts, and its review of Judge Phillips’ ruling will have to accept her findings of fact that DADT is harmful to military readiness in seeing if she misapplied legal precedent. A potential Supreme Court ruling would have the same approach.

It would appear that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is history. But several other layers of the issue reveal that to be misleading.

For any measure of finality the case will have to be reviewed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and then accepted and ruled on by the Supreme Court. The Justice Department announced on Friday it will appeal the DADT injunction, at least to the Ninth Circuit. An appeal all the way to the Supreme Court could likely take over a year. In addition, it is far from certain that the full Supreme Court would affirm Judge Phillips, and Justice Kagan (the former Solicitor General) will have to recuse herself because of her previous role in similar cases. Finally, the Supreme Court will undoubtedly be aware of political resolution close at hand and is less than certain to even take the case, leaving uncertainty as to the repeal’s permanence.

The district court’s opinion in Log Cabin Republicans comes after recent administration actions to examine DADT and the recent battle over legislative repeal of DADT in Congress. In February both Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before Congress that they supported repeal of the policy, even while several high-profile flag officers have openly opposed repeal. In March, Secretary Gates relaxed enforcement of DADT and directed a Comprehensive Review Working Group to examine DADT and issue a report on December 1, 2010, on its findings. In May, the House, on a 234-194 vote, amended the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act to include a provisional repeal of the policy, contingent on the Pentagon’s December 1 report on the issue and certification by the nation’s military leadership that the policy would not damage military effectiveness or unit cohesion. In September, the Senate, on a 43-56 vote, rejected their version of the Authorization Act, which included identical language repealing DADT. The status of a repeal in Congress is uncertain, pending the future makeup of both chambers after the midterm elections.

Although President Obama has opposed DADT since the beginnings of his campaign for president, his administration prefers a political solution to the problem rather than a judicial solution - as a matter of process it wants the policy repealed by Congress. A political decision keeps the judiciary out of military policy-making, a precedent that President Obama is eager to avoid, and adheres more closely to the wishes of an electorate where a majority supports repeal. It also insulates opponents of DADT from scurrilous, but inevitable, charges of acquiescence of liberal judicial activism hijacking our democracy. The White House, perhaps, is drawing a lesson from Roe v. Wade, which many supporters think was prematurely decided and led to a political backlash against abortion rights.

The White House is in a tricky political position. Its opposition to DADT in public while supporting it in court has led to some awkward positioning, as well as sapping political support for President Obama in the progressive and gay communities, who already see him not doing enough on the issue of gay marriage. The White House’s position is also potentially hazardous, as waiting on a legislative solution presupposes that the next Congress will support repeal, or for that matter, ever do anything to provide the president with a “win.”

The country may not see a final end to Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell soon, but it should. The policy is unjust, wastes scarce national resources, and hurts our national security. The White House should not make the perfect the enemy of the good, and should accept a judicial end to Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell as good enough.

We all should heed the words of Barry Goldwater, who said: “You don't have to be straight to be in the military; you just have to be able to shoot straight.”

Why Negotiating with the Taliban Won't Work

2010-09-30T13:07:00.003-04:00

Recently announced plans by the Afghan government for reconciliation and reintegration with the Taliban have been described to me by Afghan colleagues as both the best and the last idea that remains for how to bring the bring the nine year war to a close. The international security forces (ISAF) and the Taliban have been locked in a pseudo stalemate since the insurgent revival in 2007. While ISAF forces are more than capable of forcibly driving the Taliban from almost any area of Afghanistan, such offenses have roughly the same effect as squeezing a balloon. The more pressure you apply in one area the greater their presence will expand in another. As international support for the war has waned, the Karzai government has come under immense pressure to negotiate with the nebulous Taliban leadership in order to provide its coalition allies with an honorable exit strategy. While such a plan might seem feasible from the perspective of those sitting in Washington and perhaps even Kabul, the realities of how the insurgency is structured outside the capital discredit any hope for a lasting reconciliation.

During the course of interviews I conducted this summer in Kabul with members of the Force Reintegration Cell (F-RIC) at ISAF HQ I was shocked to learn that their plans for Taliban reintegration were based entirely on misconceptions about how the insurgency operates. The strategy, as it was explained to me, is to reward communities, not fighters, for allowing their "saddened brothers" to come down from the mountains and rejoin society. There exists two major problems with this line of thinking. First of all, as anyone who has spent serious time in places like Kandahar and Helmand can tell you, the Taliban do not live in the mountains, the majority of the day to day insurgent fighters live in the very villages that they are intimidating. Furthermore, if only communities that contain former insurgents are being rewarded with development money, we are suddenly going to find ourselves with many more fighters than we ever thought existed. Villages that were never known to have a Taliban presence before will inevitably begin blowing up their own roads in order to prove that they are deserving of reintegration money.

Apart from the difficulties surrounding how to actually identify low level insurgents, the question remains as to with whom the Karzai government actually intends to negotiate. When they ruled over most of Afghanistan in the 90's the Taliban possessed a hierarchical structure centering around Mullah Mohammed Omar. However, since their fall from power in 2001 and their eventual escape to Pakistan, the Taliban has since become an ambiguous grouping of smaller factions centering around key Mujahideen personalities such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani. Rumors abound of the senior Taliban leadership having reconstituted itself in Quetta, however, scholars such as Hassan Abbas challenge the veracity of these claims and question what if any influence the Quetta Shura would even have over the rest of the Taliban factions should it actually exist.

Massive Attack on Iranian Nuclear Facilities

2010-09-27T21:55:00.000-04:00

Yes it's true, yet strangely you don't see that headline splashed across CNN. The reason is that this wasn't a conventional attack on Iran, it was a cyber attack. As David Sanger reported in the New York Times,

The Iranian government agency that runs the country’s nuclear facilities, including those the West suspects are part of a weapons program, has reported that its engineers are trying to protect their facilities from a sophisticated computer worm that has infected industrial plants across Iran.

In short, a computer worm has infiltrated the systems that run Iran's nuclear facilities, causing an unspecified amount of damage. As the story reports, experts (and I am certainly not one) believe the level of sophistication of the attack could only be achieved by a state. Without further information about the extent of the damage or nature of the worm, which given the nature of attack is unlikely to be made public, it's impossible to say for sure who released the worm or why, but early speculation points at two prime suspects - Israel and the United States.

Attacking the technological base of the Iranian nuclear program is not a solution to the problem, but it will most likely slow the program. While that may seem minor, if you believe Jeffrey Goldberg's recent article in The Atlantic then perhaps a bit of time may be tremendously important.

Even more important, however, will be the repercussions from this attack. If Iran believes that the U.S. or Israel was behind the attack, it may seek to retaliate, in cyberspace or with a conventional attack. Furthermore, if other nations, particularly China and Russia, come to believe that America was behind this attack, it could mark the start of a new era of cyberwar. Until now countries have tested defenses and capabilities, much like boxers circling the ring and throwing exploratory jabs. Launching a prominent attack on Iran's nuclear systems could come to be viewed as the first real punch thrown in this match, and could signal to other powers that the fight is on.

Once that barrier is crossed, and cyberwar crosses from potential to actual, there is no going back.

Afghan Post-Election Analysis

2010-09-23T21:16:00.000-04:00

By: Beka Feathers

Last Saturday, Afghans across the country went to the polls to choose the men and women who will represent them for the next five years in the Wolesi Jirga, the lower house of the Afghan National Assembly (unless they were in the 20 percent of the country where the security situation kept polling places from opening, and the further undisclosed portion where people were simply too frightened to show up). Preliminary results will be announced later today, and a few days from now, domestic and international election monitors will offer their opinions on whether the vote was "free and fair." Nobody seems to want to ask whether the election was a success.

What does success mean? As with nearly everything else in Afghanistan, it depends on where you stand. For the individual candidates, of course, it means a seat in the new parliament. For Hamid Karzai, it means a body of people without the will or organization to provide any serious opposition to his policies. For ISAF and the international community, it largely means the ability to claim that despite fraud and violence, the Afghan people are still committed to democracy. And for the Afghan people themselves?

Every post-election report suggests that success isn't even on the radar screens of most Afghans. Their confidence in the ability of any national institution to provide responsible governance or to sustain the rule of law has fallen so low that for many, it just wasn’t worth the risk of showing up. Even an optimistic estimate says that turnout was down 43 percent from the 2005 parliamentary elections. Polling places were sparsely attended even in relatively secure areas (unless you count the people who locked themselves inside the stations so that they could vote over and over again).

It isn't just the security situation behind this electoral malaise. It's true that over a thousand polling stations never opened, and that the Taliban made good on threats to attack voting centers and election monitors. It's also true that many warlord candidates were running their own intimidation campaigns to prevent their opponents' supporters from getting to the polls.[1] But the most serious enemy Afghan democracy faced last Saturday was doubt.

The Afghan people doubt that elections bring change. They doubt that those elected are interested in anything other than lining their own pockets. They doubt that any of their supposed allies in the international community still believe democracy can flourish in Afghanistan, no matter what their upbeat press conferences say. That's the real reason they aren't going to the polls.

On some of these points, there's not a lot that well-intentioned international observers can do from Washington, London, Kabul or anywhere else. The parliament might not improve conditions for the average Afghan, newly-elected members might do nothing but line their pockets, violence and instability will almost certainly continue to be a feature of daily life. The only aspect of this process over which internationals have complete control is whether or not we telegraph to the Afghan people and the world that we think the new parliament is a failure before it even gets off the ground. On this point, the most important lesson we can learn is to start talking out of only one side of our mouths.

It's hard to find a uniformly positive perspective anywhere these days about the central government in Kabul, and the Afghan people know that. They aren't looking for the international community to paint a false and rosy picture of a functioning democratic bureaucracy when they know that they've got a collection of corrupt and indifferent strongmen. They don't have time to waste on American domestic PR struggles. If they look to the outside at all, it's for solutions, and support for solutions, to these problems.

International advocates for Afghan democracy can do a lot to hold their own contractors and governments accountable for corruption. They can support the fledgling efforts of the parliament to assert itself against Karzai's increasingly broad claims of authority. They can treat individual members of parliament as men and women with a responsibility to uphold the will of their constituents, rather than as placeholders to be trotted out on official occasions. And most importantly, international actors can start matching words to actions - either the election was a success for big-picture democracy, or it means we should wash our hands of the whole project. ISAF forces, American taxpayers, and certainly the Afghan people can't afford to have it both ways for any longer.

The current political conversation in Afghanistan is about the ideals that underpin the system, not about the policies of individual factions. The value of democracy is itself an issue up for debate, and that campaign did not end on September 18. If reform-minded Afghans and their international partners want average Afghans to trade in their doubt, they need to do what losing parties do in a mature democracy. Instead of bemoaning the injustice of their loss, they need to start planning for the next one.

[1] For more information on pre-election tactics by candidates, see this excellent summary by the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit “Afghan Election, 2010: Alternative Narratives.” http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=33

A Millennial Take on Foreign Policy

2010-09-20T21:13:00.000-04:00

Well summer has finally ended, and I have no choice but to accept the unfortunate reality that school is beginning yet again. On the plus side, now that I've returned to academia and a somewhat-normal routine, I'm set to resume blogging regularly (or at least less-irregularly). To kick things off, here is a response to Dan Drezner's post about how millennials understand foreign policy. Jeremy wrote a terrific response last week, and so I'm going to expand upon some of his themes and explore a few new ones.

I see two major points in this discussion:

1) We are not isolationist, instead we are globalized to an unprecedented degree.
2) We are cynical of how the world works, but that is not always a bad thing.

The most important point, contra-Drezner, is that our generation is not going to be "anti-interventionist to the point of isolationism." Instead, as Jeremy noted, this generation is truly the first "globalized generation." In terms of foreign policy, this means that we understand the inherent interconnectedness of today's world. Every individual across the globe could potentially impact our lives here, as the 9/11 hijackers proved, and as we increasingly rely on the internet for all aspects of our daily lives our vulnerability too grows. This is the bitter fruit of economic globalization and the revolutions in communications, travel, and technology that have changed the fundamentals of our existence.

Furthermore, we millennials understand that there is no going back. We cannot retreat to "Fortress America" and choose isolation; for seclusion is no longer an option. There are two reasons for this - structural and personal. Structurally, I find it hard to believe that the world will stop "shrinking" anytime soon. Communications technologies are constantly growing more powerful, and as the global economy continues to integrate it pulls the world inextricably together. We no longer manufacture everything in America that we need to survive, and the oceans of the world no longer serve as protective barriers against foreign intrusion. America is part of this global system, and millennials understand that taking our ball and going home simply no longer applies.

On the personal level, globalization, however you choose to define it, has taken root amongst our peers. Many millennials have traveled, studied, lived, and worked overseas, and not solely in Old Europe. We are fortunate to have these opportunities, made possible by the decrease in time, barriers, and, most importantly, cost of international adventure. The factors that enabled us to travel more than any previous generation are not going away, nor are the connections we made to people, places, and cultures. In other words, we millennials have a greater understanding of the globe than our predecessors, and a vested interest in places that is impossible to otherwise replicate.

The second major point concerns our relationship with governments, our own and foreign, and the international system. We are, to put it mildly, cynical. The distortions and lies of the Bush Administration regarding Iraq headline the list of grievances, but struggling through the Great Recession while watching Congress dither is only slightly less influential. Thanks to the miracle of the internet we have witnessed the prevarications of other governments and the ways in which they manipulate their own people.

This cynicism is not necessarily a bad thing. Our eyes are open to the ways of the world, and we are prepared to analyze the events of the future, not simply accept what we are given. And this doesn't mean that idealistic optimism is dead - we millennials have our fair share of dreamers, planners, and changers. But we do recognize the difficulties of achieving real, substantive, enduring changes, and come prepared.

Drezner's post is laced with pessimism for the future, and Jeremy is fueled by anger and frustration from our experiences. I don't share these views, but, like Jeremy, I am cautiously optimistic about the chances for our future. The interconnected world presents evolving threats, and it will require intellectual rigor, pragmatic flexibility, and a clear vision to meet these new challenges. I have faith that we millennials are prepared for what comes next.

Following the Money in U.S.-Saudi Arms Deals

2010-09-16T11:29:00.006-04:00

A few days ago the U.S. and Saudi governments announced a record breaking $60 Billion dollars in future arms sales. This comes as a great relief to the Obama administration who was faced with the prospect of massive layoffs in the defense sector as the Defense Department begins to roll back its budget. While these cuts will come slowly over the next few years,the more important issue for the defense industry is the lack of big ticket defense procurements in the pipeline. Defense budgeting usually looks five to ten years into the future and from what I have seen of these budgets there is simply not enough money coming their way to maintain the American defense sector at its current size. This is however nothing new. The American defense industry has essentially existed as a welfare system since the end of the Cold War. If you were to ask Ash Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, he would tell you (privately of course) that the DoD is personally paying the operating costs of several U.S. weapons factories that are not producing so much as a single bullet. In fact only one weapons plant has actually shuttered its doors since 1991.

So why is Saudi Arabia suddenly buying $60 Billion in weapons just when the U.S defense industry is showing signs of struggling? A sale perhaps? The answer is in fact two fold and has as much to do with the Kingdom's unique relationship with the United States as its does with its own internal politics.

Officially, Saudi Arabia spends around 13% of its annual GDP on defense, despite having not fought a real war since the 1930's. (Yes there was some bombing of rebels in Yemen last year but I would hardly call that a war.) Furthermore, as was demonstrated during the 1991 Gulf War, Saudi Arabia sits firmly under the protection of the U.S military's security bubble and has no real need for a high tech military and yet they are one of the top buyers of American made F-15's and Sidewinder missiles as well as the second largest purchaser of Bradley fighting vehicles in the world. While the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is long and complicated it essentially goes like this. The U.S. built up Saudi Arabia's oil industry in the 1930's and remains its biggest customer. In exchange for Saudi Arabia keeping the supply of oil steady the U.S. government agrees to provide the Kingdom's rulers, the Al-Saud family, with complete protection from both internal and external threats. The one caveat on this relationship has always been that whenever the U.S. defense industry is suffering and a key election is approaching the Al-Saud's pitch in to buy just enough weapons to ensure that workers in key electoral areas like Washington and California are not laid off. The Clinton administration did the same thing in 1993 when Saudi Arabia agreed to buy 72 F-15's for $9 billion dollars just in time for the mid term elections.

The second reason for Saudi Arabia's willingness to buy $60 Billion in weapons it doesn't need has to do with corruption within the House of Saud. While it is certainly true that the Al-Saud family is by far the richest clan on the face of the earth, over the past decade money has gotten a little tight. Decades of largess has allowed the Al-Saud family to expand to over 20,000 members with the typical male having anywhere between 10 and 40 children each. This means that allowances have dropped down to the range of $10,000 to $15,000 a month for the average prince. While this is certainly huge by normal standards it is not enough maintain a leer jet and the general lifestyle that many Saudi royals feel is their birthright. As a result, many in the Al-Saud family have had to resort to more nefarious ways of making money. Typically this activity comes in the form of "commissions" that they receive from foreign companies in exchange for the Saudi government granting them business contracts.

How large are these commissions and how large will the commission be for this most recent deal? Lets take the Kingdom's 1993 purchase of 61 commercial aircraft from Boeing for $7 billion as a case study. Boeing was in fierce competition with France's Airbus to win this contract. In an effort to win, Boeing was advised to secure the services of Khalid bin Mahfouz, a man known as the Saudi banker to the King. His consulting contract stated that he would be entitled to a whopping 5% of the price at delivery of all the aircraft. Court documents would later show that his commission was actually more in the range of 10-12%.

Behind the scene the fix was already in well before Boeing secured the services of Mr. Mahfouz. In February of 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher had been sent by President Clinton to pressure King Fahd (now deceased) to make the deal exclusively with Boeing. So why hire Mr. Mahfouz at all? While the Al-Saud family technically owns all the oil under Saudi Arabia, members of the family cannot simply withdraw funds from the Arabian Oil Company's accounts. ARAMCO is supervised and audited by huge international corporations and such thievery would not go unnoticed. Instead members of the Saudi royal family must either overpay or overbuy from foreign companies in order for those companies to return a percentage of that money (usually around 10-12%) back to the Saudi royals personal accounts. So while Mr. Mahfouz pocketed a cool $700 million from his consulting job with Boeing a significant portion of that money would have had to be dispersed amongst the Saudi royals starting most likely with Crown Prince Sultan, brother to the King and head of the the Saudi Defense Ministry.

So how much money should we expect the Saudi Royal Family to pocket off this new $60 billion dollar arms purchase? If we conservatively estimate that there is about 10% graft on every deal then the Al-Saud should walk away with around $6 Billion. Will some of this money end up being given to organizations that support terrorism? History says yes, but since the Kingdom has staunchly refused to cooperate in the Treasury Department's terrorist financing investigations we will likely never know for sure. If you are interested in a more in depth explanation of how things work inside the kingdom I would highly suggest reading Sleeping with the Devil by Robert Baer from which most of the facts in this article were taken.

What the Future Holds for the Millennial Generation

2010-08-31T19:11:00.005-04:00

It has recently been brought to my attention that as someone in their mid-twenties I am a member of what has been referred to as the millennial generation. We are a group of people who were raised in years of economic prosperity and tech bubbles, only to have our world views rocked by the tragic events of 9/11. We spent our college years being lied to about why the nation needed to go to war in Iraq, and we sat in shock as over 4,000 men and women our own age lost their lives in two wars. Finally, once we reached maturity and entered the workforce, we experienced first-hand the result of a previous generation overcome with greed, a generation that had had complete and undying faith in the infallible nature of the capitalist marketplace.

Some pundits have suggested that the millennial generation is set to become one of the most isolationist and financially cautious generations that America has ever produced. However, upon hearing this I suddenly remember that the people making such claims are in fact members of the very generation whose sheer ineptitude resulted in the very conditions that were supposed to have gotten me so depressed and jaded in the first place. To those who have already preemptively given up on us millennials I say to you why don't you forget about retiring and instead start earning again to pay China back for all that money you all so wisely borrowed from them. In the meantime we up-and-comers will attempt to shift through the ashes of our once economically strong and internationally respected country.

I contend that the events on 9/11 have had the exact opposite effects of isolationism. We millennials may just have easily been called the first globalized generation as we saw first hand the effect that 19 Arab hijackers, disgruntled with foreign policies we had never heard of, could have on all of our lives. Since that day the number of students studying Arabic and Middle Eastern culture has sky rocketed across American campuses. I recently met the daughter of a New York City firefighter from Queens who had just returned from studying in Cairo. When I asked her why she chose to study Arabic she told me that after her father saw the towers fall in person he was determined to have his kids understand how such a thing could have happened.

Yes, our generation is going to be much more skeptical of politicians as a result of having been flat out lied to and manipulated by the Bush administration over the Iraq War. But is skepticism when it comes to ones elected officials ever really a bad thing? One thing I will say though is that the only way to truly keep one's government in check is to have a population willing to educate themselves on the issues. I appeal to all of my fellow twenty somethings to abandon all of the pied pipers parading their uneducated opinions across cable tv and recognize what our parents have not, that not everything calling itself news is really news. Would you watch FOX if it was renamed APE (American Propaganda/Entertainment)? I didnt think so. We must all recognize the fact that there is a difference between being informed and being educated. Watching the "news" endlessly all day might give you insight into what is happening in the world, but these shows will rarely tell you WHY they are happening. Those answers can simply only come from reading and independent investigation.

Our generation has the hard task of having to understand a very complicated world in its entirety. The policymakers of tomorrow will need to have the foresight to understand what unrest in places like Kazakhstan is going to do to the global energy markets and in turn how this will effect Saudi Arabia's relationship with its Arab neighbors. Previous generations of leaders felt secure that all they needed to leave college knowing about was the Soviet Union and the policy of deterrence. Maybe some of them even learned Russian in an attempt to be the best. Fast forward to today where members of the millennial generation are fighting to win a war in Afghanistan, a country where five languages are spoken and two (Dari and Pashtu) are vital to successfully completing the mission.

A final thought on whether the millennial generation is more or less likely to engage in military operations abroad in the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The next generation of military leadership that have just begun to take the reigns are the men and women who have spent the last nine years making their bones effectively making strategies like Counterinsurgency work. They see the importance of getting involved in countries like Yemen before they become safe havens for terrorists. Will be be doing nation building along the lines of Afghanistan and Iraq? Certainly not, but that does not mean that we will not seek to have a presence. If anything, it was the previous generation of cold warriors in the military who were so scarred by their experience in Vietnam that kept us from getting involved in places likes Afghanistan before they became a problem.

The road ahead will not be an easy one for the millennial generation, but I am secure in the fact that the series of blunders that we have been witness to over the past decade will serve to make us, the next generation of leaders, more cognoscente of the world in which we live. While we may not be as optimistic about the future as the baby boomers who came before us, I truly believe that it is the realism of the millennial generation that will one day return America to the pinnacle of international esteem.

Civil War Still a Possibility in Iraq

2010-08-25T12:41:00.004-04:00

I have been meaning to write a post recently concerning muttering that I have been hearing from individuals with experience in Iraq about the very real possibility that Iraq may be in store for another civil war. Yesterday's coordinated attacks by insurgents are a chilling sign that it is far too soon to be breathing sighs of relief over the state of Iraq. The bombings that occurred on Tuesday took place over the course of two hours in 13 different cities including Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Basra, Karbala, Mosul and Kut. If these names sound familiar, they should as they have been the sites of some of the most heavy insurgent activity over the last seven years. These attacks represent three main points; 1. that the insurgency is still alive, 2. they still maintain an organizational capability that allows them to coordinate attacks all across Iraq, and 3. the insurgents are still in possession of a great deal of explosives.

While the Iraqi government and U.S. forces both estimate the Iraqi insurgency to number only in the hundreds, these malign actors are not the main focus of concern for people who have been observing Iraq closely these past few years. Politics and ethnic divides are far more likely to split Iraq than the actions of a few well armed fanatics.

The most likely fault line for civil war in Iraq is the oil rich city of Kirkuk. The majority shiite population of Iraq strongly favors having all the countries oil revenues come under the control of the central government, which is of course mostly controlled by Shiites. The Kurds residing in Northern Iraq have for years now claimed Kirkuk as the capital of their state within a state and they are vehemently opposed to the Iraqi government infringing upon their chief revenue stream. The Kurds have for years now been silently (or not so silently if you live there) ethnically cleansing Kirkuk of Sunni and Shiite Arabs alike. The Kurdish paramilitary force, the Peshmerga, while distinctly smaller than the Iraqi military would still be capable of making a stand against the Iraqi state should there be a show down over the sovereignty of Kirkuk and its mineral wealth. Should such a conflict lead to the Kurds declaring an independent state this would only serve to make matters worse as such a declaration would surely force Turkey to get involved militarily seeing as how they have been dealing with their own Kurdish uprising for decades.

Another likely source of trouble in Iraq's near future is the rumored return of the radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr who for the past several years has been in self imposed exile in Iran where he has been studying to become an Ayatollah (I am told he is still very far away from deserving such a title). A recent article in Foreign Policy Magazine entitled the King of Iraq highlights the immense amount of power Sadr is still capable of wielding in Iraq. However, the article is poorly titled as Sadr is much more a king maker than he is a king. Iraqs deposed and yet still sitting Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki owed his election to Sadr's support. He also likely owes his latest electoral defeat to the fact that Sadr turned on him after the Iraqi government started allowing the U.S. military to attack Sadr's Mahdi army.

We must now ask ourselves what happens if Sadr returns to Iraq intent on seeing his candidates placed in the positions of greatest power within the Iraqi government. Iraq's Sunni population is not likely going to take such a grab for power lying down. Memories of Mahdi Army death squads killing Sunni's in hospitals as a result of Sadr controlling the Ministry of the Interior are still fresh in the minds of most Sunnis. But if Sadr does not get his way it is a very real possibility that we will see a resurgence of the Mahdi army, which it is important to point out, was never disbanded or disarmed despite the fleeing of its leader to Iran.

Other theories for what may lay ahead in Iraq's future include: the resurgence of another strong man dictatorial government, increasing power plays by Iran, or god forbid another ethnic conflict between Sunnis and Shiites like the civil war we already saw play out from 2006-2007. I am not trying to spread the message of doom and gloom, as I will be the first to admit that the Iraqi security forces have come along way in the past 3-4 years. All I am saying is that we here in the America should hold off on printing another Mission Accomplished banner anytime soon.

A Brief "I Told You So" Return

2010-08-23T19:41:00.001-04:00

We here at D&D are still enjoying our August recess, but fear not, we shall return soon. In the meantime, the NYT featured a story today from Dexter Filkins about how the ISI used the CIA and American resources to arrest Mullah Baradar for their own, self-serving ends.

“We picked up Baradar and the others because they were trying to make a deal without us,” said a Pakistani security official, who, like numerous people interviewed about the operation, spoke anonymously because of the delicacy of relations between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States. “We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians.”

Well that's discouraging. And who could have ever imagined that was the case?

Plan to Cut the Defense Budget by $150 Billion in 5 Years

2010-08-11T20:49:00.004-04:00

A few days ago Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced that he is would like to see the Defense Department cut $100 billion from the defense budget over the next five years. As someone who has studied the defense budget in depth over the past few years at both the Kennedy school and the Fletcher School I have written the following memo outlining ways in which the DoD can cut $150 billion from the defense budget by 2016.

Returning the defense budget to pre 9/11 levels will force us to prioritize future threats and explicitly define the strategic purpose of each branch of the armed forces. Budgetary constraints will finally shift us away from our current Cold War mix of combat capabilities towards a new 1-3-2-1 force planning construct. Under the new formula, the U.S. military will be responsible for defending the United States (1); maintaining forces capable of deterring aggression in NE Asia, the East Asian littoral, and Middle East (3); actively partner with allies to perform stability operations in two of these regions (2); and maintain a capability to win decisively in one war against a conventional or WMD armed adversary (1).

Analysis of the future threat environment has concluded that unconventional wars are the most likely conflicts facing the U.S for the foreseeable future. In order to properly mitigate this threat, the armed forces must elevate irregular warfare, counterinsurgency and stability operations to the status of “core missions.” While critics will argue that prioritizing unconventional threats will leave us vulnerable to attack by conventional actors, the lack of a near-peer competitor makes this a low-risk opportunity to remodel our force structure to battle more current and likely threats. Institutionalizing counterinsurgency and stability operations will allow the U.S. military to respond to a broader range of threats at a greatly reduced cost. The following suggestions are ways to reduce the defense budget to approximately $400 billion by FY 2016. Suggested cuts translate to $104.7 billion in annual savings and an additional $159.7 billion in long-term savings resulting from a reduction in F-35 procurement over the next ten years.

Reduce End Strength to Near FY 2000 Levels ($63.3B in annual savings)
By reducing the overall end strength of the land forces to FY 2000 levels, we can decrease annual defense spending by an estimated $61.3 billion. The majority of savings can be found by first rolling the Army back to ten divisions each consisting of three combat brigades, a total reduction of 67,620 soldiers. From the remaining force, we should eliminate one armored division and one light infantry division to form two stability and reconstruction divisions each consisting of 10,000 troops. These divisions will allow special operations forces to focus on direct action by taking over training of indigenous security forces and most other COIN/Stability operations. CBO estimates that this restructuring would save the Army $32 billion over the next 16 years ($2 billion annually) due to the smaller number of units that would require modernization and the reduced need for next generation weaponry. One area of growth for the Army should be the 20th CBRNE Support Command, which should be doubled in size to 12,000 soldiers in order to be able to assign an EOD team to every BCT and a CBRN unit to each division. If we are no longer engaged in large scale combat operations, the Marine Corps will also be forced to reduce its numbers from 202,000 back to 172,000. While the Army and Marine Corps will likely object to large scale reductions in their end strengths, our new force planning construct no longer calls for us to fight two simultaneous conventional campaigns and thus maintaining the current number of combat forces is no long necessary

Reduce the Number of Foreign Military Bases by 25% (Cost of $30B, yields $25.5B in annual savings)
Of the 737 U.S. military bases currently operating worldwide (not counting in Iraq and Afghanistan) 427 (58%) are located in Europe. While the majority of our future planning and acquisition programs are oriented around fighting and deterring threats emanating from the Middle East and Asia, the U.S. military’s antiquated basing structure is still largely focused around deterring a Soviet threat that no longer exists. I propose reducing our global footprint by ¼ through the closing of 145 of these bases: 112 in Germany, 6 in Belgium, 2 in Greece and 31 in Italy. While the cost of many of these bases is shared with allies, we can no longer justify a large presence to guard against a non-existent threat. This new round of BRAC will cost approximately $30 billion if begun in 2011, but should yield annual savings of $25.5 billion after 2016.

Reduce Procurement of the F-35 by 50% ($15.9B in annual Savings, $159.7B long-term)
Our lack of a peer competitor and our near term focus on unconventional warfare means that our emphasis on replacing our current generation air systems with next generation systems is unwarranted. Rather than purchasing thousands of new F-35’s, we should reduce procurement of this platform and instead replace air systems that have reached the end of their life cycles with the latest version of the same system. These newer systems are far more capable than the ones they replace and cost approximately half as much as next generation technology. A fifty percent reduction in the procurement of F-35’s will cut $159.7 billion from the total long-term procurement budget and translate to $15.9 billion in annual savings. While the Air Force and Navy will argue that such cuts will reduce the number of missions they are capable of flying, a portion of the F-35’s mission can be allocated to our new long-range bombers and UAVs.

Restructure the Navy to be a More Mobile and Cost Effective Force ($5.3B in savings over 5yrs)
Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy has failed to redefine its strategic purpose. Over the next decade, we must move the Navy away from its focus on maritime warfare towards its primary missions of supporting ground-based operations and protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOC). According to their long-term shipbuilding plan, the Navy plans to acquire 53 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS’s) to perform antiship, anti-submarine and countermine warfare at a cost of $33.1 billion. I believe that combining the Navy and Coast Guard’s Small Combatant Programs will provide the Navy with a capability that is superior for executing the peacetime elements of its maritime strategy, but also offers the speed and offensive capabilities necessary to guard against threats to the SLOC. Reducing the number of LCS’s purchased will allow the Navy to acquire the naval version of the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter (NSC). The CBO estimates that swapping out 25 LCS’s for 20 NSC’s will save the Navy an estimated $5.3 billion.

Milestone for Female Naval Officers

2010-08-01T13:16:00.005-04:00

On Thursday, Rear Admiral Nora Tyson took command of Carrier Strike Group Two aboard the USS George H. W. Bush. Tyson made history, becoming the first woman to command an aircraft carrier in the US Navy. When Tyson received her first commission in 1979, women for the first time became a Surface Warfare Officer and a carrier-certified Naval aviator. Women were not given permanent assignments on board combat ships until 1994.

Congratulations to Rear Adm. Tyson!

Taliban Missiles likely of Pakistani Origin

2010-07-27T16:03:00.006-04:00

One of the major revelations to come out of the 92,000 previously classified documents recently released by wikileaks is that apparently the Taliban have on several occasions fired at U.S aircraft using surface to air missiles better known as MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defense Systems). The media has seized upon this story as yet another government blunder since after all wasn't it the U.S. government who originally supplied the Mujahideen with stinger missiles back in the 80's when they were fighting the Soviets? However, a closer examination of the specs on these stingers leads one to a far different and perhaps more dangerous conclusion; that Pakistan has begun to supply the Taliban with their own surface to air missiles to use against U.S. forces.

I had often heard that there were several hundred stingers unaccounted for after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and when I was there this summer I asked the crews of helicopters I was flying on why it was that we no longer considered these weapons a threat. According to weapons experts, the batteries on stinger missiles are good for one shot each and they must be changed out if the delivery system is to be used more than once. Furthermore, the average shelf life of unused batteries is only 4-5 years. Meaning that any stinger missiles given to the Mujahideen in the 80's would no longer be effective today. While it is not beyond the realm of contemplation that a skilled technician could jerry rig some sort of alternative battery for these devices, such skill is likely out of the range of the vast majority of Taliban. These weapons are however still capable of exploding, only the delivery device is deactivated. As such a great deal of the remaining stingers left over from the 80's have probably since been turned into IEDs.

The fact remains however that the Taliban are getting fully functioning MANPADS from somewhere, which in all likelihood have been constructed in the last 4-5 years. The most likely candidate is Pakistan which is both the traditional patron of the Taliban and has for the last twenty years been a manufacturer of their very own surface to air missile known as the Anza. The Anza has an effective range of up to 5000 meters and could certainly have been behind the downing of several US helicopters in recent years. In recent years, Pakistan has advertised the Anza series for export,displaying it at the International Defense Exhibition (IDEX) 2007 event in the UAE.

Worst case scenario: The Pakistani ISI is directly providing the Taliban with surface to air missiles

Best Case: Pakistan is irresponsibly selling MANPADS on the open market and they are ending up in the hands of the Taliban through a middleman

How Much Influence Does the U.S. Have in Afghanistan?

2010-07-25T19:07:00.000-04:00

The always-superb Rajiv Chandrasekaran has a story in the Washington Post about progress in Afghanistan, comparing the lack of it in Marja (a "bleeding ulcer," as General McChrystal famously said) with the relative tranquility and prosperity of Nawa. Both hamlets are similar demographically and geographically, but while Marja continues to hemorrhage Nawa is creeping forward.

Both were stricken by the Taliban insurgency four years ago. And over the past year, both have been treated with America's new counterinsurgency formula: Each community has been flooded with U.S. Marines and Afghan security forces, at troop levels that meet or exceed what counterinsurgency theorists prescribe. Each has received a surge of cash and civilian experts in an effort to provide public services, rebuild infrastructure and dole out basic economic assistance. Each has been described as a priority by the central government in Kabul. So why did all this work in one but not the other?

Photo by Lance Cpl. Tommy Bellegarde

Chandrasekaran is unable to reach a firm conclusion, and most of the insiders he interviewed seemed similarly befuddled. But they all seem focused on learning the lessons from each case, and applying them elsewhere. The overriding question Chandrasekaran asks concerns the future utilization of the COIN model - which town is the outlier, and which is the repeatable success?

Unfortunately, this is the wrong question. It rests on the assumption that the U.S. did something right in Nawa but something wrong in Marja, and the only thing to do is discover that error. At a deeper level, the assumption is that all events are conclusively influenced by U.S. policy - we can do it right or do it wrong, but ultimately we are the ones determining the outcome. I find this idea troubling. Accepting that the U.S. military is the decisive factor in the near-term future in Afghanistan means neglecting local relations and politics, national governance (or the lack thereof), and a host of other factors, not the least of which is the most fundamental of all military strategy - the enemy gets a vote.

Chandrasekaran almost hits on this point, but quickly loses the thread:

But the residents also emphasized that the Taliban fighters left of their own accord. "They chose to flee from here," said one shopkeeper. "They drove away as soon as the Marines arrived."

In other words, perhaps the success in Nawa was not the result of superior American tactics, but rather of a Taliban miscalculation. Their failure in Nawa may have been part of the reason the Taliban refused to flee Marja; an attempt to avoid repeating the mistake.

So what does this mean for U.S. operations in Afghanistan? It's a reminder that actors and events that are not part of the plan influence the outcome, sometimes decisively. As the Bush Administration learned in the aftermath of the fall of Baghdad, unplanned events occur and must be dealt with, even if that means discarding the original blueprint. COIN doctrine cannot be implemented according to any book, and the notion that there is a "right" way to do COIN which guarantees success is a fallacy. Perhaps General Petraeus has taken a similar lesson from recent events. He has reportedly decided to scrap the invasion Kandahar, calling the current plan "not an appropriate model." Kudos to P4 for making the right call, and hopefully this is only the first of many.

How (And Why) Countries React to Terrorism

2010-07-21T22:00:00.000-04:00

The July 11 attacks by the Somali Islamist group Al-Shabaab killed more than 70 people watching the finals of the World Cup in Kampala, Uganda's lakeside capital city. The tragic bombings, and the response, have brought up an interesting issue in the field of international security - why countries react in different ways to terrorist attacks.

On one end of the spectrum is Spain's reaction to the March 11, 2004 attacks by "homegrown" Al-Qaeda members on the Madrid subway (Ed. note - why do so many terrorist attacks happen on the 11th day of the month?). The attacks occurred shortly before the 2004 parliamentary elections, and led to Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero's party, known by its Spanish acronym PSOE, taking power from the Conservative Jose Maria Aznar. In the aftermath of the election, tinged by Aznar's contention that the bombings were caused by the Basque separatist group ETA, Zapatero's government withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq.

On the other end of the spectrum is the U.S. reaction to the September 11 attacks in 2001, with a death toll of over 3,000. Within a month, after the Taliban refused to turn over Osama Bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda members, U.S. and allied forces had entered the country. On October 7, 2001, airstrikes began in Kabul. U.S. troops are still in Afghanistan today, 105 months after the initial invasion. 9/11, far from deterring future action, led directly to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.

In reacting to the 7/11 attacks, Uganda's government has remained uncowed, despite being singled out for attack by Al-Shabaab because of the presence of Ugandan peacekeepers in Somalia. President Yoweri Museveni was defiant, stating that "we shall go for them wherever they are coming from. We will look for them and get them as we always do." Although this rhetoric is not likely to be backed by immediate military action, Museveni's words are no retreat. In fact, he has already hinted at changing the mandate of the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia to one of "peace enforcement." Such a shift in the rules of engagement would allow for a more proactive military effort against Al-Shabaab.

Leaving aside the (important) question of why Al-Shabaab would attack Uganda or what their broader agenda may be, why did Uganda react in this way, and why do countries react so differently when responding to terrorism?
First, the reaction of any given country will be a function of its relative power. The U.S. can respond in many ways to an attack, something that certainly Uganda, and to a lesser extent Spain, are constrained from doing. Uganda can certainly respond to Al-Shabaab, but nowhere near the U.S. response to 9/11.

Second, a country's reaction to terrorism appears to be a function of its tolerance for war. Put another way, a country is more likely to respond with force if its populace accepts, or is inured against, loss of life. Spain's pacifist-tending foreign policy leanings exist in marked contrast to the American public's gradual acceptance of the loss of life of troop deployments in troubled regions around the globe.

Third, the perception of the rationality and motives of a terrorist organization are key determinants of a nation's reaction to an attack. If a terrorist organization is seen to have legitimate grievances, an attack will more likely be met with negotiation or retreat. But if a terrorist organization is seen as "fanatical," "millenarian," or just plain crazy, an attack will be more likely to be matched with a forceful military response. This is because so-called rational terrorist organizations are seen as potential negotiating partners who happen to reside at the sub-state level, whereas irrational terrorists cannot be handled with anything but force. In Spain, the initial response was introspection about Spanish (and NATO) policy, which found reception in a Spanish population already skeptical of U.S. policy in Iraq. In the U.S. the early response to 9/11 focused on America as the victim, with little to no introspection. This introspection is key to understanding the different responses, as a lack of introspection by the U.S. signaled an unwillingness to examine potential policies that could have provoked such an attack, leaving the terrorists as simply evil.

Fourth, the political environment in a country can often dictate the response, although this can also be a function of other factors (i.e. a military response was politically popular in the U.S. because of acceptance of the use of military force). If an elected official can gain politically from the use of force, or the converse, then that incentive can determine how a government will respond to an attack. In the U.S. it was enormously popular to use military force after 9/11, whereas in Spain the politically safe decision was to remove troops.

In Uganda, a combination of these factors seems to have been at work. Uganda's majority Christian population has not seen much rationality in Al-Shabaab's attacks, dictating a forceful response from a conflict-inured society, but such a response has been bounded by Uganda's limited state resources and its limited military strength. Politically, President Museveni, elected by margins of over his long political career, appears to have little to fear in responding to Al-Shabaab.

I don't pretend that this post is a comprehensive account of all factors (I'm not a Uganda nor a terrorism expert), but the social scientist in me can't resist applying this type of analytic framework to the recent attacks. Please feel free to critique, edit, and/or disabuse me of my misconceptions in the comments.

Meanwhile, in Iran

2010-07-19T19:46:00.001-04:00

While we've been distracted by the ever-changing world around us and lost interest in Iran after sanctions were passed by Congress, life has rolled on in Tehran. But it has not rolled smoothly. Yesterday marked a crucial turning point in domestic relations, as merchants in the capital ended a 12-day strike.

Now why is this important? No, it's not the result of U.S. sanctions and is certainly no reason to declare a victory. And no, these strikes really are not similar to the mass protests and strikes of 1979 that brought down the Shah - the government is in no immediate danger of collapsing. But this strike is crucially important as an indicator that economic conditions in Iran continue to deteriorate and that the general populace has thus far been unswayed by the "Blame America" rhetoric from the regime.

Under the mismanagement of President Ahmadinejad, the Iranian economy has cratered. He spun profits from record-high oil prices into vast subsidy programs to bulwark domestic support, but when oil prices dropped those programs became massive government expenditures with no revenue backing. Not only did he miss an opportunity to expand and diversify Iran's economy, Ahmadinejad's fiscal cluelessness has now burdened the state with more debt than it can handle. The solution: higher taxes, which led directly to the recent strike.

Again, the regime is not in imminent danger. But these strikes illustrate the cost of financial imprudence, and without an economic turnaround even blatant vote-stealing won't keep the current government afloat.

Foreign Policy Drops Off Mid-Term Map

2010-07-18T22:52:00.008-04:00

The 2010 mid-term election is developing into a referendum on the economy, with foreign policy playing little to no role. A recent Gallup poll asks Americans what they think is "the most important problem facing this country today" and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan tie with 3%. No foreign policy issue garners more than 7% (immigration) and the aggregate of the all the foreign policy-related issues is 17%. Americans are most daunted by the economy; 53% mention either the economy or unemployment/jobs as the most important problem.

This is occurring in an atmosphere where the public sees the President as competent in foreign affairs, but increasingly inept at handling the national economy. In a recent TIME poll, Obama retains a 52% approval rate on foreign policy (41% disapprove) and a 47/44 approval/disapproval rate on Afghanistan, but has only a 44% approval rate on the economy (53% disapprove). The President has been seen as more competent on foreign policy than on the economy since March 2009.

Finally, a majority of Americans both approve of the President's timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan and approve of his decision to both remove General McChrystal and appoint General Petraeus, the latter by incredible margins.

There are two important implications of this polling data. First, foreign policy will be a non-issue for most of the 2010 campaign. With voters' attention disproportionately fixed on the economy, campaigns will be about jobs, jobs, and jobs. Of course the occasional congressional race will hinge on a foreign policy issue. Districts with large military bases or ethnic populations with specific foreign policy interests feature intense foreign policy debates, but they are not the norm across the country. However, even when foreign policy and national security are emphasized, it will likely occur in the context of, you guessed it, jobs.

Second, congressional support for President Obama's foreign policy won't flag, even with a Republican takeover of (one or both houses of) Congress. On the major foreign policy issues facing the United States, namely Iraq and Afghanistan, President Obama is supported heavily by the Republican minority. In fact, in the recent debate over supplemental funding for the war in Afghanistan, the main opposition was from liberal Democrats.

Democrats running for Congress this fall will be in a race against the economy, hoping it improves enough by October to argue that things are getting better. If the unemployment rate starts creeping down over the end of the summer, and September and October see big job gains, then Democrats can feel (somewhat) secure in the fact that they will only lose a few seats. If however, unemployment stays around 9.5%, or increases, watch for Democrats to suffer major losses in November.

Of course, all of this analysis exists in a place that assumes the absence of an "October surprise" - an event that would shock the electorate in a way so as to call into question their core electoral assumptions. I've stated previously that I thought the August 31st U.S. military draw-down in Iraq would have a similar effect, causing the electorate to focus on Iraq and the Middle East. I still think that will happen, but not anywhere near the amount required to make the mid-terms anything but a referendum on the economy. Even at the height of the CNN-led frenzy over the Gulf Coast oil spill, only 18% of voters listed the spill as the most important issue facing the U.S.

Gallup's "Bottom Line" sums up the issue nicely:

Although the precise percentage of Americans mentioning economic concerns varies from month to month, these issues have dominated the public's consciousness for well over two years. This fact should serve as a sharp reminder to politicians and challengers involved in House and Senate races this fall; failure to address economic issues will be at the candidate's own peril.

Breaking News: Synchronized Bombing in Uganda

2010-07-11T22:57:00.004-04:00

Breaking News:

Three synchronized bombs exploded in Kampala today during the World Cup final, killing at least fifty (some reports range to over 60). While many will turn their eyes to the LRA and Kony, there is another, game-changing possibility.

D&D Snap Analysis:

Synchronized explosions in crowded soft targets are not typical for the LRA, they are more typical to traditional AQ actions. This possibility is further magnified by comments made tonight by Sheik Yousuf Sheik Issa (al Shabaab Commander) in Mogadishu to an AP reporter:

"Uganda is one of our enemies...whatever makes them cry makes us happy. May Allah's anger be upon those who are against us."

If this is an Al Shabaab operation, it will mark their first outside of Somalia, and a clear shifting in both their capabilities and aims within the region. It may also signal that they are seeking some form of horizontal escalation of their conflict inside of Somalia.

More on this soon, as more details emerge.

MONUSCO: What’s in a Name?

2010-07-11T21:34:00.000-04:00

Louisa Seferis
Demagogues and Dictators Central African Analyst

On the 28th of May, the UN Security Council reached an acceptable compromise with the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo for the future of its UN mission in the DRC. Kabila’s government, which had requested a complete withdrawal of UN troops for the 50th anniversary of DRC independence on June 30th, signed off on the following changes:

The resolution authorized the withdrawal of up to 2,000 UN military personnel by 30 June this year from areas where security has improved enough to allow their removal.

[This, Alan Doss reported in May 2010, will mainly be from Western provinces to avoid troop withdrawal in the “volatile East.”]

The Council decided that MONUSCO shall comprise, in addition to the appropriate civilian, judiciary and correction components, a maximum of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units.(Source: UN Security Council)

MONUSCO, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly MONUC), now has a mandate until June 30, 2011. The new mandate prioritizes stability, as the name suggests, through the promotion of military and non-military solutions as well as the protection of civilians. Kabila would have liked to see MONUC depart this 30th of June, however, in time for his impressive display of development during the 50 years of Congolese independence. The main boulevard became a six lane highway, street lights were switched on with ceremonial fanfare, and the King of Belgium only waited for three hours for the parade to begin. But as one of my Congolese colleagues said to me, “We wait to see if the progress continues to be a reality. This is already better than Mobutu, but you can’t feed yourself on empty promises.”

Image: monuc.unmissions.org

The big problem with celebrating 50 years of independence and demonstrating development is the presence of severe pockets of violence throughout the DRC.
Each area has its own set of issues, clearly outlined during the Protection Cluster security briefing I attended this week. The MONUSCO representative struggled to incorporate the new acronym and a fresh approach to the mission’s activities, but other attendees later told me that operations continue “business as usual.” To his credit, the MONUSCO representative painted a stark and realistic picture of the challenges faced by the mission – the lack of major attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) recently, for example, which Operation Rudia 2 is currently combating in the province of Haut Uélé, means that the U.S. has not made any political decisions that could support the mission’s activities. This international inertia stalled MONUC’s plans of collaborating with the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) against the LRA in early June. Still, MONUSCO should be commended for pushing to move battalions from main hubs to more volatile and remote areas such as Ango and Dingila (both in Haut Uélé) in an effort to improve civilian protection in ways that MONUC did not.

This post is too brief to follow MONUC down the rabbit hole of its tainted past, but suffice it to say that the mission has never been without some scandal or another. The latest is Alan Doss’s fall from grace – charges of nepotism and the uncanny ability to make nearly every international actor hate him. The hope is that Roger Meece, the former U.S. Ambassador to the DRC 2004-7, can transform MONUSCO leadership in a more dynamic manner than Doss could. We cannot blame the mission for wanting to re-brand itself and refocus its objectives on its previous weaknesses, namely the protection of civilians.

While the motives may be positive, they may also be insufficient to achieve these desired objectives in a volatile environment like the DRC. Has anything really changed? At first glance, only the sign posts and gates that now read MONUSCO. (Or in the case of the Bukavu airport, MONUS – they’re still working on the CO.) Those who truly believe that the change in name and mandate will make a difference don’t seem to be present on the ground. The daunting tasks faced by each battalion are different and complex, clouding a greater vision of how the pieces fit together in this difficult environment. MONUSCO hopes to measure the positive results of its new approach in the next six months, but its overall progress in the face of fragmented threats (LRA, FDLR, FRF, PNC, internal issues with the FARDC, etc.) remains to be seen.

Unfortunately, for the moment MONUSCO is a new label on an old product. The danger is not the assumption that this “new” organization will be the answer to the DRC’s problems – the real dilemma is that it has always been assumed that a UN peacekeeping mission was the comprehensive solution. The Congolese I’ve met, from Kinshasa to Bukavu, firmly believe in the very difficult but necessary reality that their government should be doing more to improve security and development. They rarely mentioned MONUSCO during discussions about improving the DRC, and ultimately I suppose that’s a good thing.

Louisa Seferis is a Masters candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, focusing on conflict resolution and human security. She has worked in Subsaharan Africa for 4 years specializing in internal displacement, reconciliation, and post-conflict reintegration, including 2 years in Gulu, and is currently working in the DRC

Spies everywhere!!!

2010-07-08T20:03:00.000-04:00

I'm a bit late weighing in on this absurd Russian spy saga, but I still don't quite know what to make of it. Originally, I was surprised that the arrests were made immediately on the heels of an apparently successful meeting between Obama and Medvedev. However, given that Moscow has, surprisingly, not issued a sharp rebuke of the U.S., I can only surmise that they either had advance warning or realize that the proof against these alleged agents is undeniable and it would only make them look worse to attempt a denial.

Interestingly, it seems that a massive prisoner swap is in already set to be completed. Not much information is available about who will be exchanged, but it seems plausible that Washington seized these agents solely to use as trade bait in order to regain U.S. assets in Russian custody. More importantly, the whole affair reminds me of the wise words of the late, great, Warren Zevon: "how was I to know she was with the Russians too?"

And if you think this whole post was just an excuse to include such an epic video, well you might be right...

Reposted: McChrystal's Mistake: Too Much COIN

2010-07-08T18:49:00.001-04:00

A technical error caused the original post and comments to be lost. Apologies.

I'm a bit late to the pundit party, but I have a few thoughts about "The Runaway General" controversy that have been overlooked. General McChrystal crossed a line, and left the President with no choice but to relieve him of his command. This much is sure. It is a huge story, one which will reverberate in the coming months and years across Afghanistan, as my colleague Jeremy as already noticed.

However, we have focused solely on the derogatory comments sprinkled throughout the article, and in doing so have missed the bigger point: COIN is not working in Afghanistan, and General McChrystal was oblivious to its failings. Unfortunately, President Obama and his national security team seem similarly blinded, as the selection of General Petraeus indicates more of the same COIN-predicated strategy.

Ironically, criticizing the COIN orthodoxy has become near-heresy in many circles, a far cry from its wandering in the desert days in pre-surge Iraq. The rapid growth, and indeed dominance, of this theoretical paradigm is not inherently negative, but falling in thrall to the theory and neglecting to think critically and reflect on the situation in Afghanistan and the applicability of COIN theory is a fatal flaw. General McChrystal and his team fell victim to true-believer blindness, and U.S. and NATO troops, and Afghan civilians, will pay the price long into the future.

One of the fundamental prerequisite for COIN is the existence of a viable alternative to insurgency. This entails a functioning state, economic opportunity, and basic governance structures, such as police, utilities management, and the like.
As Vali Nasr has observed, the party that gets the most support is the one that collects the garbage. These standards are not high; transforming Kabul into Geneva is not necessary. But Hamid Karzai's government has failed to meet even these basic standards, and in fact has exacerbated the difficulties with rampant corruption and fraud. Karzai blatantly stole the last election, enriches himself and his kin at the expense of the populace, and does so in full public view. General McChrystal and his team recognized the shortcomings of President Karzai, complaining "he's been locked up in the palace the past year," yet were unable or unwilling to follow this thought to its logical conclusion: Karzai's regime undermines COIN.

In fact, McChrystal's staff were apparently so in thrall to the power of COIN that they spoke of it as a complicated, almost mythical process, one which only they had mastered and were therefore above reproach. Speaking of Ambassador Holbrooke, one of McChrystal's advisers said "He's a brilliant guy, but he just comes in, pulls on a lever, whatever he can grasp. But this is COIN, and you can't just have someone yanking on shit." Ambassador Holbrooke has a reputation as a prickly individual, and it's no surprise to hear him criticized. Yet the nature of this criticism is that Holbooke was messing with COIN, something he clearly did not understand as well as McChrystal's people. COIN in this conception is the only solution, and this reverence for doctrine, the belief that COIN is the The Answer, the only answer, and that they were the only ones able to lead the way, is shocking.

Yet despite, or perhaps because, of their true believer status, McChrystal and his team were unable to recognize how COIN was failing in Afghanistan and the problems in their position. When Ambassador Eikenberry wrote a classified cable critiquing U.S. strategy, McChrystal's reaction was one of betrayal and anger, not introspection. Instead of examining the argument, Eikenberry was criticized among McChrystal's team and his intellectual positions summarily dismissed without serious contemplation. Eikenberry's prescient predictions and concerns ran counter to McChrystal's faith in COIN, and were therefore without merit.

There was tension even in his own policies. McChrystal lectured troops at Combat Outpost JFM about "insurgent math," yet told other operators "you better be out there hitting four or five targets tonight." This disconnect, between the seriousness of protecting the population and avoiding civilian casualties yet supporting robust Special Forces raids, which often resulted in Afghan deaths, is a troubling use of COIN fundamentals. It's either a willful disregarding of principles at random, or a blindness to the inherent contradictions of a misapplied doctrine to an ill-fitting environment.

General McChrystal was ultimately done in by his lack of discretion, but the war effort in Afghanistan will eventually be a failure because of the over-reliance and misapplication of COIN. For the sake of all involved I hope that General Petraeus is wise enough to recognize the shortcomings of McChrystal's approach, but I fear that he, with the full support of the President and most of his national security team, will continue to fine-tune an instrument which has no business being used in Afghanistan while marching towards an ignominious end.

Romney falters, and Republicans look for 2012 foreign policy leadership

2010-07-07T22:10:00.013-04:00

On Tuesday, former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney took to the opinion page of the Washington Post to deliver a full-throated assault on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New-START) championed by President Obama and the nation's military leaders. Romney's op-ed, titled "Obama's worst foreign-policy mistake," takes President Obama to task for caving to the Russians and receiving "nothing whatsoever in return."

Romney's piece was another step toward a likely 2012 run for president, an attempt to assert his national security credentials on the national stage. As a one-term governor Romney has none of the "tough on national security" experience that conservative voters crave, and must convince the Republican base that he can handle Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention Iran, North Korea, and other global hot spots.

Romney's effort, however, was nothing short of a disaster. His critique has been lampooned as "thoroughly ignorant," "groundless and misleading," and "ridiculous." Even The American Conservative called Romney's argument "absurd."

Fred Kaplan of Slate, an expert on nuclear weapons and arms control, went through Romney's argument line by line, debunking nearly every claim made by Romney. Romney uses wildly inaccurate weapons numbers, misunderstands the military's position on missile defense, and, at one point, even suggests that the Russians would try to mount ICBMs (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles) on strategic bombers and railroad cars.

Romney is not an international arms control expert, but he is an intelligent and analytical man. I'd bet my student loans that this was bad staff work. An initial draft was probably written by an aide, edits were made, not all were included, and someone pressed "send" prematurely. It's no excuse, but no politician or elected official writes everything submitted in their name, and mistakes happen.

Bad staff work doesn't mean Mitt Romney is ignorant of foreign policy, but it does illustrate a problem for the Republican Party - its leaders are not serious foreign policy leaders. Republicans, who have traditionally enjoyed wide margins over Democrats on national security issues, have turned inward to focus on domestic policy, ceding foreign policy to the Democrats. The Tea Party has swept the conservative base with an emphasis on tax cuts, budget deficits, and constitutional law. The rising stars and most popular officials in the Republican Party, from Senator Jim Demint of South Carolina and Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi to Sarah Palin, are all focused primarily on domestic issues. The foreign policy leaders in the party, Senators like John McCain and Lindsay Graham, are either past their prime or too moderate to survive a primary. One needs to look no further than RNC Chairman Michael Steele's recent comments on Afghanistan to see the lack of foreign policy credibility in the leadership of the Republican Party.

The 2010 midterms will likely be decided on a combination of health insurance reform, taxes, and jobs - Iraq and Afghanistan will be important issues, but there is relatively little disagreement between the parties on US policy in both countries. The 2012 presidential election, however, will be a showcase for foreign policy. Voters don't see Congress as protecting US national security, but they do see presidents that way. When President Obama stands next to his Republican challenger, that challenger will be judged by his or her ability to protect the nation and conduct its foreign affairs. As it stands, there aren't many Republicans who can play that role.

Petraeus Takes Command in Afghanistan

2010-07-06T09:39:00.006-04:00

General David Petraeus took command of American and NATO troops in Afghanistan on Sunday.

Many are considering this change of command to be little more than a change in nameplates, as President Obama has made it clear that US and NATO policy in Afghanistan will not change with the removal of General McChrystal. As we at Demagogues and Dictators seek to provide multi-faceted analysis of issues, I thought the below image provided an excellent graphical evaluation of the situation (courtesy of Doctrine Man)

On a serious note, I do think that the transfer of command is significant, even with all parties involved professing fealty to the current strategy.

Why? Because personalities matter, even in war.

Anyone who has ever spent time in any office (or pretty much anywhere, for that matter) can tell you that individuals who don't get along find it difficult to work together. Even if the dysfunctional triangle of General McChrystal, Ambassador to Afghanistan Eikenberry, and AfPak Envoy Richard Holbrooke never led to any purposeful undermining, poor (or very bad) communication is disruptive on many levels. First, and foremost, it causes a breakdown in staff communication farther down the chain. Second, it makes it that much more difficult for the US military and the US civilian agencies to understand what the other requires, something that is already difficult in the most hospitable of conditions. Third, it forces the United States to show a divided front in Afghanistan, and to all of the myriad actors important in the conflict (Pakistan, India, Russia, NATO, etc.).

Effective communication won't fix anything overnight, but they do improve ISAF's chances. In the jargon of the social sciences (I know, I can't resist), effective communication between civilian and military actors doesn't provide the permissive conditions for a successful counterinsurgency campaign, but they almost certainly are a necessary condition.

I don't know if General Petraeus will be able to work effectively with Ambassadors Eikenberry and Holbrooke, but I know that General McChrystal couldn't. That alone is reason for some hope.

Keane: A Response to Reidy on Kristof

2010-07-05T22:11:00.000-04:00

Emily Keane
Kampala, Uganda

In response to Dave Reidy’s post on Nicholas Kristof’s article on conflict minerals in the DRC, I strongly believe that Reidy’s attack is deeply flawed. As I see it, Reidy’s main point is to lambaste Kristof for his uninformed, simple description and solution of a conflict that United States consumers cannot solve.

But I believe Kristof's whole point IS to be sensationalist. Let's remember that he is a columnist in the New York Times, and not Foreign Affairs or any other academic publication. He is not an expert, nor does he pretend to be. What his column does best is bring these important, yet neglected issues to light. And while Reidy is right that Kristof paints a watered down account of the conflict, Kristof has the power and audience to push these grim realities into people's faces. Who else continually writes about the conflict in Congo, sex slavery in Southeast Asia, and the genocide in Sudan on such a regular basis to such a large audience?

Why must we claim that a commitment group of people cannot influence change?! Sure, American consumers are idealistic and have the attention span of a fly, but their power CAN be harnessed! Worldwide pressure against South Africa's policy of apartheid played a role in its banishment. There's are more than enough examples to use here, but just look at Kristof’s first sentence: ''“Blood diamonds” have faded away, but we may now be carrying “blood phones.” Perhaps a bit kitschy, but no one would argue that only years ago the idea of combating conflict diamonds was considered impossible. And look how far we've come on that issue! Do they still exist? Yes. But now a majority of people have the facts and have the ability to make a more ethical decision when buying diamonds. Why is it any different with the natural resources in Congo?

I completely agree with Reidy that the conflict in the Congo and its associated economy is complex. But to scoff at Kristof’s suggestion that a more well-informed public will not change anything is too pessimistic for me. Kristof’s solution will perhaps, at best, only put a small dent in the conflict, but is that not something?

Of course, this will not solve the conflict and only locally stakeholders committed to peace can achieve that. Kristof’s article offers food for thought on what we can do for those affected by this conflict: to be more aware and thoughtful in our choices as consumers.

Emily Keane is a joint-degree student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology focusing on humanitarian logistics

Conflict Minerals and the Fallacy of Influence

2010-06-30T20:40:00.001-04:00

Nick Kristof has another column out this week on the DRC, highlighting the role of "conflict minerals" in the ongoing violence.

I’ve never reported on a war more barbaric than Congo’s, and it haunts me. In Congo, I’ve seen women who have been mutilated, children who have been forced to eat their parents’ flesh, girls who have been subjected to rapes that destroyed their insides. Warlords finance their predations in part through the sale of mineral ore containing tantalum, tungsten, tin and gold. For example, tantalum from Congo is used to make electrical capacitors that go into phones, computers and gaming devices.

This, sadly, is true: the conflict in the DRC is horridly brutal and violent, and some of the belligerents do derive funding from mining these minerals. Kudos to Kristof and the ENOUGH Project, under the leadership of John Prendergast, for calling attention to the horror unfolding daily.

Image: Sasha Lezhnev/Enough Project

Unfortunately, the plaudits for their efforts end there, as their narrative of the conflict is one-dimensional and unrealistic. Bringing pressure to bear on companies like Apple is a good thing, but it's nothing more than symbolic and will ultimately be impotent to halt, or even alter, the carnage in the Congo. Kristof acknowledges that combating conflict minerals alone is insufficient,

It’s not that American tech companies are responsible for the slaughter, or that eliminating conflict minerals from Americans’ phones will immediately end the war. Even the Enough Project, an anti-genocide organization that has been a leading force in the current campaign, estimates that only one-fifth of the world’s tantalum comes from Congo. “There’s no magic-bullet solution to peace in Congo,” notes David Sullivan of the Enough Project, “but this is one of the drivers of the conflict.” The economics of the war should be addressed to resolve it.

but he doesn't go far enough. There are two problems with the notion that public pressure can change events.

First, as Kristof mentions, conflict minerals are not the main driving force behind the violence.
But he undersells the point: there are far more complicated and nuanced factors at play, from ethnic and regional rivalries to corruption and failed governance. His lip service about addressing the "economics of the war" and President Obama putting pressure on Rwanda are entirely too simplistic. If it was as simple as Obama leaning on Kagame, the conflict would already be over. And "addressing" the economics of war is a meaningless phrase. Conflict economies are notoriously complicated, interdependent, and difficult to unravel. It's not as simple as going after the bad drug- and mineral-trafficking "warlords" to protect the innocent people. When the state ceases to function, as it has in much of the DRC, people resort to activities that would otherwise be deemed criminal or illicit to preserve their livelihoods. This doesn't make them criminal actors; it's merely a coping mechanism to ensure survival. By simply writing that "the economics of the war should be addressed to resolve it" Kristof displays a stunning lack of nuance and appreciation for how difficult, perhaps impossible, a task that is. Likewise, his assertion that Obama must pressure Rwanda glosses over the historical difficulties between the neighbors, the role of other regional states, and the myriad of issues in play.

Secondly, even among the small part of the conflict driven by the trade in conflict minerals, the role of the US and American companies is small and shrinking fast. Our share of the global electronics market is falling as laptops, smartphones, and other modern technologies become ubiquitous in China, India, Iran, and much of the Middle East. In other words, pressuring Apple and their peers only influences a small percentage of the companies using conflict minerals. And you don't need me to point out that most Chinese companies probably aren't interested in divesting or shunning cheap minerals from the DRC.

I don't mean to be overly critical of Kristof. The conflict the DRC is horrible, and American consumers need to be aware of what is happening and the part we play, however small it may be. Any public awareness he raises about the DRC is positive. Unfortunately, he falls prey to a classic American instinct - of course we can do something to fix this! The sad truth is that in a regional conflict so vast, complicated, and entrenched, we, as mere consumers, have little role to play in the solution.

The only answer involves a sustained, serious, and well-financed commitment from the US, EU, China, and regional governments; but I'm not holding my breath for that.

Tomorrow's Big Story... Tonight (Moscow Rules, George?)

2010-06-28T23:52:00.005-04:00

For those of you not addicted to the Telegraph and the BBC -- here's tomorrow's big news, tonight. It looks like the NYT are going to run with it in the morning, but we here at D&D have it now.

Take a read... and check back tomorrow for more news and analysis!

For now, here's the story (via the BBC)

For more background:
The Guardian

Reuters UK

The Independent

Lamenting the Loss of the "Runaway General"

2010-06-24T03:54:00.003-04:00

Kabul, Afghanistan

The bottom line of what has happened to General McChrystal is that he was betrayed by his aides, who were supposed to be the ones protecting him from this sort of thing. The reporter from Rolling Stone was supposed to have two weeks of access to the staff, but because of the Iceland volcano and the resultant ash cloud he ended up getting stuck with McChrystal's team for a month. During that time the staff essentially "went native" with the reporter and started speaking too freely. If you read the article, all the bad stuff is said by McChrystal's aides, who imply that they are expressing the boss' feelings.

The rumor mill here in country speculates that perhaps McChrystal wanted out and this was how he decided to do it. But that is quite ridiculous, since there is really no bigger disgrace for a military man than to be fired by the Commander-in-Chief. While I understand the political reasons for why Obama removed McChrystal, I think a major blow has been struck to the effort here in Afghanistan. As we speak, instead of concentrating on the fight at a time of year that is the most kinetic we have seen in the past 9 years, the entirety of command is either packing their shit in boxes (as its not just the boss who gets fired but his whole staff) or preparing several weeks worth of briefs for Petraeus when he gets here.

On a different note, I personally feel that Petraeus is an over-rated American hero. Despite being credited with writing the COIN manual, I think most of us know it was actually written by John Nagl and Sarah Sewell, with oversight by Petraeus and Mattis. Most of the COIN that Petraeus "implemented" when he got to Iraq was already being carried out well in advance by Odierno and the Marines in Anbar Province. Plus overall, we entirely lucked out in Iraq when AQ started mistreating the Sunnis and they revolted in Anbar. There will be no such similar luck here in Afghanistan. From many discussions with troops who have done multiple tours in Afghanistan I have learned that the one thing they hate most is guys who come into this country having served in Iraq and think they know how things are done. If Iraq is a third world country then Afghanistan is a fifth world country. There is simply no comparison to be made. Most Afghans will tell you that they don't even understand this country and they have lived here their whole lives. Petraeus may have been briefed on all operations in Afghanistan as head of CENTCOM, but McChrystal was living the war here. He even started learning Dari two days ago. I actually met his teacher, who was all excited because once he became the General's teacher he got his living arrangements upgraded from a converted shipping container to a proper room with his own bathroom. I would bet they are kicking his ass out of there as we speak. Poor Guy.

Breaking News: Petraeus to Replace McChrystal in Afghanistan

2010-06-23T13:29:00.002-04:00

You heard it here first. Word here in Afghanistan is that General Petraeus will be leaving CENTCOM to replace General McChrystal as Commander of ISAF in Afghanistan.

Obama Lacks a Suitable Replacement for McChrystal

2010-06-23T06:50:00.003-04:00

In my opinion General McChrystal will survive this ordeal not because he is the best man for the job but because he is the only man for the job. Discussion around the camp fire here in Afghanistan has centered around who would be a suitable replacement for McChrystal and the only name that really holds any water is Lt. General David Rodriguez who came to Afghanistan at the same time as McChrystal to run the ISAF Joint Command (ICJ). The IJC is the operational arm of the coalition here, devoted to running the day to day operations of the war. While General Rodriguez could assume control of ISAF without a large learning curve, this would cause and even larger problem by leaving the positional of operational commander vacant at the height of the deadliest fighting season seen in the past 9 years of the war.

The other four names being floated in the press as possible replacements are all decorated soldiers but not one of them has the background or institutional knowledge required to assume command of a war as complicated as this one.

General James Mattis:
General Mattis is currently Commander of Joint Forces Command. Talk about someone with a past for making outrageous comments to the press. General Mattis is also a marine which will likely disqualify him from the top spot in Afghanistan. The Marine Corps has been the slowest to adopt Counterinsurgency practices, instead preferring to rely on the same battle tested tactics that brought them victory in Fallujah.

LT. General Allen:
As deputy commander of Centcom, General Allen would have a decent understanding of ongoing operations in Afghanistan but there would still be a significant learning curve involved if he were to assume command in Afghanistan. Furthermore, he is a marine and as I mentioned earlier the marine's do not have the best reputation when it comes to counterinsurgency practices.

General Martin Dempsey:
General Dempsey has Iraq experience but Iraq is not Afghanistan. Yes it is true that General McChrystal came to Afghanistan after fighting in Iraq for several years, however, as a Special Forces Commander he had the advantage of being well versed in COIN principles whereas General Dempsey is not.

Navy Adm. James Stavridis:
Is an intelligent man and has proven himself as a skilled commander of both SOUTHCOM and as Supreme Allied Commander-Europe (SACEUR). However, he has very little experience with the conflict in Afghanistan and has had zero experience implementing COIN in the field. Furthermore, the Army represents the vast majority of the troops currently fighting on the ground here in Afghanistan and as a result any successor to McChrystal would have to come from the ground forces, most likely the Army.

A View from Afghanistan: Why General McChrystal Must Stay

2010-06-23T05:34:00.003-04:00

Here in Afghanistan the talk in the hallways and cafeterias has been dominated by discussions of what will happen when "the boss" meets with President Obama tomorrow at the White House. There is no question that General McChrystal will offer to resign as a result of comments made by him and his aides to free lance journalist Michael Hastings author of the controversial Runaway General article in Rolling stone. When I initially heard murmuring about this article two days ago I assumed that the comments contained within were a strategic move on the part of General McCrystal and his staff to have their voices heard in order to pressure Congress and the Obama administration to stop playing politics with his war. After conducting more than 50 interviews with experienced military professionals here in Afghanistan, I can tell you first hand that many commanders here echo McCyrstal's point that they are being asked to sell an unwinable position. Setting a deadline of July 2011 for the start of a withdrawal essentially cuts counterinsurgency strategy off at the knees. However, now having read the Rolling Stone article, it is clear that General McChrystal and his staff went native with this reporter, letting their guard down too much to someone who was not to be trusted.

General McChrystal is obviously not the superman that the media had made him out to be. He is a man who has often blundered when it comes to off the cuff remarks to the media. He is however the exact person that America needs running the war in Afghanistan. Counterinsurgency doctrine is a relatively new introduction to Afghanistan and there are still many commanders who who do not buy into it. It will take a known warrior like McChrystal, who has more than his fair share of blood on his hands from his days running the Joint Special Operations Command in Iraq, to convince the most stubborn hold out here that we cannot kill our way out of Afghanistan. Besides his credibility amongst the majority of the troops here in Afghanistan, McChrystal is the only American that President Karzai is known to actually like in the whole country. The Rolling Stone article wrongly depicts General McChrystal as having stolen the diplomatic playbook for Afghanistan away from Ambassadors Eikenberry and Holbrooke. However, the plain fact of the matter is that both those men have publicly questioned Karzai's ability to lead and as a result he does not want to work with them.

The Western media has apparently flipped the switch on its collective brain and has begun incorrectly comparing General McCrystal to General MacArther, the commander of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula in 1951 who was subsequently fired by General Truman for insubordination. General McCystal is guilty of poor judgment obviously but has come no where close to committing insubordination. General MacArthur on the other hand flat out refused to follow several of President Truman's direct orders and was in fact secretly negotiating with influential congressman behind the Presidents back in order to gain approval for the escalation of the Korean War. Had MacArthur not been removed from his command the Korean War may very likely have gone nuclear. General McCrystal has disobeyed no direct orders nor has he sought to subvert President Obama's influence and thus has not committed insubordination.

If I was a betting man, I would bet conservatively on General McChrystal retaining his position as commander of ISAF, however, he is likely to be stripped of the majority of this diplomatic portfolio which will surely be given to Ambassador Eikenberry who will likely become the public face of the war as General McChrystal is ordered to retreat to the background.

Thoughts on McChrystal-Gate

2010-06-22T19:24:00.006-04:00

I've been following the scandal surrounding the remarks of General Stanley McChrystal fairly closely and have a few thoughts to add to the discussion kicked off by Jeff. I'll leave the decision of whether to sack McChrystal to the President, who said today he will make the opinion based on "how [he] can make sure that we have a strategy that justifies the enormous courage and sacrifice that those men and women are making [in Afghanistan]," but I don't think that the issue is the same kind of Rubicon-crossing challenge to the chain of command that Jeff implies in his post.

First, a few misunderstandings bear some brief analysis:

1) General McChrystal will almost certainly offer to resign, but President Obama's acceptance is far from certain.

2) General McChrystal is not new to the media. With fellowship stays at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and the Council on Foreign Relations, as well as briefing the press during the Iraq invasion as the Vice Director for Operations on the Joint Staff, McChrystal should know the media quite well.

3) The vast majority of the quotes came from unsourced aides of McChrystal, not the general himself. TPM has a good summary of the most damning quotes from McChrystal's "Team America." This doesn't excuse their comments, or those made by McChrystal himself, but the Rolling Stone story wasn't just a profanity-laced interview by McChrystal, as some have made it out to be.

3-a) It is okay to vent and blow off steam, even regarding one's superiors, in a high-stress environment like Afghanistan. Doing so is natural, healthy, and far from an offense against the political order or the UCMJ. But that only applies when one does so privately. When you do so on the record to a reporter, no excuses apply.

Simply put, if the President is to fire his commander in Afghanistan, it should be for gross negligence, not purposeful insubordination. General McChrystal showed extremely poor political judgement in allowing the Rolling Stone reporter close access and allowing his staff to vent their frustrations on the record. Some might argue that McChrystal's job as a military commander is not to be political, but I don't think that argument is very strong when you're in a Senate-confirmed position leading the highly visible campaign in Afghanistan.

Of course this latest kerfluffle comes after a similar public disagreement last fall, when McChrystal was publicly chided for contravening his superiors during the President's Afghanistan Policy Review. In the end, President Obama's decision depends on whether he gives McChrystal a second (or fourth, depending on your perspective) chance. We'll see tomorrow.

Crossing the Rubicon, or, How to Put Your Career in a Box

2010-06-22T08:14:00.008-04:00

Gen. Stanley McChrystal is ISAF Commander no longer -- at least that's what an unnamed TIME source is reporting.

If he hadn't resigned willingly, he should have been fired. If he resigned under pressure, he got off light. (For those of you living in a cave somewhere, go check out Rolling Stone.)

This morning Gen. Stanley McChrystal was flying home -- past the point of no return. But unlike in 49 BC, this time Caesar's army stayed at the front. The comparisons are flying fast and loose out here in the blogosphere, but whether the new crisis between Pres. Obama and his Afghan commander is the modern parallel of McArthur and Truman seems less important that what has actually happened in the past 24 hours.

Sure, it is satisfying (and required) to berate the General's apparent disdain for things like chain of command and those who disagree with him.

It is fitting to point out that for a special forces guy, McChrystal sure seems to love the media.

It is infuriating that for the second time in a year he has fundamentally challenged the authority of both the SecDef and POTUS in a very public way.

And he should be (and now is) gone.

While, according to this profile, he is apparently no stranger to bad romance; why McChrystal chose to deliver his resignation letter in the Lady Gaga edition of RS is a question for other pundits, the real question, in my mind, is: what now?

ISAF is without a commander, and after a year of taking body punches from the political right on his war decision making, President Obama and Secretary Gates can ill afford a lengthy interview process to pick his successor.

The pick, however...

... is more than simply finding someone willing to fill McChrystal's shoes -- it will define the future of the US strategy in Afghanistan. So far President Obama has gotten rid of his McClellan (Gen. McKiernan) and now his Mead (McChrystal). Will the next general redefine the conflict in Afghanistan the way Grant did in Northern Virginia?

The answer? Unlikely. The COINistas seem to have won this battle -- as evidenced by McChrystal's fratboy antics towards Joe Biden -- and while the US may be changing commanders, the strategy will not shift -- though the time frames will (and most likely should) shift for the coming action in Kandahar. Like it or hate it, COIN is here to stay. (I don't think we can afford another powerpoint slide defining it anyway)

But that doesn't mean that COIN cannot continue to evolve. In Anbar, luck and risk combined with strategic buffoonery on the part of AQI gave us Petraus's first generation of COIN. It's original failure in Afghanistan taught us that COIN was not a cookie cutter tactic that could be plucked from the Sunni deserts of Iraq to the Pashtun belt of the Hindu Kush. McChrystal's bleeding ulcer in Marja has many lessons for his successor -- if they can learn them. (side note -- if Tom Friedman doesn't pull out some version of COIN 3.0 in the next week I'll be shocked)

But who will it be? Tom Ricks over at FP is calling for some Petraus/Mattis hive-mind. No offense to both men, but this is exactly the wrong idea. Petraus must keep his eyes on CENTCOM, and Mattis (for all his awesomeness) is heading towards retirement. The head of JSOC is currently a Vice Admiral -- President Obama cannot shoulder-tap a former special operator to take of ISAF from there the way he did with McChrystal -- and the ranks of COINista generals in the USMC and US Army are thinning, at least publicly. Many are unwilling to accept the heightened risk to the soldier required by COIN's shifting mission from force protection to its civilian centric approach -- even McChrystal lost the confidence of many ISAF troops through his revised ROE (if we believe the Rolling Stone representation).

So who? And when?

Lets see what tomorrow brings. President Obama, Sec. Gates, ISAF and the entire US Mission in Afghanistan are in crisis -- but in every crisis there is both danger and opportunity. This may be a chance to balance the civil-military mission in the region -- back from the one-sided dominance of McChrystal over Eikenberry and Holbrooke, and towards a functioning strategy in Afghanistan.

Or maybe not.

Why is Uncle Sam buying Russian Helicopters for the Afghan Army?

2010-06-21T22:14:00.015-04:00

The US military is buying Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters in order to equip the Afghan National Army Air Corps, and Congress is not happy about it.

The Washington Post reports:

In a turnabout from the Cold War, when the CIA gave Stinger missiles to Afghan rebels to shoot down Soviet helicopters, the Pentagon has spent $648 million to buy or refurbish 31 Russian Mi-17 transport helicopters for the Afghan National Army Air Corps. The Defense Department is seeking to buy 10 more of the Mi-17s next year, and had planned to buy dozens more over the next decade.

The spectacle of using U.S. taxpayer dollars to buy Russian military products is proving a difficult sell in Congress. Some legislators say that the Pentagon never considered alternatives to the Mi-17, an aircraft it purchased for use in Iraq and Pakistan, and that a lack of competition has enabled Russian defense contractors to gouge on prices.

So what's wrong with buying American helicopters to equip the Afghans?

The most likely alternative candidates, the UH-60 Black Hawk or the CH-47 Chinook, have unit costs of between $10-$15 million and $10-$24 million, respectively. These costs track closely with the $15 million per unit the US government is paying for the Mi-17s. The American aircraft, however, are significantly more complicated than the Russian models - they lack "amenities" like GPS - which would drastically increase maintenance costs. With the goal of creating an Afghan air corps that can operate independently of US support, keeping future maintenance costs at a minimum can't be too far from the minds of US officials.

Most importantly, the Mi-17 works well in Afghanistan. First, Afghan pilots, to the extent that they have flight experience, have it with the Russian aircraft. This fact significantly lowers the learning curve of the new Afghan air corps, accelerating the development of Afghanistan's own armed forces. Second, the Mi-17 is described by US officials as "well-suited for navigating the altitudes of the Hindu Kush mountains, as well as Afghanistan's desert terrain."

"Buy American" is a worthy goal in the abstract, especially when times are tough, but the military's decision seems based on realities on the ground. Congress, led on this issue by Senator Chris Dodd of Connecticut and Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama, has a legitimate oversight role to make sure the military acts as a good steward of tax dollars, but can't lose sight of the larger picture. Winning the war in Afghanistan is more important than steering more contracts to a particular state - the UH-60 Black Hawk is produced by Sikorsky in Stratford, Connecticut.

UPDATE: Apparently my unit cost research was a bit off - the Mi-17 is actually much less expensive than the Black Hawk. The Thai Royal Army recently opted for purchasing three Mi-17s for the price of one UH-60.

Sanctions and Myths for Iran

2010-06-20T21:41:00.000-04:00

The drumbeat of support for harsh sanctions against Iran continues, this time in a featured article from Mark Dubowitz and Benjamin Weinthal. Slate usually produces cogent pieces, but this one strains all notions of credibility and logic.

To begin with, their argument rests upon a single flawed assumption, proffered in the subhead:

Sanctions helped South Africa's pro-democracy movement. They can do the same in Iran.

Really? They did? Because I seem to recall that the sanctions against South Africa were economically pathetic and insignificant. They had value as a message from the international community, but the meat of the sanctions did little. In fact, the ban on arms trade with South Africa, one of the core components of the sanctions regime (along with oil), had the perverse effect of transforming South Africa into one of the largest and most sophisticated arms manufacturers in the world (see Crawford and Klotz for details).

And oil, the second primary focus of the sanctions regime, continued to flow freely. Smuggling was rampant, and many states chose to defy the will of the international community to exploit a lucrative market. Ironically, Iran was the main player to do so (see Klinghoffer for more). In short, the international embargoes on goods had little effect on the apartheid regime, and certainly did not "marginalize and undermine the government" as Dubowitz and Weinthal claim.

Secondly, much of this piece rests on the notion that Green Movement leaders are calling for international sanctions to support their efforts. They cite the example of Mohsen Makhmalbaf, a filmmaker, to substantiate this claim. Unfortunately, all other supporting claims are from "a growing number of key opinion-makers and activists in the green movement," "other Iranian dissidents and activists," and "Iranian experts and analysts" - an impressive list of anonymous sources. I understand that personal security is a factor (nobody wants a knock on the door from the basij), but constructing an entire argument on nameless sources is poor analysis, especially when you factor in their dismissal of Mir Hossein Mousavi and other leaders speaking out against sanctions for "for what appear to be tactical reasons." So the opinion of Mousavi, who was the face of the Green Movement and actually stood for office, can be summarily dismissed, but the thoughts of anonymous "dissidents and activists" are grounds for robust sanctions.

Puzzlingly, the authors paint China and Russia as complicit in Tehran's pillaging of natural resources, yet do not recognize that sanctions are meaningless without full international cooperation. The U.S. could pass harsh unilateral sanctions on Iran, and would most likely be supported by many European allies. However, if Russia and, even more, China, could undermine any sanctions simply by continuing to trade. The growing energy appetite of China and Russian refinement capabilities could comfortably offset the loss of trade from the U.S. and Europe. In other words, the Obama Administration is constrained in what it can do, something the authors fail to recognize.

Harsh sanctions are not the answer in Iran. The risk of playing into the hands of Tehran's hardliners by acting as "the Great Satan" is high, and the potential payoff is low, especially without full international support. More troubling is the idea that the authors speak for "Iranians who yearn for democracy," yet fail to produce a shred of proof that the disparate members of the loosely-affiliated Green Movement would welcome international sanctions. Dubowitz and Weinthal, and Slate, should know better.

Was the Gaza Flotilla a success?

2010-06-20T16:38:00.003-04:00

The flotilla of ships carrying humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip might not have arrived safely in Gaza, but they did accomplish something. Most of the world has now come out in opposition to Israel's Gaza blockade, and Israel has already begun to ease the blockade.

The calls to end the blockade have been widespread. The EU has called for Israel to lift the blockade, as has the Arab League, and the Red Cross. The US has increased pressure on the Netanyahu government to lift the blockade.

Israel is easing the blockade, promising to make "adjustments" in the policy. These adjustments will be considered by the security cabinet, but are likely to be passed. The new policy would allow "all goods except for weapons and materials that can be used to make them."

But the world shouldn't be too eager to declare the Gaza blockade over, or the Flotilla a success. The language used by Israel, of "easing" the blockade rather than ending it, has been seen by the Arab press as the Israeli version of putting lipstick on a pig. Clearly, taking steps to "ease" the blockade is different than lifting it. And the details of the new Israeli policy remain to be seen. So-called "dual-use" items will still be banned, with Israel to define what constitutes such an item. An overly broad definition of dual-use would still have a severe effect on the people of the Gaza Strip.

China doesn't have to take it anymore

2010-06-19T16:36:00.013-04:00

China's rise to great power status is moving along steadily, and US policymakers are acknowledging it publicly.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made the following comment at a June 16th Hearing of the Senate Appropriations Subcommitee on Defense (in response to a question about arms sales to Taiwan from Senator Dianne Feinstein):

And I was struck by an article in the local press in Singapore following that session. Somebody asked one of these Chinese generals or some Chinese general -- it may not have been one present -- "You guys have known about these sales for decades. Why all of a sudden are you raising such a stink about them?" And -- and this general's response was, "We had to accept it when we were weak. We are no longer weak."

China has a long history of being pushed around by Western powers. It was "opened" by the British in the mid-19th Century (when the British acquired Hong Kong), and subsequently maintained as an open trading partner by force by various Western powers, including the US. As an underdeveloped country lacking economic and military power, China was (mostly) forced to accept the terms dictated to it by others.

Since China became the state we know today, it has espoused an ideology of "peaceful rising." In a nutshell, China knows it deserves a place among the great powers, but won't ruffle any feathers along the way.

Recently however, China has begun to assert itself. Its actions at the Copenhagen climate conference and its stance towards the sinking of the South Korean navy corvette Cheonan have alienated would-be partners, and have amounted to a policy that Daniel Drezner describes (diplomatically) as "Pissing Off as Many Countries As Possible."

Given this trend, how should the US address China today and in its future policies?

For starters, it's important that the US and China understand each other and have effective bilateral communication. Even countries that disagree vehemently can avoid conflict when they understand the other's perspective and have an effective way to communicate during crises. This was the point of the US-Soviet red phone during the Cold War - after the Cuban Missile Crisis it was considered of paramount importance that the US President and Soviet Premier be able to communicate directly in minutes.

Secretary Gates' June 16th testimony offered another insight, courtesy of his long career in the intelligence field:

Because in my experience with the Soviet Union, I don't know if the strategic arms talks ever really achieved much arms control. But the one thing I do know is that over a 25-year period, we -- we gained a very good understanding of each other's approach and strategy when it came to nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy and so on. And I believe deeply that it helped avoid miscalculations and misunderstandings.

The US and China need to develop a similar relationship and understanding, not just to avoid any chance of the tit-for-tat escalatory crises that characterized the early years of the Cold War, but also to forge a partnership to collectively address global and regional issues.

Despite Chinese protests, the US should not drop its support for Taiwan. Nor should it stop engagement with the Dalai Lama. Hypocrisy and backtracking aren't good. But the US should keep pushing for more connections with Chinese policymakers. The Chinese cancellation of a recent visit by Secretary Gates is troubling, but that should only increase the urgency of establishing more communication. In keeping with the campaign promises of this Administration to never fear to negotiate, the US should push for more talks with China.

China and the US sometimes agree, and sometimes disagree, but understanding which is which, and why, is crucial as we enter an era when China knows it is "no longer weak." Perhaps its time for a presidential visit?

Border Security: The Solution...But You're Not Going to Like it

2010-06-19T13:50:00.005-04:00

I would like to start out by making a disclaimer as this post is sure to generate some criticism. I am in no way anti-immigration, nor do I support government action restricting the rights of immigrants (legal or not) such as the law recently enacted in Arizona allowing police to demand proof of visa/citizenship from anyone they suspect of being in the United States illegally. My own father in fact is an immigrant to America. Demagogues and Dictators is at its core a security blog and the following is meant to bring your attention to a certain new technology that could have uses far beyond what the military is currently thinking.

For the past few years, the U.S. military has been developing what it is calling an "Active Denial System," or as Wired Magazine has dubbed it a "Pain Ray" (Aka the "Goodbye Weapon or the Vehicle Mounted Active Denial System (V-MAD)). When I first head of this device back in 2007, the military was testing to see if it could be used to non-lethally disperse crowds in Iraq. Essentially what this technology does is to concentrate microwaves across a limited distance. All organic tissue within a close proximity to the rays beam will experience an extremely hot sensation similar to opening a hot oven. From videos of the testing I have seen, the ray is very effective at getting people to instinctively move away from an area. The military claims that the weapon is entirely non-lethal and causes no permanent damage, although in one case a test subject had to be rushed to a hospital and treated for burns. As reported by Wired, this system has also recently been deployed for testing in Afghanistan

Now how does this relate to border security? Imagine a string of these microwave devices planted across the southern border of the United States all rotating in a random order such that only a minority of the border is hit with the ray at anyone time but ensuring that over a certain period of time the entire border is covered. This would negate the selective use of certain easy border crossing points as anyone crossing at any point along the border would risk being hit with the ray.

Human rights groups would obviously go crazy if the U.S. government were to even float the idea of such a system and I for one am not advocating it use either. However, I can imagine instances when such a system might have to be at least considered in emergency situations. Say for instance if terrorists were caught trying to smuggle nuclear material over the border. There would be in instant public outcry to seal the borders once and for all. You can't put up a huge fence overnight but you could deploy these Active Denial Systems in a matter of hours if you had a deployment plan already worked out. Furthermore, if the Mexican government were to fail, which according to the Defense Department is on par with the likelihood of the Pakistani government failing, the U.S government would need some way to temporarily stop a mass exodus of millions of people from Northern Mexico. In my opinion using this system would result in far fewer casualties than deploying the National Guard and the Minutemen down to the border armed with M-16's.

I know this is not a popular thought but we here at D&D believe that it is never wrong to think and we welcome any and all debate on this topic.

Why News of Mineral Deposits in Afghanistan is Neither New Nor GOOD

2010-06-15T06:23:00.004-04:00

On Monday, the New York Times reported on a Defense Department memo claiming that under Afghanistan's hard terrain lays nearly a $1 trillion in mineral deposits. These minerals include large veins of iron, copper, cobalt, gold and lithium a vital component of computer batteries. But the reality of this story is that it is more of a propaganda campaign or "information operation" than it is real news. Yes it is true that these minerals do exist in Afghanistan but it is by no means news. The U.S. Geological survey made the discovery back in 2007. However, the U.S. government is pushing the story now because the coalition here has been rocked by some particularly bad press here the past week (Ironically from the New York Times. This causes me to wonder if the Times is attempting to buy its way back into the good graces of the Embassy in Kabul.) The most damaging of this press was comments attributed to President Karzai about the West not being able to win in Afghanistan. This story is similar to ones that preceded the Iraq War when the Bush administration claimed that Iraq's oil wealth would pay for all the costs of reconstruction.

The reason why news of these vasts deposits is no need to celebrate is simple. The minerals are worthless unless you can actually get private companies to come in here and mine them. And with the security situation what it is that is not likely to happen any time soon. Afghanistan for instance would be a great country to run oil pipeline through, stretching from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and then on to China as well. However, despite a great deal of effort on the part of a U.S. company called Unocal they were never able to negotiate enough treaties with all the tribes and Taliban to agree not to blow up the lines or siphon oil from them. The one country with a mining contract in Afghanistan right now is China which now owns the largest copper mine here. They don't care about their people dying so it works out well for them.

The Taliban can't really mine anything so we don't really have to worry about them getting this revenue as they simply arent organized enough not to mention the lliterate enough. Furthermore, from this map you can tell that the majority of the deposits are located in Northern, Western and Central Afghanistan, all areas where the Taliban is not strong. The Taliban makes the majority of their money through taxes, which they are pretty good at collecting. They front farmers the money to buy opium poppy seed. They then take a percentage of the farmers cut when he sells his product to the local drug lord. They then also tax the drug lord for the right to move his product through areas they control. It is very mafia like here both in the government and the black market.

The other really bad thing about all these mineral deposits being discovered is that its really just one more thing for the government here to exploit for bribes. The Chinese got their copper mine for a song simply by paying a few million to the right ministers. The mine itself is worth billions.

Flournoy and More at CNAS

2010-06-10T22:36:00.001-04:00

I wasn't able to attend in person, but I did manage to watch a bit of the proceedings from today's conference at CNAS. They had a great cast of presenters, headlined by Michèle Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (and rumored successor to Bob Gates as SecDef) giving the keynote.

Her speech was good, though it didn't contain anything she hasn't said before. I thought her defense of Gates' attempts to restructure the Armed Forces was strong, and a clear indication that if she is indeed the next Secretary of Defense that she intends to continue along the same path. Her clear commitment to a force constituted to meet the small, irregular challenges of today, however, I find slightly worrisome.

The basic premise, that the U.S. military was ill-prepared for the wars they are currently fighting, is sound. As is the underlying assumption, that these wars (call them small wars, hybrid, 5th generation, whatever) will be the most prevalent forms of kinetic conflict in the future. What concerns me is that fighting these wars is only possible because of American hegemony in traditional warfare. In other words, the U.S. ends up fighting small/hybrid wars/insurgencies because their dominance in all other aspects of warfare means that nobody is willing to even mount a challenge. But, if a majority of resources are shifted away from conventional operations, that could potentially leave the U.S. military open to a challenge from a near-peer rival (the most obvious candidate being China).

I'm not the first person to suggest this danger; in fact I think this places me firmly with the majority of military analysts. Nor am I pressing the panic button: I don't think this scenario is likely, and I think Gates/Flournoy are smart to seek an increase in the U.S. irregular/hybrid capabilities. But it's important to be cognizant that the pendulum can swing too far the other way and avoid becoming enamored with the latest and greatest in technology and strategy.

Israel, Gaza, and a media furor

2010-06-03T13:05:00.000-04:00

I wasn't planning to comment on the recent events involving Israel and the flotilla of humanitarian aid. The event has received saturation media coverage and, as an expert neither on the Middle East nor international law, I didn't feel I had anything new or valuable to contribute. However, readers have requested we address the topic, so I have no choice but to bow to their wishes (the customer is always right!) and add my two cents.

First of all, the fact that this ended with multiple deaths is tragic and was utterly avoidable. I'm not adequately equipped to wade into debate over the legality of Israel's actions, so I'll hold my tongue - but do check out the excellent discussion taking place over at Opinio Juris.

I do, however, feel sufficiently qualified to share the sentiments put forward by Stephen Walt and Dan Drezner - what the f*** were the Israelis thinking? They had to understand that this overreaction would have overwhelmingly negative consequences for them, and that having commandos forcibly board would inevitably lead to bloodshed. As the ever-astute Jon Stewart put it, perhaps those on board the ship thought the Israelis were greeting them with "commando-shaped pinatas." (Clip starts at 3:45)

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Furthermore, I am disappointed in the response from the Obama Administration, which refused to condemn the incident and watered down the UN Security Council statement. The Administration could potentially use this tragedy to bring about meaningful change in Israel, by privately pressuring Netanyahu to make serious concessions while publicly protecting the Israeli government to offer political breathing space. That would be a delicate balancing act, and unfortunately I have yet to see any evidence to support that theory.

In addition to not being qualified to debate the legality of the incident, I also think that discussion is a bit of a sideshow. This was not an isolated incident; it is symptomatic of and caused by the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian deadlock. Immersing ourselves in the minutiae of international law may be missing the forest for a single tree, because the relevant issue isn't this incident, it's the situation as a whole. There can be no resolution to this tragedy nor a way to prevent future iterations without a comprehensive peace process, involving and satisfying all relevant parties.

Perhaps the fallout from this shoot-out will be the catalyst for breaking the decades of regional stalemate. But the overall situation is static: the Netanyahu government remains intransigent, Hamas refuses to recognizes Israel's right to exist, regional governments use the issue as a soapbox to enhance their "pro-Muslim" and "anti-West" credentials among their own radicals, and pro-Israel groups in America retain their influence. I'm not holding my breath for change.

UPDATE: More Nothing in Afghanistan

2010-06-02T10:33:00.000-04:00

Apparently the nothing I discussed is actually substantial enough to draw attention from militants, who attacked the jirga proceedings yesterday. In a perverse way, this is a positive sign for Karzai. Empty talks pose no threat to the Taliban, and therefore are unlikely to prompt a response. But a concerted attack indicates that they view the jirga as a threat. In a strange way, this attack serves to increase the legitimacy and potential of Karzai's peace talks.

I remain skeptical that the Afghan government will actually implement any governance improvements, but having a peace jirga attacked by militants is a twisted victory in the public information war.

More Nothing in Afghanistan

2010-06-01T22:20:00.000-04:00

The BBC has a question: can a jirga without rebel leaders bring Afghanistan peace?

The answer, obviously, is a resounding no. Duh.

But if the jirga is a kind of peace conference, it is rather one sided. The insurgents' leaders are not there. Hizb-e-Islami, a small militant group which has sometimes fought with the Taliban, said the jirga was of "no importance". "The participants of the jirga are state favourites," said a statement released by the group. "They have no power of decision. It is only a consultative jirga - without any participation of the Mujahideen."

So what's going on with Karzai? Clearly the U.S. is backing this initiative, but only tepidly. The Embassy released a statement of support, but the process hasn't been emphasized by any of the leading American policymakers, most notably McChrystal, Holbrooke, and Clinton. NATO is in favor as well, but let's be honest: this jirga is nothing but empty talk. Karzai and Co. can continue talking the talk of governance and reconciliation, but without clear results, real progress, changes will not be forthcoming. And if we've learned one thing about Karzai over the past (almost!) decade, it's that he is willing to talk nice, but not follow through.

War on the Korean peninsula?

2010-05-25T11:51:00.001-04:00

Well, let's just say I think it's unlikely. Tensions are high, and the North's provocative sinking of a South Korean warship requires a response. But what should that response be?

War is out of the question, at least from the American and South Korean side. North Korea could, if open hostilities commenced, inflict not-inconsiderable damage on the South, particularly Seoul, and possibly on Japan as well. A war would also have a destabilizing effect on the entire region, and could prompt a massive refugee crisis that all states, especially China, would like to avoid.

And what of sanctions? Well there really aren't many sanctions available to the international community that aren't already in place. Pyongyang has persevered under a myriad of sanctions over the years, with little discernible change in policy, and that option seems exhausted, save as a gesture of international condemnation.

A limited, proportional military response may seem to be the logical answer at first blush, but given Kim Jong Il's impetuous nature any military act risks initiating an escalation cycle, with potentially devastating consequences.

So what can be done? Not much, it appears, unless South Korea, the US, China, Japan, and the UN Security Council agree to mount a large-scale invasion and regime-change operation. Needless to say, the odds of that happening are slightly smaller than winning the Powerball.

I believe the more pressing concern is about motivation - why did Kim Jong Il choose to attack a South Korean warship? I'm no expert on North Korea, but it seems to be an attempt to maintain his "irrational actor" status. If you accept that he is irrational, potent options - such as limited military strikes or more robust targeted sanctions - must be shelved under the notion that they may cause him to overreact, possibly with nuclear weapons. I think he is an eminently rational actor, interested solely in maintaining power and ensuring the succession of the family dynasty. If that is his goal, acting like a crazy person to keep the rest of the world off-balance is actually not so crazy. However, calling his bluff with surgical strikes is an extremely dangerous gamble with little upside.

The other key consideration is China. Beijing has been North Korea's most ardent supporter, and Chinese food aid nourishes many North Koreans. China fears the after-effects of a destabilizing regime change, with refugee flows across the border causing domestic upheaval. Kim Jong Il took a recent "secret" trip to China, and while the full contents of his conversations are not public it's safe to assume that the sinking of the Cheonan was on the agenda. As usual, China holds the balance of power and can influence the direction of future talks.

My prognosis: nothing. The Security Council may pass a few additional impotent sanctions, and South Korea will verbally lambaste the North, but no concrete action will be taken. Eventually the six-party talks will resume, with the status quo unchanged.

Blogging From Afghanistan

2010-05-22T12:20:00.002-04:00

To all our readers,

I must start off by apologizing for my long absence from the blog. Being a grad student, I was sidetracked with a large number of other papers and neglected my duties to this site.

Since then I have traveled to Afghanistan where I will be living for the next five weeks. Tomorrow I start the Counterinsurgency Leadership Course after which I will be traveling outside of Kabul observing information operations. Over the course of this time I hope to be able to provide you with a series of observations from the field.

My first such observation has to do with the complete lack of emphasis that Western media has put on exactly how international the force here really is. Today alone I have interacted with a dozen Australians, 5-6 French troops, some Italian army and police, and even an Irishman, not to mention the countless numbers of Nepalese and Mongolians who provide perimeter security for the majority of ISAF bases here.

This failure or reporting I believe stems from the emphasis that the Bush administration but on the fact that the invasion of Iraq was an international effort comprising troops from over forty members of the coalition of the willing. The number of international troops involved in that conflict were indeed laughable when compared to the 150,000 U.S. troops present in Iraq. While in Afghanistan, U.S. troops do account for more than fifty present of the force here, the level of international commitment to the Afghan conflict is clear to anyone who spends more than 15 minutes on any base here.

A Note on Self Starter-ism and Times Square

2010-05-11T15:19:00.005-04:00

Well, the Third Generation of the Global Jihad has landed smack dab back in the middle of the news. First off, apologies for my absence here on D&D -- finals landed pretty hard here at the Fletcher School, and I am only now coming out from under. The news about Faisal Shazhad should have been enough to jar me from my work, and back to blogging, but what can I say. Anyway, in the hopes of starting a discussion of Global Jihadi radicalization in the west (and some blatant self-promotion) here is the conclusion of my most recent paper on the subject. The paper (currently titled "Getting to Boom") seeks to analyze and synthesize the current theories and frameworks explaining self-starter radicalization.

I do hope to be adding more pertinent context vis-a-vis the Times Square "wanna-bomber", but for now, here is my valiant attempt of doing two things at once -- paper writing and blogging:

Conclusions and Today's Threat Environment:

Many scholars, social psychologists, and counter-terror analysts have sought to accurately describe the process of radicalization that transforms a Western citizen to shahid...

The process is amorphous, and one that is supremely individual – a fact that makes the endeavor all the more difficult. These researchers have, through case-studies, data analysis, and network deconstruction, sought to define the process through clearly delineated “stages” or “steps”. The result is a body of work with conflicting definitions and dichotomous interpretations of the motives, drivers, enablers, and issues that drive this process. Moreover, all this research is necessarily done in the rear-view mirror – as the only data available through either open-source or classified sources relates to those who have already radicalized – and sought to act.
Maghaddam likens the process to a staircase that is climbed by the radicalizing individual, who must complete each “step” before proceeding to the next. To Wiktorowicz, a radicalizing individual may simultaneously undergo cognitive opening, religious seeking, and frame alignment – but cannot proceed to the final stage of socialization without the full completion of the previous three. For Sageman, it is an iterative process that drives the individual through constant simultaneous moral outrage, interpretation, and resonance with personal experience, with the chance of network mobilization occurring during – and in between – each successive iteration. For Silber and Bhatt (of the NYPD Intelligence Unit), the process is a linear combination of multiple processes from pre-radicalization to the in-artfully termed “jihadization”.

All scholars agree that many who will embark on this process will not finish it. Some will eventually reject the implications that come from the internalization of the Global Jihad Movement’s ‘grand narrative’, others may radicalize in their world-view but not seek to act out violently – instead choosing to become online force-multipliers of the jihadist message, aptly named “jihobbyists” by counter-terror analyst Jarrett Brachman.

After an analysis of both cases, and the work of these scholars, it becomes clear that a citizen does not go to bed at night, and wake up a shahid – this is a long social and psychological process that necessarily does not occur in a vacuum.

All those who radicalize first experience a crisis that compels them to seek new explanation to define their world – that confirms that their perceived marginalization was not their fault, but the result of powers external to their lives; their moral shock or cultural frustration creates a cognitive opening, which leads many to redefine their identity, and to seek cognitive bridges between their life experience and the common experience of those who share similar grievances. This new interpretation leads many to adopt a new frame for interpreting events both personal and global, and to seek out others with similar interpretations. Finally, few of these citizens will radicalize to the point of action – seeking to strike a blow against the perceived cause of their victimization.

To many western Muslims, this process is defined as a struggle for agency. They begin their radicalization feeling powerless and pushed aside by their home nation or culture, unable to enact change in either their personal lives or within their societies. They can no more find healthy relationships or desired levels of social mobility than they can alter the outcomes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As these frustrated citizens begin seeking alternate explanations for their lack of power, many encounter the grand narrative of the Global Jihad Movement – which espouses the idea that the West is entrenched in a war against the Islamic faith – both abroad in conflict regions like Iraq or Afghanistan, but also domestically against Western Muslim citizens.

To a select few young Muslims, this is at once infuriating and comforting. It causes rage in their perception of the “wrongness” of a seemingly hypocritical west that preaches freedom of faith, while seeking to destroy those who are non Judeo-Christian; but it also comforting in that it allows the individual to explain their unhappiness with their lives as the result of exogenous forces more powerful than they – allowing them to defer responsibility over their status quo to the state. At this point, an individual will begin internalizing this new identity, and adopting a frame that enables them to universally explain all things vis-à-vis this millennial ‘us vs. them’ struggle of faiths through a zero-sum lens. From here, the radicalizing individual will begin seeking new pathways to regain their ‘stolen’ agency by allying themselves with the “underground majority” of the dijihad – and eventually seeking new offline relationships with those like-minded fellow travelers.

This is the crucial point for those radicalizing from citizen to shahid. Offline relationships will provide the individual with a support structure of similarly frustrated individuals, who seemingly reify the perceived “wrongness” of the western status-quo, and whose peer pressure may push all involved to attempt to enact change through violent action. Throughout the Global Jihad Movement’s strategic communications and the multiple sectors of the dijihad, there are many examples of how individuals from around the world have ‘regained their dignity’ through the ‘glory of sacrifice’. To those that are frustrated by their assumed mantle of victimhood, the bloody act of the archetypical shahid is one that allows the suicide bomber to reject the West, victimize the victimizer, show bravery, and show commitment to the ideals of those whom they now consider brothers and sisters in jihad. It allows, in the radicalized mind, for a shocking display of agency – showing that the attacker has ultimate control not only over his or her life, but also over the lives of an attacker’s victims – yet it can be described (in the language of the Global Jihad Movement) not as a selfish act of violence, but as a selfless act of sacrifice for the greater good of the umma.

To the non-radicalized mind, this process is madness – yet, as this paper has shown, radicalization is not a process driven by psychopathic urges. Furthermore, all studies agree that there is no set “type” that will embark on this process. Understanding the logical processes and stages that can transform the citizen to shahid is essential. This threat will not end, and, if the data is to be believed, the threat from self-starter members of the Global Jihad Movement’s third generation is the one the West is worst equipped to counter.

Historical Fallacies in Afghanistan

2010-05-09T19:51:00.002-04:00

William Dalrymple is one of my favorite writers. City of Djinns, The Last Mughal, and White Mughals are among the finest sources available on the history of India, and From the Holy Mountain is an intellectual travelogue, blending the ancient and modern Middle East. But his recent op-ed in the New York Times, The Ghosts of Gandamak, is a disappointment. Dalrymple's sense of history and lively narrative ability are abundant, but his decision to abuse the tired trope about Afghanistan's invulnerability to conquest is a waste.

Dalrymple recounts the disastrous British invasion in 1839; with particular focus on the 1842 massacre at Gandamak. The heart of his story is in the present, when he ventures to Gandamak for research and narrowly avoids getting caught in the midst of a battle between the local Taliban and government forces. The cause, according to Dalrymple, was government neglect. Soldiers last year eradicated the poppy crop and promised full compensation, but never delivered. This year, after repeated attempts to obtain their due, villagers teamed with Taliban fighters to prevent Afghan forces from burning the poppy crop.

This story is sadly easy to believe. However, its relationship with the 1842 massacre is unclear. Dalrymple attempts to draw the lesson that military solutions alone are inadequate; if that's the status of the enlightened discourse about the Afghanistan campaign we are all in dire straits. That a political initiative is needed is apparently to all non-comatose observers, and although Dalrymple's advice to negotiate with the Taliban may be correct, it is in no way supported by his historical analogy.

I find it infuriating when a discussion of strategy in Afghanistan is hijacked by the fallacy that it is an inherently ungovernable zone. This position invokes the argument Seth Jones made when writing In the Graveyard of Empires: that would-be conquerors, from Alexander the Great through the British Empire, met their downfall in the mountains and valleys of Afghanistan at the hands of fiercely independent natives. The only lesson that can be learned from this teleological reading of history is to avoid Afghanistan at all costs, because forces sinister and free lurk to thwart the aspiring invader.

This notion, to be charitable, is rubbish. Afghanistan is difficult to govern because of its vast size and rugged terrain, but it is scarcely the only inhospitable ground on earth. It is no more or less difficult to control than any topographically similar area. Relying on this simplistic formulation to explain contemporary events dangerously obscures important factors and places undue emphasis on irrelevant areas.

There is value in Dalrymple, but it has nothing to do with the failings of the British or events of 1842. Instead, his tale should serve as another reminder of what we already know: no measure of success is possible in Afghanistan without good governance from Kabul; but all parties are falling drastically short in that metric. A failed 19th century British invasion holds no explanatory power nor relevant information about the continuing failure of President Hamid Karzai to provide basic services or tackle corruption, and that is the point which matters.

The LRA (continued)

2010-05-05T13:01:00.000-04:00

We seem to have sparked a debate here about the LRA, and I invite everyone to contribute. This is a complex issue fraught with implications for human rights, sovereignty, and regional politics, and I think it would behoove us all to carefully unpack and analyze each component.
To begin with, commenter "Caroline" raised some excellent points about the desirability of a military approach and other alternatives, and I would like to highlight her thoughts and respond to here.

Caroline:

Dave, Thanks for writing about this important topic on your blog. I generally agree with your arguments here but have to disagree on a few points.

First, you say "America has the power to catch Kony, but not the will." I agree with you that the US will never deploy troops to capture or kill Kony. No matter how many human rights organizations jump up and down decrying the abuses of the LRA, the US will never deploy troops to capture or kill Kony. I am less certain, however, that the US actually has the power to do so -- effectively. Granted, I am not an expert on the tactics and capabilities of US Special Forces, but if faulty US intelligence was one of the reasons why the attack on Kony in December 2008 failed so catastrophically, I am not confident that the US is the best candidate for capturing him. In order to carry this out, the US would have to spend a significant amount of time gathering intel on a region of northeastern Congo and southeastern CAR that I am almost certain they are not familiar with. I highly doubt the US would commit Special Forces to spend the required amount of time gathering this intel if they did decide to launch an operation. And if they don't gather the intel, the operation will no doubt fail. Again.

This leads me to my second point. I believe discussing the military option surrounding the LRA is not a constructive debate. Neither the US nor the EU will commit the time or troops needed to capture Kony, so any operation they launch would likely fail. Continuing the debate on the military option, in my opinion, is not the direction the debate should be going. I realize there are strong vested interests in Uganda that encourage this debate, but it is a dangerous one. One glance through the Human Rights Watch reports on the consequences of the December 2008 operation should lead readers to understand that pursuing this route is both foolish and highly irresponsible given the civilian costs.

What then is the solution? I don't have an easy one. I would advocate for a return to the negotiating table, an increase in MONUC deployments (with contingents ready to use force to defend civilians) to areas at risk from LRA attack, an increase in Ugandan and possibly Rwandan deployments to Obo in CAR, and strong US, EU, and AU pressure on Khartoum to stop its recently renewed support to the LRA. All of these efforts should be focused on the protection of the civilian population, not on killing Kony. Pursuing the military option is entirely irresponsible and disregards the reality of civilian life that is lost in its wake.

Thanks in advance for considering my comments.

First of all, thanks for reading. You make some insightful and important points, and I think you and I agree on most aspects here.

Your first point, about the necessity of good intel to catch Kony, is absolutely true. It's one of the many reasons I believe the U.S. won't become more heavily involved. As you point out, gathering intel requires personnel, time, and money, and I don't believe the Obama Administration is prepared to commit those resources for a sustained effort. The difference between the U.S. and the regional governments is in capacity. The U.S. could put together the required intel if so inclined, whereas the Ugandan, Congolese, Sudanese, and CAR governments simply don't have the ability to undertake such a large, complex operation.

Your second point is also quite astute - I agree that the military option holds little promise so long as the US and EU are not willing to commit. Not only is the military option unlikely to catch Kony, but it also comes with severe human rights consequences, as you point out. This unfortunately is not a new aspect to the campaign against the LRA; the Ugandan military was responsible for despicable human rights violations in northern Uganda when pursuing Kony.

I disagree, however, with your conclusions.
I don't think going back to the negotiating table is a viable option. Kony has proven that he isn't actually interested in peace or any sort of political solution. Freed LRA fighters have testified that Kony used the Juba talks to rearm and resupply. Juba was his best chance at an equitable agreement and avoiding the ICC, and he turned it down. Arguments are often made that the ICC warrant is the final straw preventing Kony from coming in, but I don't buy it. I agree with Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo, who has assembled a great deal of information on the LRA and concluded that Kony has no desire for peace - he manipulated good faith negotiations to strengthen is own agenda, and then reverted back to destruction as soon as he was physically capable. Negotiations with Kony are a dead end.

I like your other suggestions - increased MONUC deployments and strong international pressure on Khartoum - but I fear that they too are infeasible.

MONUC is struggling to make any difference in the Kivus, Kabila wants them to withdraw ASAP, and it's unlikely that any country would step forward with troops to find Kony. I also doubt that the UN would allow MONUC to operate with such the aggressive force posture that would be required to take find the LRA. Protection of Civilians has been a disaster for MONUC so far in the DRC, and attempting to protect scattered villages across the vast north of the country would require a significant increase in troops (which I don't foresee) and a commitment to a robust PoC mandate (which I don't see the UN providing). In theory MONUC could be part of the solution, but in reality it seems unlikely.

Likewise, getting Khartoum to cease support for Kony is necessary, but easier said than done. Bashir has yet to bow to international pressure on other issues, and I doubt that the LRA would take precedence over South Sudan or Darfur among the priorities of the international community. It could possibly be a face-saving measure for Bashir - compromise on a relatively insignificant issue, the LRA, to appease the West while holding firm on his core desires in the South and in Darfur - but it also wouldn't be the first time he pledged to cut off the LRA. Any promises from Khartoum should be taken with a liberal dosage of salt.

Like you said, there is no easy solution. The long-term key is to increase the ability of the regional states to control and police their own territory, but I think you and I would agree that day is well in the future. I still believe it's necessary to understand the constitution and operating orders of the LRA in greater detail to craft a successful strategy, be it civilian or military. And despite the civilian costs that have accompanied military action, I'm not sure I see an alternative. We can take steps to minimize the associated human rights violations, but the only other option to military action I see is to allow Kony to roam free - and I certainly do not think that's a viable way forward.

Back to the LRA (finally)

2010-05-04T21:01:00.000-04:00

In case you're just tuning in, a few weeks ago Michael Wilkerson wrote a piece for FP entitled "Why Can't Anyone Stop the LRA." I quibbled with a few points, and wrote up my objections here on D&D. Michael got wind of my response and wrote a supremely cogent rebuttal on his own blog, at which time the sheer hell of finals derailed me from ever posting a response. Here, slightly belatedly, is my answer (could we call it a re-re-response?).

While it's tempting to allow this to degrade into a snarky blog-war, (because, let's face it, that's fun) I prefer more serious analysis, and in fact Michael and I agree on most points. And even where our opinions differ, I wouldn't say we disagree so much as we have slightly different interpretations.

We agree (and Michael, please correct me if I err here) that the regional governments, South Sudan, CAR, and DRC, are extremely weak. Michael notes that "regional governments are working together - at least on paper" and I agree, and it seems as though we concur in our analysis that this coordination is, practically speaking, essentially worthless.

We also share the belief that if the U.S. was seriously committed the LRA would soon be eliminated. He has a great line here about the level of American commitment:

But that’s akin to saying if Congress really wanted to balance the budget it would eliminate corn subsidies. There may be a lot of truth there but that doesn’t put it very far within the realm of political possibility.

I agree wholeheartedly here; and Michael I would like to eventually discuss the merits of the increasing U.S. military presence in Africa. My point in raising the specter of greater U.S. involvement in the chase for Kony is to critique those very factors that make it an infeasible outcome - America has the power to catch Kony, but not the will, and this must be considered among the sad reasons the LRA is still at-large.

But we do have our disagreements. At the end of his rebuttal, Michael objects to my characterization of the Ugandan forces as "rag-tag" and points to the presence of former LRA fighters in their midst to substantiate his point. I respectfully disagree. Perhaps the term "rag-tag" is altogether too vague. I take the point that these are not bottom-of-the-barrel troops - certainly these Ugandan units are superior to their Congolese colleagues. And they appear to be better behaved than other branches of Ugandan military, which committed innumerable human rights violations in the campaign to chase the LRA from Uganda. The Gettleman article Michael cites even quotes a representative from Human Rights Watch praising their behavior, a welcome change from the past.

But talk about damning with faint praise - those are some weak comparisons. Militarily, perhaps the best way measure of the competence of the Ugandan troops is to look at their results, and they are not positive. Kony is still roaming free, and reportedly has popped up everywhere from the DRC to Darfur. And even with logistical aid from the U.S., as Michael touts, and intel contributions prior to Operation Lightning Thunder, they have been unable to corral Kony.

This is where Michael and I differ most sharply, though on a theoretical rather than practical level. I believe that part of the reason the LRA remains at large is a failure to accurately conceptualize and analyze them as an organization. The LRA lacks serious political goals (Kony occasionally pays lip service to the idea of ruling Uganda, but his actions belie that goal). Nor do they have the support of the populace, on ethnic or ideological lines, to conduct a classic Maoist Peoples War. But, on the other extreme, they don't seem to be engaged in criminal trafficking except to support their own existence. In short, who the hell are the LRA? If they aren't traditional insurgents or guerrillas, but they aren't criminals, who are they?

This is not simply an academic question. How can you effectively target a group if you don't understand their motives and goals? Overlooking the nature of the LRA is one of the reasons Operations Lightning Thunder was such a spectacular failure. The Ugandan military (and, presumably, their U.S. supporters) were stuck in the old RMA mindset about the superiority and universal applicability of air power. The massive bombing raids that characterized the operation would have been appropriate for the skies over Nazi Germany, but not for finding and eliminating a small group of fighters. New enemies call for new tactics, and that lesson has gone unheeded.

There is some promise of innovation in the Ugandan's use of former LRA members as trackers, but it is an incredibly risky move and I think it also speaks to the paucity of ability among Ugandan units. I have seen no coherent attempts to understand the existence of the LRA as anything but a band of cult killers and their brainwashed followers. Even if that is their raison d'etre, there needs to be some work done on utilizing that information to form a coherent strategy. Simply hunting Kony across such a vast area with little idea of where he will go next, or why, is an awfully tall task.

I don't pretend to know how to understand the LRA, and so I'll bounce that (possibly impossible) question back to Michael. But I do think it's important to become familiar with the enemy, otherwise any strategy risks being misguided.

In the final tally, Michael and I seem to see eye-to-eye on most aspects of the LRA. But, Michael, what do you make of the LRA, and can we use that information to better formulate a strategy for stopping them?

In the Meantime, Read This

2010-04-30T13:56:00.000-04:00

Apologies to all for my absentee blogging. I'd like to come up with a detailed and sophisticated explanation, but quite simply finals are kicking my ass and I have no free time to sleep, let along blog.

I have quite a list of topics to tackle, starting with my long-overdue response to Mike Wilkerson about the LRA and some thoughts on the latest RAND study. With any luck I'll be back in the flow next week.

Until there, here are is a bizarre, insane, and utterly fascinating Vanity Fair story about a born-again American Hells Angel, roaming Sudan and trying to kill Joseph Kony.

A Belated Analysis of the Obama Nuclear Posture Review

2010-04-30T10:49:00.007-04:00

(A belated analysis of the Obama Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, released on April 5, 2010)

The Obama Nuclear Posture Review is a profoundly political document whose main effect is diplomatic. It makes no major strategic changes to US nuclear doctrine, and the changes it does make are hedged by reservations. The document’s major departure from its predecessor, the Bush Administration’s 2002 NPR, is that of tone. As one reviewer noted, President Obama is no longer brandishing “a nuclear sword in every direction," which is the main legacy of this review.

First to the details. The review eschews a policy that the “sole use” of nuclear weapons is for deterrence, instead declaring that

“The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.

The NPR sends a message to North Korea and Iran, declaring that

"the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations."

While the US will not use nuclear weapons to counter a chemical weapons attack, the review includes an exception for biological weapons, stating that

"the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat."

Regarding the contentious issue of the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the NPR states that

"The United States will consult with our allies regarding the future basing of nuclear weapons in Europe, and is committed to making consensus decisions through NATO processes."

In essence, although abandoning the bluster of the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration still maintains the right to use nuclear weapons outside of the context of a nuclear attack on the United States, and clearly describes North Korea and Iran as countries for which any assurances do not apply. Although this represents a shift in tone from the Bush years, its strategic impact is minimal. In fact, Stephen Walt has gone so far as to declare that “from a purely strategic perspective, this new statement is largely meaningless.”

Now to the politics. (more after the jump)

It isn’t a coincidence that the release of the NPR on April 5, 2010 was the one year anniversary of the president’s speech in Prague, where he outlined a vision of “a world without nuclear weapons.” The administration knew that the introduction to any story about the NPR would include his 2009 speech, with an image of President and Mrs. Obama in front of the historic Prague skyline on b-roll. The previous pronouncements of the president were further referenced by Secretary Gates, who in his press conference emphasized that the NPR is part of overall US policy with a “long-term goal of a nuclear free world.” Domestically, this amounts to a large political gesture to the left, who overwhelmingly support the “elimination of all nuclear weapons.”

At the same time, President Obama conceded politically to the right, maintaining significant reservations in US strategic nuclear policy and a “tough” stance toward Iran and North Korea.
Disregarding exhortations from the policy community and the left to adopt a policy that the “sole use” of nuclear weapons would be for deterrence, Obama instead had the NPR adopt the “fundamental role” language outlined previously. Although the difference seems largely semantic, anything less than “sole use” is a significant signal. This type of “toughness hedge,” viewed by many as unnecessary from a policy standpoint, was no doubt used to preempt and deter the inevitable attacks from the right on Obama’s more conciliatory rhetoric. In addition, the document’s reservation to make “adjustments” regarding biological weapons developments is a stark reminder of US willingness to fight back. This type of language, abhorred by many on the left, is just the thing to remind conservative Americans that Obama is in fact their Commander in Chief.

Beyond the push and pull of domestic politics, the same dynamic can be seen in the diplomatic arena. The odd combination of conciliatory rhetoric and unchanged strategic nuclear policy will likely have the effect of placating allies longing for less abrasive American leadership, while at the same time issuing a stern warning to the “outliers” of North Korea and Iran. Politically, this seems to work for the US’s allies, but its effectiveness vis-à-vis Kim Jong Il and President Ahmadinejad is likely to be minimal, if not counter-productive.

In addition, the argument that the NPR is a mainly political and diplomatic document is strengthened by the fact that the NPR is merely “declaratory policy,” is not binding in any way, and can be changed at any time. Declaratory policy, not even rising to the level of an executive order, is by definition rhetoric.

Is the Nuclear Posture Review “just” a political scrap of paper? No, surely not. It puts a crucial emphasis on the threat of unsecured fissile material and the threat of nuclear terrorism, a first in a nuclear posture review. But the appropriate frame with which to view the NPR is that of political balancing, not that of strategic transformation. Obama, as the president of a politically polarized country and the leader of the free world, must balance many constituencies in the policies he makes. In those roles, tone matters a lot.

The Afghan National Assembly Comes Into Its Own

2010-04-29T15:36:00.003-04:00

Beka Feathers
Demagogues and Dictators Afghanistan Parliamentary Analyst

As the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated over the past two years, the public narrative has increasingly resembled a litany of failure: the central government is full of corrupt warlords who are tied to the drug trade, violate human rights with impunity, and are interested in the idea of governance only insofar as they can profit from it. The Afghan National Police are brutal, biased and uninterested in upholding the rule of law. Corrupt officials are becoming more prevalent than opium poppies. As a result, establishing legitimate government has become critical to success in all other areas of the mission in Afghanistan.

In all the fuss about the failures of the central government, however, a surprising success story is being overlooked. The Afghan National Assembly, the country’s highest representative institution, has begun, quietly, to govern. This is a surprise not only because the parliament has long been the forgotten stepchild of the Bonn Process, but also because Karzai and his international allies have done everything possible to prevent the parliament from becoming a strong check to the presidency.

Afghanistan is one of the most centralized countries in the world, and almost everything leads back to Karzai sooner or later. Consider: In Afghanistan, the President has the power to make the budget, pass decrees, hire governors and police chiefs, even to appoint teachers to local schools. Electoral law makes it almost impossible for political parties to operate by forbidding them to organize along any of the nationally recognized identity lines. The international community has largely supported Karzai’s attempts to further consolidate power in his person. The parliament, meanwhile, has lagged behind other government institutions in funding, resources, and capacity.

But starting this year, the parliament seems to have found its feet. Since January, it has challenged Karzai to appoint qualified ministers instead of warlords and cronies, rejected his attempted takeover of the independent Electoral Complaints Commission (the same body that found a third of his votes fraudulent in the election last fall), and refused to serve as a rubber stamp for decrees. In fact, it's been doing what so many outside observers have said is necessary to keep the government from collapsing entirely: serving as a legitimate, Afghan-led check on Karzai's administration.

This is in part because the people now running the parliament are the people who are truly committed to the long-term vision of a peaceful, democratic Afghanistan. They are not operating without spoilers; this is not a parliament of angels. As an excellent Washington Post piece pointed out last week,

"The parliament remains a rogues' gallery of drug barons, criminals and warlords. Many members are uneducated and even illiterate. But the complexion of parliament has shifted over the past year, as the warlords lost interest and a group of reformers -- including many women -- coalesced into a working group of approximately 30 that increasingly drives the body's agenda. "

As the warlords grow bored or disinterested, a space is opening up for people who are genuinely committed to effecting change. Women, minorities, reform-minded moderates who aren’t Karzai loyalists and don’t have an ear in ISAF headquarters now have a place to stand up to the warlords and corrupt officials and demonstrate to the Afghan people that a democratic government truly can look out for their interests.

It is therefore unfortunate that the international community has been so determinedly unengaged with the parliament. When it rejected more than half of his Cabinet appointees on the grounds that they "couldn't even run a small government office," Kai Eide, the UN's special representative in Afghanistan, called the move "a political setback," despite the fact that ISAF and UNAMA had themselves spent months advocating for more qualified Cabinet appointments. This is a problem not only because it indicates a profound ignorance of public opinion on the issue of corruption, but because it undermines exactly the kind of democratic accountability the international community wants and needs to foster.

Like the rest of the Afghan government, the parliament is an imperfect institution. It is not the magic bullet that will transform a government riddled with corruption and abuse. But it is the only government body with both the ability and the will to stand up to Karzai’s one-man destruction derby. Parliamentary elections are coming up in September, and a new crop of reformers are launching their campaigns. If the US and its allies are serious about building a long-term legitimacy for a democratic government that truly represents the needs of Afghans, they should move working with the parliament to the top of their political agenda.

Beka Feathers is a student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Boston, MA. She studies the role of institutions in conflict-affected societies, with a particular emphasis on legislatures and parliaments. She has worked on legislative issues in a variety of contexts with legislatures from Oregon to Cambodia.

Returning

2010-04-26T14:39:00.000-04:00

I have just returned from an exhausting weekend in the woods as a participant in the 2010 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative field simulation. It was quite a weekend, and between conducting rapid assessments on refugee camps and being ambushed by "militia" I didn't have much time for anything else.

In the next few I days I hope to catch up on the news (and my sleep), and I'm starting with a new report from RAND - How Insurgencies End. I'll check back in when finished. Anybody out there with thoughts on this study?

Tomorrow's Headline: North Korean Suicide Torpedo Squadron Implicated in the Sinking of the Cheonan

2010-04-23T23:40:00.008-04:00

A few months back, we reported here at D&D on the crisis surrounding artillery barrages fired by North and South Korean forces into the highly contested maritime zone along the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Western Sea.

That escalation has continued, though our coverage of it has not. I have been hesitant to speculate on the swirling crisis around the suspicious sinking of the South Korean Corvette Cheonan on March 26, that claimed the lives of 46 sailors.

I was hesitant, mainly because there was little more than speculation around the causality of the Cheonan's sinking. Tonight, it appears that our wait may be over.

Whispers have been leaking from the South Korean defense establishment all day today, as the South Korean navy raised the sunken half of the Cheonan from the bottom of the Western Sea -- looking for answers.

Yonhap news has begun publishing, and then removing, some of these whispers:

"It is the military intelligence's assessment that the North attacked with a heavy torpedo."

Chosun Ibo, a South Korean Daily, has run with the story.

The inference is that the North Koreans have made the first combat-effective use of their rumored suicide torpedo units. The units have been, to this point, mythic -- a boogie man brought out in the debriefings of high-value North Korean defectors, who describe a unit of 13 specially trained special forces members, and modified midget submarines. The Telegraph reports now that sources claim these men were responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan.

Image Courtesy of Chosun Ibo

(more after the jump)

If true, the orders to strike the Cheonan came from the very top -- Kim Jong Il, who personally commands this special unit of suicide submariners. Riding modified Japanese Kaitans, these men may have given their lives to commit the bloodiest action since the cease fire between North and South in 1953.

The accusation, should it be born out by the investigation, will be send shockwaves through the region. The crisis in the Western Ocean along the NLL has been escalating for over a year now, with fire exchanged by both sides, and casualties taken in escalating numbers. While the 'long fuse' of North/South Korean tension has been rising since the cessation of hostilities, the actions along the NLL in the Western Ocean are escalating in frequency and seriousness.

It started last March, with North Korea's declaration for a No Sail-No Fly zone along the NLL. A month later, a South Korean Naval Patrol opened fire on a North Korean vessel that had crossed the NLL. Six days later, the South was forced to evacuate its naval assets from the region when they detected North Korean land to sea missile radars painting their ships.

Both sides have been moving land-based and sea based assets into the region. At first it appeared that North Korea intended to begin a new battery of missile tests in the region -- and wanted to keep inquisitive eyes clear of the region.

The North declared the NLL a "peacetime firing zone", unilaterally banned all commercial transit along the line -- east of the island of Baeknyeong and and west of the island of Daechyong, both locations of South Korean Naval and Marine Bases. One day later, they signalled their intent to enforce their declaration, and fired hundreds of artillery rounds into the zone.

If the Cheonan was sunk by a North Korean torpedo, it will stand as an escalatory fait accompli that South Korea will find very difficult to ignore, especially as domestic pressure rises in the South, and international pressure ramps up in the region.

My snap analysis back in March may still stand -- North Korea may still intend a new round of missile tests based near the NLL, especially as the joint Japanese-US SM3 missile defense programs are showing impressive progress. However, North Korea may have finally become too zealous in their escalatory tactics in the Western Sea.

Time will tell, but a crisis is brewing in an area where crises should not brew. The message is clear -- North Korea will respond to any perceived Southern naval dominance. The naval action of Nov. 10, 2009 was generally considered a victory for the South, and cost North Korea the life of at least one sailor. Their response?

Look for the headlines tomorrow.

For a closer look at the escalating crisis, see the time line below:

March 29, 2009 -- North Korea Declares 2 "No Sail/No Fly" Zones in the long-contested Western sea border between North and South Korea

November 10, 2009 -- A South Korean Patrol Ship opened fire on a North Korean naval vessel that had crossed the NLL (northern limit line), exchanging fire with that vessel, killing one North Korean sailor, wounding 3.

November 16, 2009 -- South Korea evacuates naval ships from the Western sea after detecting signs that North Korea had activated radar for surface to ship missiles deployed on the Ongjin Peninsula, Hwanghai Province, and had painted South Korean ships.

December 22, 2009 -- North Korea declared a "peacetime firing zone" along both sides of the NLL, to counter "the reckless military provocative manoeuvres by the warmongers in the South Korean military." warning of the deployment of both land based artillery and land to sea missiles.

January 25, 2010 -- North Korea unilaterally announced a shipping ban on both sides of the NLL, specifically in the region of east of the island of Baeknyeong and and west of the island of Daechyong, both locations of South Korean Naval and Marine Bases.

January 26, 2010 -- North Korea opened fire with land based artillery into the contested maritime border region, an action that was met with retaliatory "warning shots" fired by South Korean forces.

March 26, 2010 -- The Cheonan suffered a devastating explosion below the waterline, the explosion occurred away from ordinance storage, weapons systems, or fuel tanks.

The Broken Confirmation System

2010-04-21T14:21:00.008-04:00

The Treasury Department finally has an Undersecretary for International Affairs. Lael Brainard, was confirmed yesterday by the full Senate by an overwhelming majority after a wait of more than a year.

Let's take this step-by-step. Brainard was nominated on March 24, 2009. Her nomination was held up by Senate Republicans because of problems with her tax returns, specifically a problem with her "home-office tax deduction." However, Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona was also worried about the expansion of internet gambling. On April 19, 2010 (two days ago), the Senate voted 84-10 for cloture on Brainard's nomination. The next day (yesterday), the Senate voted 78-19 to confirm Brainard.

This is a problem.

I understand that in the US political system, the US Senate's role is to "advice and consent" to the President's nomination. I understand that the minority party must exercise its power in creative ways to foil the efforts of the majority party. I also understand that you have limited options when the opposing party holds the presidency and large majorities in the House and Senate.

But really?

Brainard is nothing if not qualified. Her resume includes Deputy National Economic Advisor for President Bill Clinton; Vice President and Founding Director of the Brookings Institution's Global Economy and Development Program; Associate Professor of Applied Economics at MIT Sloan School; a White House Fellow; and a National Science Foundation Fellow. She isn't crazy, or a criminal. For the record, her husband, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, was confirmed in June 2009, so the tax issues were not the reason. And finally, when you're confirmed by 78-19, there clearly wasn't that much worry over your nomination.

The confirmation process is broken, if not (hyperbole coming!) horribly, irreversibly, and ridiculously broken. The Senate is entitled to its role in the foreign policy process, but what does it accomplish to deprive the Treasury Department of a point-person on international affairs during the greatest financial meltdown since the Great Depression? It knee-caps the department and makes it less able to function. That is the point of Senate Republicans' efforts.

Lots of people have put a lot of thought into reforming the process and streamlining presidential appointments. But the bottom line is that in a system built on checks and balances between the "political branches of government," politics trumps. I know Democrats engage in obstructionism while in the minority, and that is the way it works. But blocking a nominee for 13 months because of an unrelated policy difference (by no more than 20% of the Senate) is over the line, and should be called out as such.

UPDATE: I should add that this applies to appointees who serve in presidential administrations, NOT to nominees for the Supreme Court. The serve for life, unlike most nominees who serve for the duration of an administration.

A Ground View on the LRA

2010-04-20T14:48:00.000-04:00

Thoughts on the LRA from Louisa Seferis,
Demagogues and Dictators Sudan Region Analyst

I'd like to point out 2 things:

1) The U.S. did lend Marines to help collect information for Operation Lightning Thunder in 2008-9.

The Enough Project and others have commented on Operation Lightning Thunder, the operation that attempted to "catch" Joseph Kony when he was in DRC. I can personally attest to Marines' sudden presence in Northern Uganda in mid-2008, which seemed strange at the time. We were told they were stationed there for "regional information gathering" because USAID had just established a permanent office in Gulu, Northern Uganda. Later it became apparently that this was recon for Operation LT.

The operation failed miserably and it was an embarrassment to all involved. I won't go into the details here, but the Enough Project does a pretty thorough analysis of the dynamics involved (http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/finishing-fight-against-lra-strategy-paper), and I believe Newsweek wrote a lengthy piece (in 2009?) mentioning specifically that Kony seemed to know that the attack was going to take place. Also, Ron Atkinson, a renowned scholar of the Ugandan civil conflict, wrote a 2 part analysis of OLT for The Independent (http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/column/insight/67-insight/1039-revisiting-operation-lightning-thunder). All said and done, if the U.S. had wanted to help they should have gone in all the way - the half-assed assistance didn't do any good.

2) Stopping the LRA isn't just about resources.

In addition to being predominantly composed of women, children, and youth who have spent most of their adolescent/adult lives in captivity, the LRA usually travels in TINY numbers. They are "bush people" - they have survived like this for literally decades.
In Gulu in 2007, we had a scare in a completely safe, government-controlled area because 5 former LRA didn't move to the assembly points in South Sudan designed by the summer 2006 ceasefire: they hid in the Ugandan bush and came out literally a year later. We worked extensively in that area, but they knew the bush far better than even the internally displaced people, and managed to elude anyone in the area for months! (I should also mention the bush is ridiculously thick, even more so in the DRC - only motorcycles can pass, and only during the dry season.)

Just last week the LRA attacked a couple of villages in northeastern DRC and mutilated a few people in the brutal ways they used against their own people in the 1980s and 1990s (cutting off lips, ears, noses, etc.). Apparently it was only 3-7 LRA rebels posing as refugees who managed to abduct a few individuals to gain access to food. These are hungry, emotionally destroyed people who are used to a level of violence that is incomprehensible. If they could abuse and torture their own tribe, the Acholi, they can certainly do it to others without blinking. I blame Museveni for convincing them to meet in a safe space like South Sudan in 2006, and then reinforcing the Sudan-Uganda border so it was impossible to re-enter. We watched as young men and women emerged from the bush in August 2006 and WALKED to the assembly points. We prepared for an influx of 2,000+ women and children from the LRA to be returned to Northern Uganda and reintegrated into their communities, but it never happened. The LRA suddenly became someone else's problem. Museveni consequently scored some major development projects (USAID, EU, etc.) in 2008.

The last thing I'll say is that a lot of these LRA rebels have Stockholm syndrome in the worst way. I've worked with people who spent 5+ years in the bush with Kony, and although they now hold steady jobs and live somewhat normal lives, they still believe Kony has magical powers. Indeed, when Operation LT failed, Newsweek (or was it Time Mag?) quoted some people as saying it was as if Kony predicted the attack and dispersed his "troops" before they could be eliminated. This mysticism (not to mention the years of abduction or forced marriage and children) permeates Kony's hobbling troops. The LRA is the weakest yet nastiest and most pointless killing machine on the planet, there is no doubt about it.

Louisa Seferis is a Masters candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, focusing on conflict resolution and human security. She has worked in Subsaharan Africa for 4 years specializing in internal displacement, reconciliation, and post-conflict reintegration, including 2 years in Gulu

Murder in Kandahar

2010-04-20T13:38:00.000-04:00

Yesterday the Taliban killed the deputy mayor of Kandahar, Azizullah Yarmal. He was apparently was widely regarded as an honest and effective leader, unlike most of his colleagues. As Spencer Ackerman notes, this is clearly a setback to U.S. goals, as after the planned summer offensive in Kandahar providing good governance will require dedicated civil servants like Deputy Mayor Yarmal.

However, there is a silver lining. The method the Taliban used to kill the deputy mayor was quite brutal, even by their standards.

Deputy Mayor Azizullah Yarmal walked into a mosque in central Kandahar, turned toward Mecca and began to pray. As he reached the point where he and the others in the mosque knelt in unison and then bent forward to touch their foreheads to the ground, gunmen made their move, shooting him with a pistol, said Zalmy Ayoubi, a government spokesman.

I haven't studied the issue in depth, but my understand is that assassinations in mosques are generally frowned upon. We know the Taliban is borrowing from the U.S. COIN manual, and killing a man while in the act of prayer generally serves to enrage, not please, the local population. This move smacks of desperation. If the Taliban in Kandahar must resort to mosque assassinations, I would hazard a guess that they are back on their heels and struggling to achieve their aims.

It will be interesting to follow reports from the area and see if this event does indeed represent a Taliban overreach, and, much like happened to Zarqawi in Iraq, the violence becomes too much for residents to bear.

The Curious Case of Kaiser Soze al Baghdadi

2010-04-20T08:41:00.005-04:00

AQ Conspiracy theorists rejoice! Abu Omar al Baghdadi is back in the news -- and this time he's dead.

The reports (this time) came in from joint US and Iraqi forces. This week the Obama and al-Maliki governments confirmed the deaths of Abu Ayyub al Masri, the head of AQI, and Abu Omar al Baghdadi, the head of the Islamic State in Iraq -- an AQ affiliate. For those of us AQ watchers, the al Masri elimination has been completely overshadowed by the reports surrounding al Baghdadi. al Masri, you see, at least has been confirmed to possess corporeal form.

Al Baghdadi, on the other hand, has been reported "captured", "killed", and "non existent" multiple times since 2007. There has also been an incisive debate about his hair.

(more after the jump)

The Mysterious Mr. Baghdadi first appeared in whisper form as the heir apparent to the infamous Mr. Zarqawi, after the Jordanian was killed by US air strikes. Tapes began turning up in and around Iraq, with a fiery demagogue espousing anti-coalition sentiments -- purportedly from al Baghdadi, and as the Islamic State began stepping up mass casualty suicide attacks, Abu Omar became target number one.

In March, 2007, the Iraqis claimed to have captured al Baghdadi. A few days later, the Maliki governmentretracted their claim.

In April, 2007, the Iraqis announced they had killed al Baghdadi. Video tapes, purportedly from the Lazarus-like ISI leader continued to surface, railing against events that would have occurred after the Iraqis had killed him.

In July, 2007, The United States decided that al Baghdadi did not exist. He was, in their estimation, a creation of al Masri to put an Iraqi face on what was primarily a movement carried out by foreign fighters.

In April, 2009, The Iraqis again claimed to have captured, and interrogated the elusive man of mystery. The response in Anbar was one of puzzlement, as covered by Liz Sly at the LA Times:

Over in Anbar province, authorities say they have been hunting a different Baghdadi. "Wanted" pictures of that suspect, a bald man, are posted at checkpoints across Anbar, where the Islamic State of Iraq was founded in 2006.

Iraqi government officials say the man they are holding has confessed to being Baghdadi. Pictures they released clearly show a different man, one with hair.

Sheik Ali Hatem Sulaiman, who heads the Dulaim tribe in Anbar and is a founder of the Awakening movement that fought Sunni insurgents there, believes the central government has the wrong man.

"They are talking nonsense," he said of the claims. "The security forces are always making mistakes in which they confuse people. The real Abu Omar al Baghdadi is bald, while this man has hair."

And al Baghdadi's myth began to grow. Anbar Police Chief Gen. Tariq Yusuf said:

"Maybe there are two of them, in order to confuse the security services... there might be Abu Omar al Baghdadi No. 1 and Abu Omar al Baghdadi No. 2."

To recap, as of 2009 -- There were either zero, one, or two al Baghdadis -- possibly with or without hair.

And now, April 2010, the US and Iraqis seem to be in agreement. There was one al Baghdadi, and he is no more. If we are to believe the news (this time), he is not only real, but really dead. Time will tell.

Word is still out on the hair though.

An Answer to the LRA

2010-04-19T22:54:00.004-04:00

Michael Wilkerson over at FP poses a fairly simple question - why can't anyone stop the LRA? - and then fails to satisfactorily answer is own query. The short answer - regional governments are too weak to do anything, and nobody with sufficient resources (read: U.S.) is interested.

Why is the LRA still around? The Ugandan government has been trying to wipe out the group for ages, with some recent support from the United States. The governments of the DRC, South Sudan, and CAR have pitched in, all to no avail.
On top of it, the LRA should, in theory, be quite easy to defeat. It's relatively small -- according to a Ugandan Army spokesperson it has just 200 active fighters. The Enough Project estimates that there are another 800 or so kidnapped civilians on top of that -- two-thirds of which are likely children. The LRA has little firepower -- most of the DRC attacks were committed with blunt weapons like sticks and axes. It has no support from the civilians it preys on. Of course, its leader, the elusive and still at-large Joseph Kony, claims to commune with spirits and have mystical powers. But setting aside the supernatural, how is it possible that the LRA -- with no support base or weaponry -- is still thriving?

First of all, Wilkerson overplays the role of the U.S. Yes, in recent years, the America military has provided some intel and perhaps even a bit of training for the Ugandan Army. It's a nice PR gesture and an attempt to highlight the "good neighbor" aspects of the newly established AFRICOM. But that token support has been extremely limited, and there's only so much help AFRICOM can provide to Ugandan forces operating far outside their own country. If the U.S. was seriously committed to killing or capturing Kony, and provided a fraction of the resources going to Afghanistan, the LRA would no longer exist.

Second of all, the notion that "the governments of the DRC, South Sudan, and CAR have pitched in" is laughable. [READ MORE]
The Kabila regime has more than enough problems to worry about (I recommend the excellent Congo Siasa and Texas In Africa blogs for all the latest) and no capacity to spare for chasing rebels in scarcely-populated regions. Likewise, the Central African Republic is in disarray and completely unable to police it's own territory. South Sudan, in addition to not actually being a sovereign state, has been too preoccupied with it's own violence and elections and lacks the manpower and logistical capabilities to hunt the LRA in the bush.

Wilkerson does justly highlight the corruption of the Ugandan Army and the support Kony has received from the Sudanese regime in Khartoum. But his decision to frame the issue as LRA vs. conventional armies obscures a fundamental reason for Kony's survival - the LRA is not a classical guerrilla force. It does not have the support of the local populace, it is highly nomadic across international borders, and it subscribes to no coherent political ideology. It is akin to a roving band of criminals. Furthermore, despite what Wilkerson would have you believe, the small size of LRA forces is a distinct advantage. It's easier to hide 500 fighters than to hide 5,000.

The LRA is a problem, sowing instability and violence across multiple borders. To stop it, you must understand it, you must have the resources to find and fight it, and you must be committed. The ragtag "coalition" of governments and armed forces looking for Kony are unable to assemble all three of those necessary conditions. And that, Mr. Wilkinson, is your answer.

The Real Demagogues and Dictators

2010-04-17T14:55:00.002-04:00

Say what you will about the many tyrannical regimes around the globe, for my money they are few despots that can match the owners of professional sports teams. Jerry Jones, Mark Cuban, Daniel Snyder, and, of course, George Steinbrenner are about as vicious as they come. And the some of the divas among the ranks of professional athletes have reached a demagogue status to rival Joe McCarthy, at least in their own minds. Just ask Terrell Owens, Kobe Bryant, or Peyton Manning.

You may think this is just a lame attempt to run a scary picture of Jerry Jones and to blog about sports instead of important serious things. And you're right! But you know what? I've satisfied my own (minimal) criteria, and that's enough for me. So without further ado, here are my picks for the NBA Playoffs (and the obligatory creepy Jerry Jones photo).

Eastern Conference:

Cavs over Bulls in 5
- Bulls can take a game while LeBron shakes off the rust and they reintegrate Shaq into the offense, but that's it.

Hawks over Bucks in 5
- Losing Bogut means no chance for the Bucks.

Celtics over Heat in 5
- DWade is terrifying (as a Celtics fan), but his complete lack of a supporting cast dooms the Heat.

*Upset Special* Bobcats over Magic in 6
- Slightly crazy, I know, but I just can't buy into this Magic team. Howard is still limited offensively, and I have a hard time seeing any of their other guys creating for themselves offensively. Larry Brown has a crew of long, athletic defenders who can disrupt the Magic 3-point attack, and I think they can put together enough offense to steal the series.

Western Conference:

Lakers over Thunder in 7
- The Lakers are reeling and Durant can score on anyone anytime he wants, but they're still too young and green (not Jeff Green) and small in the middle to take down the champs.

Mavs over Spurs in 7
- This one will be a war. It all comes down to Manu, and I don't think he can take 4 games for the Spurs.

Suns over Blazers in 6
- No Brandon Roy means no second round for Portland.

Nuggets over Jazz in 6
- I know the Jazz are playing well and the Nuggets are struggled, but who is going to guard Carmelo? And never bet against Billups in the postseason.

Check back next week to laugh at me when my predication turn out to be terribly wrong.

The Weekly Reading

2010-04-17T12:33:00.001-04:00

It has not been a good week for essays, at least not for the ones I've read. If you've read anything that I've missed, please let me know in the Comments section.

Here is a recycled, but timely, C.J. Chivers piece about the Korengal Valley, and you can read Jeff's post for an update on what's changed since last August.

C.J. Chivers, Esquire - The Long Walk: Afghanistan (and Its Future) as You've Never Seen It

Eight years. Nearly eight years had passed since B-52 strikes and a Northern Alliance offensive had chased the Taliban from power in Kabul and President Bush had spoken triumphantly of American ideals and American power. Nearly four years had passed since the SEALs had died on this mountain, a battle far enough back to have been memorialized in a book. And still the Americans were here, sweeping the same ground, headed toward the wreckage ahead, somewhere up there, in the dark.
Each man silently peered down his dim green cone, breathing deeply, picking his next footstep, walking on.

And in honor of my favorite season, baseball season, getting fully underway, here are a few diamond stories - a new one, a classic, and (The Weekly Reading goes multimedia!) a must-see movie.

Marty Dobrow, ESPNBoston.com - Mixing memory with desire: Lary Hasenfus, a 58-year-old knuckleballer, finds new life on the collegiate mound

So it was no surprise that when he was sent out to the bullpen, the dugout came alive with chatter: "Now's the time, Larry. Go get 'em, seven. Here we go, Larry, Larry Kid."
Looking like some sepia-toned image from Ken Burns' movie studio, Larry wipes the sweat from his handlebar mustache (a follicular time machine: gray in the middle, reddening as it curls out to the sides). He then swings both of his arms behind him, kicks his right leg in the air and delivers the ball right into the catcher's target.
Larry is raring to go at age 58.

Richard Ben Cramer, Esquire - What Do You Think of Ted Williams Now?

He's always first, 8:00 A.M., at the tennis club. He's been up for hours, he's ready. He fidgets, awaiting appearance by some other, any other, man with a racket, where upon Ted bellows, before the newcomer can say hello: "WELL, YOU WANNA PLAY?" Ted's voice normally emanates with gale and force, even at close range. Apologists attribute this to the ear injury that sent him home from Korea and ended his combat flying career. But Ted can speak softly and hear himself fine, if it's only one friend around. The roar with which he speaks in a public place, or to anyone else, has nothing to do with his hearing. It's your hearing he's worried about.

Sugar, Written and Directed by Anna Boden and Ryan Fleck

Sugar tells the story of a young Dominican baseball player who earns himself a spot in the minor leagues and his struggle to adapt to life in America. It's shot in the style of a documentary, and, while fictional, is inspired by the true stories of hundreds of Latin youngsters who have come to the U.S. seeking major league glory. It's as much about the immigrant experience and coming-of-age as it is about baseball, so don't shy away if you aren't a fan. Just see it - trust me.

Leaving Korengal -- Not With a Bang, But a Whimper

2010-04-16T00:07:00.004-04:00

This week, US Forces withdrew from Afghanistan's Korengal Valley -- known more commonly to those who served there as "the valley of death". It is a story that has landed relatively quietly in the US media, and deserves much more attention.

US troops arrived in the Korengal in 2005 -- they moved in, claiming the high ground of the tiny, isolated valley, and prepared for an impossible mission. The strategy was for those soldiers to draw the fire and attention from Taliban and foreign fighters who sought to enter into Afghanistan from the Pakistani theater via the .8km-wide valley.

The goal was not to secure the valley, nor to block the valley's entrance. The goal was to tie up insurgents in a battle away from more populated regions of Afghanistan.

The goal was put quite frankly by the Washington Post:

"The troops were, in essence, bullet magnets. "

Since 2005, over 40 US soldiers have been killed, hundreds wounded. The soldiers were met by daily small arms fire, ambushes, IED attacks, and mortar fire from the surrounding hills. Some of the fire came from Taliban, more from local insurgencies who sought to oppose the central government's expanded control over the remote valley -- filled with 5,000 fiercely independent Korengalis -- who speak their own language, and follow many of their own customs.

This year, a new command structure in Afghanistan has come to the conclusion that ISAF operations in Korengal run higher risks than rewards. The conclusion was that Capt. Mark Moretti's troops in the valley had not stumbled not into a hive of Taliban insurgency, but an internecine blood feud between Korengalis, who sought, above all, to be left to their own devices.

(more after the jump)

The thinking is straight forward -- that US troop presence in the Korengal had provoked the very insurgency that they then sought to counter. The removal of those troops, in Gen. McChrystal's calculus, will remove these soldiers from an impossible situation. As long as these soldiers stay, the violence in Korengal will continue. If they leave, there is a chance it may stop.

In this, Korengal may prove anathema to the prevailing ideological wind blown from Gen. Rupert Smith's manifesto "The Utility of Force", which argues that soldiers in today's "wars amongst the people" must "fight to create space" between the citizenry and insurgents -- therefore allowing room for humanitarian assistance, infrastructure creation, the implementation of the rule of law, and the facilitated buy-in of the non-combatant citizenry into the centralized government supported by counter-insurgent forces.

In Korengal, the very presence of these soldiers sparked insurgency among the populace -- who's fighters were inseparable and indistinguishable from the very citizenry that the soldiers sought to protect. Much of the opposition in the Korengal was targeted at the paving of the lone road into the valley -- a project designed to facilitate the integration of the valley into that Afghan nation.

In the first day of the project, security on the road was attacked, their guns taken, and the contractor tasked with the road work driven out -- never to return.

The lesson?

COIN theory must be fungible. There is no silver-bullet. There is no cookie cutter theory. There is no Clausewitz of COIN. The difference between a success and an epic COIN fail lies in the contextual understanding of the commanders who plan and implement these operations.

When we essentialize counter-insurgency to its most basic facets -- Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer, it is temping to view it as a universally applicable strategy. But the devil lives in the details.

Unfortunately, not only the enemy gets a vote -- the populace in "held" regions does as well.

And so, this week, 28 year old Capt. Moretti walked hand-in-hand (as is custom among friends in the valley) with Shamshir Khan, a local elder in the valley, in preparation for the departure of US Troops.
Again, from the Washington Post:

"I hope that when I am gone, you will do what is best for your valley and the villagers," an almost wistful Moretti said.

"I want you to travel safely to your home, to your family," the 86-year-old elder replied.

And so began the strategic retreat from the Korengal Valley. The coming months will tell whether the valley will become an insurgent highway from Pashtun areas of Pakistan into the Afghan theater of operations -- but there is a possibility that those Talibs seeking to enter the Korengal will be met with the same resistance that faced the US forces there.

Whatever the outcome, the Korengal Operation stands as one of the most important referendum on the importance of context in COIN. Much has been made on nation-wide COIN planning, even more on "province wide COIN implementation". Korengal shows us that local contextual understanding supersedes any of these.

The sole question I have, unfortunately, cannot be answered yet. Is the goal in leaving Korengal to alleviate the security crisis there by removing its causality, or have commanders simply decided that the valley is lost -- and are repositioning their troops to bottle the valley, seeking to continue to fight for space between the insurgents of the valley and the citizenry of greater Afghanistan?

I'm not sure which answer I want to hear.

Time will tell.

Cutting the US Defense Budget

2010-04-14T13:46:00.012-04:00

Renewed warnings about the US Federal Government's budget deficit hit the front page of the New York Times today.

The Federal Reserve chairman said Wednesday that the government must begin to make “difficult choices” to address its gaping deficits and warned that “postponing them will only make them more difficult.”

Bernanke continued:

"Although sizable deficits are unavoidable in the near term, maintaining the confidence of the public and financial markets requires that policy makers move decisively to set the federal budget on a trajectory toward sustainable fiscal balance."

The United States needs to spend less money. Period. But that is the easy part. The hard part comes when specific cuts must be made.

(I should add that this post is written under the assumption that no further tax increases are politically feasible/possible/desirable in the short- or medium-term)

The American reaction to potentially cutting Social Security benefits is representative of the difficulty of cutting domestic social benefits - Americans react with visceral disdain to any suggestion that their Social Security benefits might be cut and politicians are wary of running on benefit-cutting platforms. Social Security is rightly called the "third rail of American politics."

If social benefits can't feasibly be cut, where to next? Foreign aid is a favorite target of budget-cutters (71% of Americans would cut it), but it accounts for less than 1% of the total federal budget.

One idea, until recently thought to be tantamount to political suicide, is to make cuts in the US Defense Budget, which represents the largest single piece of the discretionary budget. Why is it not political suicide now? Matthew Yglesias has some interesting analysis that examines the political feasibility of defense cuts.

(Graph courtesy of Anne Lowrey of the Washington Independent - In blue, the number of people who say something should be cut with. In red, the percent of the budget that these programs account for)

Yglesias calls defense spending "the least-unpopular cut" of "the major budget items," but correctly identifies that "it’s very politically difficult for a president to do anything that provokes the ire of the defense establishment whether or not it polls well in the abstract."

Stephen Walt, examining the same data, identifies two areas where defense cuts could come from:

One is to hold one’s military obligations (aka “roles and missions”) constant and to devise cheaper ways of meeting these commitments. In this approach, you have to identify genuine waste, fraud and abuse in the Pentagon, and devise a convincing way to defend various interests while spending less money.... The second way to cut defense spending is to reduce one’s military commitments; i.e., to decide that there are some missions or obligations that the United States does not need to perform, either because they are not essential, because they are counterproductive, or because other states can and will do them better than we will.

I think Walt lays out the two choices well, but doesn't frame the choices. In the current climate, it seems much easier to me to go after the "waste, fraud and abuse" than to fundamentally re-think America's "missions and obligations."

Congress thinks so too - the most recent evidence being the House Armed Services Committee's second effort to reduce the costs of DoD's acquisition and procurement. The "Implementing Management for Performance and Related Reforms to Obtain Value in Every Acquisition Act of 2010" is a follow up to last year's Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act. One can hope that both efforts will ultimately prove successful, but even the hoped-for savings will not be monumental. The Congressional Budget Office found "no basis for determining whether such improvements would result in net savings to the government."

Thus, even if increasing efficiency, eliminating fraud and abuse, and streamlining procurement and acquisition efforts work swimmingly, other aspects of the Defense budget will need to be examined - the Obama Administration is planning on $160 billion per year for the next two years to cover the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is a lot of money normally, but especially when money's tight in the federal budget.

(Jeremy has done a lot of research and thinking about this issue and I expect he'll give his 2010-inflated "50 cents" in the comments)

Closing Time

2010-04-14T12:49:00.001-04:00

By: Anonymous

For over eight years, the U.S. has been embattled in a war on terror. Since then, almost 800 detainees have passed through the gates at Guantánamo Bay. On his third day in office, President Obama signed an Executive Order that established a responsible date for closing the detention facilities at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. Three months ago that date passed; but the urgency of closing the facility remains.

Closing Guantánamo would immediately increase the United States’ long-term prospects for safety and security. Our enemies could no longer exploit the camp as a recruiting tool to inspire hatred and violence against our troops and citizens. Some doubt the link between the symbolism of U.S. prisons like Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib and terrorism, however, reports from troops in the field suggest otherwise. Major Matthew Alexander, whose team of interrogators obtained the information necessary to locate and capture the head of al Qaeda-in-Iraq, believes that “the reason why foreign fighters joined al-Qa’ida in Iraq was overwhelmingly because of abuses at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, and not Islamic ideology.”

Furthermore, closing Guantánamo will enhance our credibility with our allies throughout the developed world.
The purpose of detaining these prisoners, after all, is to enhance this nation’s safety and security, and our practices at Guantánamo have strained relationships with vital allies. Eleven British citizens formerly held at Guantánamo claim that British Government was complicit in allowing them to be tortured. Closing the prison will generate the necessary goodwill to effectively foster vital counterterrorism cooperation with our allies, and better enable the United States to combat the threats we face.

In order to close Guantánamo, the Administration has requested $350 million to purchase the Thomson Correction Center in Illinois to serve as a replacement facility. The inmates that are judged too dangerous to release, and cannot be effectively prosecuted, would be relocated to the Thomson facility. The remaining detainees would be repatriated or transferred to other countries for release. Opponents of this plan argue that a domestically located facility poses too great a security risk; that it would invite an attack from al Qaeda or another terrorist organization. These concerns, while important, are overstated. Our domestic prison system has shown its capability to hold terrorists before, and according to the U.S. Bureau of Prisons it held over 200 international terrorists as of May 19th of last year.

But last week, in an action that speaks to the political difficulties of closing Guantánamo, a coalition of civil liberties advocates, including the ACLU and Amnesty International, signed a letter opposing the federal purchase of the Thomson facility. These same groups have criticized the conditions of confinement at Guantánamo, yet stand in the way of its closure. We have seen a marked improvement in the conditions at Guantánamo over the past three years, as new facilities have been brought on line, and establishing Camp Justice has provided capacity for independent oversight and access for reporters, lawyers and human rights advocates. Moving the detainees to the U.S. mainland will provide for increased scrutiny and oversight.

The civil liberties advocates maintain that no change is justified if the practice of indefinite detention will be continued. But their ideals are premised on the existence of a world devoid of the very real security threats we face. Indefinite detention is a necessary and useful tool that the Administration can use to keep American citizens safe. Opposing the proposed transfer is a simple case of letting the perfect be the enemy of the good.

By bringing the detainees onto American soil, this Administration will end the Constitutional loophole that the former Administration exploited so regularly. We will see domestic benefits in the form of increased oversight and transparency and positive international consequences by undoing a symbol of extralegal disregard for human rights, and removing an effective recruitment tool of our enemies.

The previous Administration ignored this choice for the last eight years, but President Obama is strong enough to make it.

This D&D Guest has elected to remain anonymous due to their employment status. This Guest has worked for several government agencies and the U.S. Congress.

South Sudan

2010-04-13T19:23:00.001-04:00

Well this TIME piece is just about the most depressing thing I've read all week.

How can southern Sudan become an independent nation when it possesses so little of what defines one? Many aid workers and development experts in Juba doubt it can. They have coined a new term to describe its unique status: pre-failed state.

I'm no expert on development, but it seems overly teleological to call it a "pre-failed" state. Clearly a newly independent South Sudan would be impoverished, but it's impoverished now as a part of Sudan! Moreover, poverty does not inevitably cause state collapse. Good governance, coupled with international aid, could presumably keep the nation afloat until a real economy develops.

I'm not saying it will be easy, but isn't it too pessimistic to assume a new state would inherently fail?

Something's Rotten in the Province of Helmand

2010-04-12T09:26:00.004-04:00

An unheard of story out of Helmand this weekend. On April 10, Afghani police and intelligence agents stormed a hospital run by the Italian NGO Emergency in Lashkar Gah -- the capital of Helmand. The charges are startling. IRIN News reports that three Italians and six Afghans from the aid organization of "terrorism and assassination". The charges come from the top -- Provincial Governor Golab Mangal.

Mangal accused the head of Emergency in Afghanistan, Marco Garatti, of taking a US$500,000 bribe from Taliban insurgents and involvement in a plot to kill him during a visit to the hospital. He also accused Garatti of the “deliberate killings” of patients and wounded people in the hospital at the behest of the Taliban.

To be specific: the charges are that Garatti was accepting Taliban money for organizing a suicide bombing. Mangal held his press conference with props -- two suicide vests, guns, and ammunition he claims were seized inside of the Emergency hospital.

Mangal is alleging that an Italian NGO was in the pocket of the Pakistani Taliban, targetedly killing their patients, and accepting money in a cash for suicide deal. The charges are shocking, surprising even the Afghan Ministry of Public Health.
(more after the jump)

Emergency has certainly made contact with the Taliban in the past, negotiating the release of Italian journalist Daniele Mastrogiacomo in exchange for five Afghan held Taliban prisoners in 2007. Mastrogiacomo's Afghan translator, Ajmal Naqshbandi, however, was killed by the Taliban after Kabul refused to release more prisoners in the deal. The result of that failure? In May 2007, Afghan Intelligence arrested Ramutallah Hanafi, then the head of Emergency's Lashkar Gah hospital, charging him for the mis-brokered deal.

Today? Mangal has accused the three arrested Italian Emergency members of the murder of Naqshbandi in 2007 -- along with the suicide terror plot.

Something smells funny here. It feels, almost, like Mangal may have jumped the shark on this one. If I am wrong, my sincerest apologies to the governor -- but I find these charges not only incredibly unlikely, but technically impossible. For Mangal's version of events to be true, the Italians working at Emergency's hospital would require the contacts, wherewithal, and know how to radicalize, recruit, and train a suicide bomber; and to acquire, build and handle the explosive vests required for the attack. Not to mention the will to do so. Suicide attacks have long pre-attack periods, and the likelihood of Italian aid workers maintaining the requisite network security for the operation unlikely.

Finally, let us turn to reason. If I were in the Pakistani Taliban, I would have experience in recruiting, training, and arming suicide terrorists. I would have the ability to move people and personnel into Afghan cities like Lashkar Gah. Moreover, I could achieve all of these things for much less than 500,000 USD -- why outsource what you can do cheaply and safely in your own organization? The attack plan outlined by Mangal was not one the relied on access to the Provincial Governor -- it was to be at an open event, so why would I (as a Pakistani Taliban) ever involve Italian NGO workers in my plans? The risk verse reward scenario here seems to negate the charges leveled against Emergency's workers.

Something else is going on here. Time will tell.

From Emergency's webpage:

"This accusation sounds simply groundless to us, and we are absolutely certain that the truth will come forth quickly. These are individuals who for years have been working to ensure medical treatment for the Afghan people. We ask that their rights be respected, the first of which is to allow them to communicate with us and let us know their personal conditions."

Both CNN and IRIN Asia have good synopses of this story, should you want to read more.

Corruption and Counter-Productive Policy

2010-04-11T21:05:00.000-04:00

I finally read James Traub's excellent piece on emerging drug trade routes, "Africa's Drug Problem." Traub highlights the case of Guinea-Bissau, a small West African state that has become a regional hub for narcotics smuggled from South America into Europe. The sheer volume being transported is staggering:

The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that 40 tons of cocaine, with a street value of $1.8 billion, crossed West Africa on the way to Europe in 2006. The number has now dropped significantly, but many law-enforcement officials view this as a pause before further adaptation.

Three key issues emerge from this piece.

This first is the maladaptive role governments play in this trade. In Guinea-Bissau, the state, depending on your level of cynicism, is either impotent to stop drug traffickers or is entirely complicit and enmeshed in illegal activities. Traub presents strong, although anecdotal, evidence of the latter:

Then, Djata says: “We got a call from the prime minister’s office saying that we must yield up the drugs to the civil authorities. They said the drugs would not be secure in police headquarters, and they must be taken to the public treasury.” A squad of heavily armed Interior Ministry police surrounded the building. Djata said his boss replied, “We will bring the drugs ourselves, and then we will burn them.” Government officials refused. Djata and his men relented, and the drugs were taken to the public treasury. And soon, of course, they disappeared — as did the Colombians.

In either case, the mismanagement of resources by governments has either created additional incentive for public officials to illegal enrich themselves or has deprived the state of the necessary capabilities to intercept well-financed drug traffickers. The heart of the matter is the prevalence, and acceptance, of corruption.

Secondly, the insatiable global demand for illegal narcotics provides a powerful financial incentive to criminal gangs.
Anti-drug efforts, most notably the U.S. "War on Drugs" initiated under President Reagan, have done little to stop the demand growth for drugs. Targeting traffickers has only increased the price, and therefore the financial incentive, and forced criminals to adapt their strategies. Instead of sailing narcotics into Miami, as was once the norm, traffickers now use other methods. Smuggling through Mexico has led to instability, and, as Traub shows, using Africa as a way-point to Europe is on the rise.

Finally, one important issue Traub alludes to only briefly is the growing nexus between crime and terrorism. Thomas Sanderson wrote an eerily prescient piece several years ago examining the relationship between the two, and as Traub describes:

In November, an old Boeing 727, which had taken off in Colombia, crossed West African airspace and touched down on an airstrip controlled by terrorist groups in the desert of Mali. The plane was almost certainly carrying cocaine and perhaps guns as well; no one knows, since the cargo was unloaded before the plane was burned. Late last year, in a separate case, federal prosecutors in New York indicted three Malian men who they say had promised to transport drugs across the desert in league with Al Qaeda, which would serve as the security arm of the operation; officials said one of the men is caught on tape claiming that he regularly supplied extremist forces with gasoline and food.

While no surprise that extremists and drug traffickers occasionally cooperate when their interests align, it is a troubling phenomenon that warrants further investigation and action. Separating the two and combating extremists and drug traffickers separately would be beneficial, and stripping away financial and material support given to extremists terrorists is of utmost priority.

A Good Week for the President

2010-04-10T15:35:00.008-04:00

Although it seems much longer, it has only been less than a month since some pundits were declaring the death of the Obama Presidency. The failure, or success, of health insurance reform would "devastate" the Administration and Democrats in the 2010 mid-term elections. Words like "doomed" and "failure" were tossed around like inevitabilities by respected news sources.

But in politics, like in many things, success begets success. More importantly, narratives of success beget narratives of success. Today, a mere 20 days after the House of Representatives passed health insurance reform by a 219-212 margin , Obama's presidency is now "emboldened". The president's "sensible" Nuclear Posture Review was announced last week, immediately garnering both international, bureaucratic and domestic support. A few days later, President Obama signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia. As new job numbers for March were announced, coverage focused on President Obama's argument that the U.S. economy was "turning the corner." And finally, just yesterday President Obama was given the opportunity to name a new Associate Justice to the Supreme Court with the retirement of Justice John Paul Stephens, which the media is reporting as putting the GOP "on the defensive."

Our northern neighbors in Canada described the dynamic well:

His presidential voice carries more weight than just a few weeks ago. It's an odd political world where the difference of a few congressional votes on a subject such as health care can be said to define a presidency's success.

The CBC adds that President Obama's "influence abroad is clearly greater if he is seen to be a winner at home."

The Administration won't be able to wave a magic wand and create world peace and stability now. But the Administration's hand has clearly been strengthened, and the White House is once again in control of the political narrative in the United States, critically important as it faces financial regulation, the upcoming nuclear summit, and more tough decisions in Afghanistan.

What a difference a couple of weeks make.

Elections Sudan 2010: Status Quo You Can Believe In

2010-04-10T11:36:00.003-04:00

Louisa Seferis
Demagogues and Dictators Sudan Analyst

Beginning Sunday April 11, Sudan will hold historic national elections – the first in 24 years. As expected, the buildup to the elections has been fraught with inconsistency, opacity and contention. President Omar al-Bashir’s main political opponents – except for one party – have withdrawn at all levels because of fraud. Only minor opposition parties remain in the presidential, parliamentary, and state polls in the northern areas. (South Sudan will have its own regional voting structure, making these polls extremely complicated.) What’s worse, EU election monitors in Darfur left due to insecurity, proclaiming they had never been treated so badly. Indeed, Bashir doesn’t seem to want to make friends: the BBC quoted him as saying that if the observers intervened in Sudan's affairs, "we will cut off their fingers and crush them under our shoes."

While discouraging, it’s not clear if the EU monitors’ departure from Darfur will have an impact. Most of Darfur’s nearly 2.7 million internally displaced people were not registered due to insecurity or remoteness; even if they were, it is unclear if they would vote at all. The SPLM candidate, Yassir Arman, announced on Wednesday that he was pulling out of the election. He cited a “lack of preparedness” in Darfur as one of the reasons for his withdrawal, explaining in an interview with the BBC "the people of Darfur in the internally displaced people's camps asked the SPLM not to be involved in the election.” Darfur’s IDPs know their votes will not be counted properly, regardless of an international monitoring presence.

This is actually old news. As Reuters reported Friday, “Sudanese activists say the irregularities began with a flawed 2008 census, demarcating electoral constituencies and fraudulent voter registration.” A lovely example of this is when more than 1,900 security force members were registered to vote at a tiny police post in Khartoum where only five policemen were officially stationed. Sudanese civil society organizations continue to report outrageous situations like this one, but they fall on national and international deaf ears.

Simply put, Bashir refuses to delay the elections so he can check them off his list and use the event as political leverage later. It is difficult to accuse a sitting head of state of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court if he wins “democratic” elections, no matter how fraudulent.

And these elections will go through. The polls are already underway, and although the U.S. and others (EU, UN) have expressed dismay at Bashir’s unwillingness to postpone the elections, the stakes are not high enough for them to interfere – if Afghanistan’s elections took place, so will these. The world is more interested in the referendum for South Sudan’s independence than anything else, and Bashir is dangling this in front of the international community. The BBC reports...
...that he has threatened to cancel the vote on the referendum if the SPLM withdrew from the presidential race. It’s not the actual act of withdrawal that is problematic to Bashir, it is the delegitimizing of elections that his party wants to avoid. Any delay or reevaluation of the census and registration will reveal enormous inconsistencies that, if exposed and corrected, would cost the National Congress Party its political monopoly. If polls close on April 13 and a clear winner is announced on the 18th, however contentious, Bashir just might keep his promise about the South Sudan referendum. This is what the international community is hoping for.

In the midst of all the bleak reports emerging from Sudan’s election process, in particular regarding Darfur, the international community should not lose sight of two beacons of hope – the latest rounds of ceasefire agreements between Darfur’s major rebel groups and Bashir’s government. In March 2010, the Government of Sudan signed two ceasefire agreements with Darfur’s largest rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement, and with the Liberation and Justice Movement, a newly formed umbrella group of 10 movements. The only major group still holding out is a faction of the Sudan Liberation Army led by Abdul Wahid.

While these two agreements are largely associated with political posturing, they are a step in the right direction. If the international community wants to ensure that the ceasefire arrangements evolve into lasting peace, they have to ascertain if the internally displaced people are onboard. The international community’s involvement in Sudan’s elections has been problematic because of its inadequate use of high-level discussions to broach difficult discussions about voter registration at the most local levels.

If the U.S., EU, and UN want to see freer and fairer elections in Sudan, they need to do more than last-minute public diplomacy. Scott Gration stated that he believed if the main opposition withdrew from the legislative elections, “it was not clear whether they would still be held” (BBC). I think he received his answer when polls opened throughout Sudan.

Louisa Seferis is a Masters candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, focusing on conflict resolution and human security. She has worked in Subsaharan Africa for 4 years specializing in internal displacement, reconciliation, and post-conflict reintegration.

The Weekly Reading

2010-04-09T21:23:00.001-04:00

P.W. Singer, Foreign Policy - Meet the Sims...and Shoot Them

The link between games and war goes all the way back to "boards" scratched onto the back of statues by Assyrian guards almost 3,000 years ago. Three millennia later, as the U.S. military recruits from, and is increasingly led by, a generation raised on Grand Theft Auto, real warfare is taking on the look and feel of a video game, from the aerial drones launching precision strikes at terrorists in remote hideouts in Afghanistan and Pakistan to the joystick-controlled robots defusing roadside explosives in Iraq. "The biggest change is that it's gone from being unique to being ubiquitous. It's everywhere now," Mark Sinclair, a staff vice president at military contractor General Dynamics, told a U.S. Navy journal.

Adam Hoschild, Mother Jones - Blood and Treasure

IN 1890, A BEARDED YOUNG POLISH SEAMAN made a trip up the Congo River as a steamboat officer and was appalled by the lust for riches he saw among his fellow Europeans. A decade later he finally got the experience onto paper. "A stream of manufactured goods, rubbishy cottons, beads and brass-wire" flowed into the interior, wrote Joseph Conrad in Heart of Darkness, "and in return came a precious trickle of ivory...The word 'ivory' rang in the air, was whispered, was sighed. You would think they were praying to it."

Eli Saslow, The Washington Post - For a look outside the presidential bubble, Obama reads 10 personal letters each day

Obama read the 10 letters in the folder on Jan. 8, but he responded to only a few. He typically returns five to 15 letters each week, aides said, and he tends to write back most regularly to level-headed critics, military veterans and destitute Americans who maintain their optimism. He gravitates toward messages that "inspire," said Valerie Jarrett, his close friend and adviser, and prefers mail that provides a "counterbalance to business in Washington" and transports him someplace else.
After Obama read Cline's letter, he took out one of his custom-made notecards -- thick slabs of white paper cut to the size of postcards, with the presidential seal embossed at the top.

Donald Morrison, The Financial Times - The Dreyfuss Affair

Dreyfus’s ordeal was the first big test of a modern justice system, and it defined one of the central issues of democracy: should the rule of law be applied consistently, or are there cases in which it should be bent to fit a current crisis or pressing national concern? Even today, hardly a month passes without an alleged misstep of justice somewhere in the world being labelled a “new Dreyfus Affair”.

Stan Grossfield, The Boston Globe - Cleaned-up Hitter

“I probably smoked two joints, drank about three or four beers, got to the ballpark, took some [amphetamines], took a pain pill, drank a cup of coffee, chewed some tobacco, had a cigarette, and got up to the plate and hit,’’ Carbo said. The Sox were four outs from elimination against Cincinnati’s Big Red Machine in Game 6 when Carbo came off the bench to smash a three-run home run into the center-field bleachers, tying the score at 6-6. The blast set up Carlton Fisk’s arm-waving, 12th-inning walkoff home run for the ages.

This Week in Weird: Weekend at Bernie's Meets Monty Python at the Liverpool Airport -- For Realsies

2010-04-09T08:16:00.006-04:00

Sometimes I have trouble with my intrepid searching for all things random in weird for my weekly column here at D&D. This was not one of those times.

Our story this week begins (and ends) at the Liverpool Airport. The players? Gitta Jarant, 66, and Anke Anusic, 41, and Willi Jarant (91).

The three arrived to catch their flight home to Germany. Gitta and Anke pushing Willi in a wheelchair up to the check in counter. Willi was dressed for a vacation, relaxing in his wheelchair, sporting his dark sunglasses to protect him from the tropical Liverpool/Manchester sun. Yet, the agents there were concerned about Willi's ability to fly -- mostly due to his lack of breathing (mostly because he was dead, and had been for approximately 24 hours).

(more after the jump)

From the NY Times:

But efforts by the two women to claim that the man, 91-year-old Willi Jarant, was just resting were thwarted when it turned out that he was, in fact, dead.

For realsies. Willi had been dressed, and was wearing dark sunglasses. His traveling companions on this mortal coil insisted that he was tired, and was simply resting. But, unfortunately (for all involved), Willi could not be coaxed out of his nappy nap.

The result? His companions have now been arrested for failing to properly report a death -- something they vehemently contest. Ms. Anusic insisted to the BBC that

"He was alive. He was pale but he wasn't dead."

Really? Lets step back for a second here, and recognize that this is a sad story. Then, lets watch these clips I have assembled so that those in the future will not make the mistakes of the Jarants.

I present to you, TWIW's first video how-to: How to Deal with Dead, or Almost Dead Entities.

Breaking News: Protesters Topple the Tulip Revolution

2010-04-07T21:13:00.007-04:00

UPDATE as of (Thursday, 22:56 EST)
Russian complicity in Kyrgyz revolution confirmed by opposition party now in power. Please see the following Reuters piece here

This news is both unsurprising and troubling. Snap analysis soon.

UPDATE as of (Thursday, 10:52 EST)

For those of you still following this story, please read Simon Shuster's piece at Time, and Peter Leonard from the AP.

Information is still trickling out of Kyrgyzstan to the western media as this snap analysis goes to print -- we here at D&D are monitoring the situation as we go here, and should any of you have contacts in Kyrgyz, please pass their information on to us at demagoguesanddictators@gmail.com

First -- a thanks from our reader Drew, who sent us the link for following pictures from Bishkek -- a quick warning: these pictures are graphic, but important. They can be viewed here.

Background, News and D&D Snap Analysis After the Jump

The past months:
Over the past months, and specifically the past week, has seen an increasingly organized and aggressive series of protests directly opposing the government of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev -- who himself rose to power in the mass protests now known as the "Tulip Revolution" of 2005. The protests resulted from the increasingly centralized powers of the Kyrgyz president, and multiple allegations of human rights abuses at the hands of the security forces.

Tuesday, April 6, 2010
In the north-western town of Talas, Kyrgyzstan; thousands of protesters stormed, briefly seized control of a government building -- burning pictures of President Bakiyev, and declaring the ascendancy of a "people's governor" and demanding the resignation of the nation's president in Bishkek.

In response, the central government dispatched riot police, who retook the building -- but only for a short while. The protesters counter-attacked with rocks and Molotov cocktails, retaking the building.

Late Tuesday night, the central government announced the detention of several opposition leaders, and declared the situation resolved, in advance of the previously advertised date for mass opposition protests in the capital on Wednesday, April 7, 2010.

April 7, 2010 (Today)
Thousands of protesters gathered across the country, with a crowd numbering in the hundreds marching towards the national seat of governance, the White House, in Bishkek. As the crowd swelled, they overcame multiple riot police cordons, and, as they came into close proximity to the White House, were fired upon by police snipers and attacked with flash and stun grenades from police on the street. Over 40 have been confirmed dead, and more that 400 wounded.

And things began to move very fast.

Crowds stormed the White House in Bishkek. Crowds took control of the National TV and Radio stations. Crowds took control of police headquarters -- setting free those opposition leaders captured by the Kyrgyz government the day before.

Those set free announced the stand-up of a new, interim government, lead by opposition leader Roza Otunbayeva. President Bakiyev has fled the capital, taking refuge in the southern city of Osh. A National State of Emergency has been declared, and as of now, civil war may loom in Kyrgyzstan.

D&D Snap Analysis
When it comes to power in Kyrgyzstan, there are two factors to consider. The first is local legitimacy, which stems from the ability of the central government to provide the services and rule of law expected by the people of the nation. The second is the support of foreign interests, which provide the government with the means and assistance to provide those services and governance.

The foreign players in Kyrgyzstan? Russia, China, and the United States. The US currently maintains a contentious airbase at Manas -- which is central to troop movement logistics into the Afghan theater of operations. The opposition now declaring itself the government of the Kyrgyz have demanded the closing of that base -- and flights have been diverted throughout the day.

US Officials, citing a contentious Russian aid package offered to Kyrgyzstan last year, have hinted that Russia has made the closing of the Manas base a requisite to any monetary transfer to the republic. Russia's last offer was $2 Billion USD. It was turned down by the previous government.

From a senior US official to the AP:

"We want to see the situation resolved peacefully, consistent with the rule of law. Our conversation with the opposition at this stage is about finding out what is happening and encouraging a peaceful resolution."

From Vladimir Putin:

"When President Bakiyev came to power, he was very harshly critical of the fact that the relatives of the deposed President Akayev had taken positions throughout Kyrgyzstan's economy. I have the impression that Mr. Bakiyev is stepping on these same rakes."

To date: Russia has denied any knowledge or support for the opposition that has apparently toppled the government in Kyrgyzstan -- but...

I fall back on the old Latin phrase -- quid profites? (who benefits?)

Hopefully the Kyrgyz people.

The protesters have shown an amazing ability to organize and mobilize their support -- and have done so incredibly effectively. Because of this, I feel that it would not be surprising to find FSB involvement in the arming and organization of the opposition movement. Russia, in the past years, has made it clear that the leaders of former Soviet Republics must stand Moscow's side, or face dire consequences -- a message relayed via Georgia and the Ukraine.

President Bakiyev has consistently moved towards the United States, turning down Russian aid, and allowing the US to maintain their base in Manas. He has also allowed his legitimacy to slip away as he sought to consolidate his power. The result?

Lets see what tomorrow brings. We still haven't heard from China.

Please read the breaking news updates (linked below).
NY Times

Twitter

Reuters Wire

Response to Bing West's Article on Saving Afghanistan

2010-04-07T18:18:00.004-04:00

Today in the NY Times, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, Bing West wrote an Op-ed outlining his plan to save Afghanistan by circumventing Hamid Karzai and focusing on bringing governance to Afghanistan at the local level. Mr. West puts it out there that having a strong military actually running the country from behind the scenes may in fact be the best case scenario for Afghanistan. As he points out this would be situation like in Pakistan where instead of the country having a military, the military would have a country, but at least it would be more stable than the Afghanistan we find ourselves with today.

This argument is certainly interesting, and I do not argue with Mr. Bing that what we have now in Afghanistan is certainly not a democracy considering the blatant evidence that Hamid Karzai stole the election. However, his plan for a strong man government backed by the military has a very serious flaw. Bing West assumes that the Afghan National Army (ANA) is actually a capable force. While the ANA is rated higher than the Afghan National Police (ANP) in the sense that they aren't actually extorting locals or running drugs like the police. However, you have to think about who is actually joining the ANA. Afghan families and tribes are not going to let their best men leave their homes to support a government that they have no faith in. From what I have heard from U.S. troops who have gone on patrol with members of the ANA is that a lot of them are the "scrubs" of Afghan society.

My readers may find this short documentary clip of interest. Its a british video journalist who is on patrol with British and Afghan troops. As you can tell, the ANA shows no discipline and are in fact High in the middle of a firefight!

I leave you to draw your own conclusions about this.

And that's my fifty cents (inflation...)

Wikileaks, Iraq, and Violence

2010-04-06T13:35:00.004-04:00

In case you haven't been following the news, Wikileaks.org recently posted a video showing American helicopter pilots firing on Iraqis in Baghdad in 2007. I've embedded the shortest version below the fold.

I won't rehash the whole saga here - check NYT or WaPo for the background - but the short version is that among those killed in the attack were two Reuters employees. Reuters has been pressing the US military for information about the death of their employees without success. Additionally, the attitude, disposition, and actions of the pilots has been called into question. See here, here, or here for some insight into the issue.

I have two primary takeaways.

First, without knowing the ROEs and situation, I'm hesitant to condemn the pilots. While I too find their language overly-enthusiastic, that alone doesn't make their actions wrong.
They did receive permission to engage, and several people were armed. It's easy to judge the situation innocuous and their actions unjustified three years after the fact and from the safety of home. That said, the military should conduct a thorough investigation. The video along presents enough information to warrant a full inquiry.

This incident illustrates Clausewitz's "fog" and "friction" of war. Clausewitz posited that battle is inherently chaotic and information always murky. Because of these factors, plans can never be executed as designed and warfare decisions are often made based upon incomplete or inaccurate information. In Iraq, the plan calls for U.S. forces to engage militants with deadly force but protect civilians. While this sounds straightforward, in practice it is incredibly difficult to implement.

Secondly, the fact that the military suppressed this information, covered up the incident, and refused to help Reuters determine the fate of their employees is troubling. If the pilots acted improperly, they should face discipline. If the military feels the pilots acted correctly, than why would they bury the incident and stonewall Reuters? I understand the urge to avoid negative publicity, but in this case the actions of the military are worrisome.

I'll be following this story closely and will be updating as new information emerges.

UPDATE: April 7, 4:30PM

A few more thoughts about the implications and fallout from this incident:

Globally, this footage will damage U.S. efforts to end the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Efforts to "win the hearts and minds" will take a major hit, and insurgent and terrorist actors will receive a recruiting boost. Some pundits have already invoked Abu Ghraib as a comparison, and while this footage is not as severe as the prison torture it will similarly harm U.S. interests and stature worldwide.

The entire affair is tragic and disturbing. But it should serve as a reminder of the overwhelming complexity of war, especially as continue to withdraw soldiers from Iraq and mount new offensives in Afghanistan. The words of Clausewitz still hold true:

"The great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently - like the effect of a fog or moonshine - gives to things exaggerated dimensions and unnatural appearance."

Warning 1: The video is graphic and disturbing, so be prepared
Warning 2: I wish I could edit out the unnecessary and inflammatory commentary Wikileaks included, but I don't know how - my advice is to disregard their commentary

Help for Our Vets

2010-04-05T14:34:00.001-04:00

A great story this week from the New York Times about vets struggling with P.T.S.D. getting help from specially trained dogs.

In dozens of interviews, veterans and their therapists reported drastic reductions in P.T.S.D. symptoms and in reliance on medication after receiving a service dog.
Veterans rely on their dogs to gauge the safety of their surroundings, allowing them to venture into public places without constantly scanning for snipers, hidden bombs and other dangers lurking in the minds of those with the disorder.

P.T.S.D is a serious problem. It's not as easy to spot and treat as a physical wound, and consequently it has historically been neglected. Diagnosis and treatment has increased in recent decades, and awareness has grown.

Our vets deserve the only the best care and treatment, and if dogs help soldiers recover than they should get dogs. Kudos to Senator Al Franken for writing the bill and spearheading the movement in the Senate to fund the program and to Secretary Gates for helping repair the broken veteran care system. We've come a good ways from the Walter Reed debacle, and hopefully will only continue to improve from here.

Photo Courtesy of U.S. Army

Bad News for Iraq from Sadr City

2010-04-03T14:01:00.001-04:00

To my esteemed colleague, Jeff Schneider:

You wrote that the news of a vote in Sadr City to determine which candidate the Sadrist MPs would support was a positive development. I respectfully disagree. Or, if you prefer the immortal words of Dan Aykroyd, Jeff, you ignorant slut.

First of all, these "elections" are entirely unmonitored. As the New York Times reported,

There were no lists of eligible voters, no one was required to show identification and apparently there was no way to prevent people from voting more than once...
Zaman Jabar, 30, who helped organize the process, said traditional election standards like registering voters and requiring identification were not necessary.
“We know all the voters in our sector here,” he said. “All of them are our people.”

Forgive me for being dubious that Mr. Jabar knows every resident in the Sadr City area of Baghdad. The situation cries out for fraud. I don't think al-Maliki or Allawi are able to overrun the polling places with their supporters to sway the results, but I do believe that the lack of formal accounting mechanisms will allow Muqtada al-Sadr to declare his support for which candidate he decides.

In short, the entire "election" is a sham, and the end result will be the same - whichever party does the best job bribing Sadr will get his support. And the bribing has already begun. Juan Cole relays the news that al-Maliki already began releasing Sadrist political prisoners.

Furthermore, Sunni-Shia divisions are driving this process, not democracy.
With the exception of Allawi, all of the major candidates descended on Tehran after the vote to start the political bargaining. Iran is controlling the process, and it is no surprise that Allawi, a relatively secular candidate who renounced support from Iran and courted the vote of exiled Iraqi Sunnis, was not present. The delicate truce that has held across Iraq since the Sunni Awakening may collapse if the Sunnis feel that their candidate, Allawi, is cheated of his right form a coalition. Unfortunately, sectarian violence already shows signs of returning.

Jeff, your point that the mere presence of the Sadrists in the electoral process is a positive development is well taken. However, Sadr's assessment that he can manipulate the electoral process to serve his own ends without violence is not a healthy outcome. It's better than violence, but it still undermines the notion of democracy. Elections are not democracy. Elections are a part of democracy, but are not the most important piece.

I'm glad the Mahdi Army isn't currently resorting to force. But the notion that Sadr has suddenly become a true believer in democracy is far-fetched. If you believe that, I have a nice bridge in Brooklyn I'd like to sell you...

Good News for Iraq, from Sadr City

2010-04-02T18:48:00.007-04:00

The headline from Sadr City, March 10, 2004:

Militants take control of huge Baghdad slum / Sadr City locked up by gunmen loyal to rebel Muslim cleric

The headline today?

Iraq's Sadrists hold vote for prime minister choice

What a difference an effective COIN operation makes.

Sadr City, the Shia dominated slums of Baghdad -- long oppressed, forgotten, and marginalized under the Ba'athist regime of Sadam Hussein, was once the most dangerous area of Baghdad. The powerful, yet irregular mehdi army, under the command of Muqtada al-Sadr, once rejected the new Iraqi government -- and American forces -- to the last. They attacked armed patrols and civil servants alike, and directly opposed the central government of post-invasion Iraq.

Today, the story is very different:

(Reuters) - Supporters of anti-American Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr stood in long lines on Friday to vote their choice for prime minister of Iraq in a two-day referendum that carried no government sanction or legal weight.

The unusual plebiscite is organized by Sadr's political movement, which won about 40 seats in a March 7 parliamentary election and stands to play a kingmaker role in the next government, was intended to determine the public favorite for prime minister after squabbling among election winners.

The background?

(more after the jump)

While Ayad Allawi's non-sectarian Iraqiya party has won a victory over the Rule of Law Party of Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, that victory is paper thin -- 91 parliamentary seats to 89 -- with neither party gaining enough to secure the requisite 163 seats needed to control a majority of the Iraqi parliament.

This has placed the "king maker" title squarely on the Sadrists -- who won 40 of Iraq's parliamentary seats. Many expected back-room deal making and cronyism to gain the Shia/Sadrist support. It was a situation that many felt would not favor the Sunni supported, but non sectarian, Iraqiya party. It was a situation that again thrust Muqtada al-Sadr into a unique position of power.

But today we discovered that may not be the case.

From Muqtada al-Sadr:

"According to political developments, a mistake might occur in choosing the next prime minister, and for that I think it is in the (national) interest to assign it directly to the people,"

He then called for a 2 day plebiscite to determine the will of Sadr city residents, which he intoned would sway his party's decision as to which party to form a coalition majority government.

So why is this such good news?

In 2004, the Sadrists were unwilling to even involve themselves in non-violent political action -- instead choosing armed revolt and hybrid sectarian warfare to seek out dominance in the Iraqi political scene. Today, their leaders sought democratic, non-violent input from their constituents to ascertain what future democratic governance they would prefer.

This may be a bright day for Iraq, and is certainly a credit to the super-human effort to the men and women of the 4th Infantry Division and Major General Jeff Hammond -- who in partnership with Sadr city leaders, USAID, and a multi-national coalition of NGO's and development workers, showed how an effective COIN operation can be won.

Not only is Sadr city not gripped in an armed sectarian insurgency, today its inhabitants took to the streets to line up and peaceably vote for the path they hope their democratic political party will take in forming a national coalition government.

That being said -- things are far from perfect in Sadr City. The area is still surrounded by Iraqi troops, and chaos is still not banished from the region. While all Iraqis were invited to take part in this census, it is unclear how anyone other than Sadrists will gain access to those ballots.

Also, it is very unclear as to whether the measured will of the people will be honored by the Sadrists party, or whether the leaders of the movement are simply seeking to appear democratic -- but I ask you, is that not a good step to take? Time will tell.

This Week in Weird -- What if Guam Goes Bottom Up?

2010-04-02T00:31:00.005-04:00

Poor Admiral Robert Williard had to go before the House Armed Services Committee this past week. He went as the head of US Pacific Command -- but he left as a defender of common sense and geology.

The cause of his title shift? Rep. Hank Johnson (D-GA), who was worried that the US Navy's decision to station an additional 8,000 personnel and their families on the island of Guam would, well, perhaps you need to see it for yourself:

This is a rare occurrence for me, but for commentary, I must defer to the National Review:

"Presumably, when you're the head guy of a major fleet for a big-time navy, you've got plenty of other ways of filling your time other than reassuring congressmen on whether miscellaneous land masses are likely to tip over and sink."

Only in America my friends!

In all fairness, Rep. Johnson's office released the following statement,

"The subtle humor of this obviously metaphorical reference to a ship capsizing illustrated my concern about the impact of the planned military buildup on this small tropical island."

I'm not buying it, and I doubt it will be enough to free him from the mockery of that series of tubes we call the internets.

Fueling the Stereotype: Putin versus the Chechen “wolves”

2010-04-01T15:17:00.001-04:00

By: Elise Crane

This week’s subway bombings in Moscow sharply displayed the consequences of ignoring the complexities of conflict. Last April, the Kremlin declared the war in Chechnya officially over and formally ended its counterterrorism campaign in the republic. However, death squads continue to flourish, Ramzan Kadyrov is hardly a competent—nor uncorrupt—leader and, as Monday’s tragedy so glaringly demonstrated, the conflict is far from over.

Moscow’s continued refusal to address the root causes of the Chechen separatist drive virtually ensures that the violence will continue. Although the Chechen movement took an admittedly virulent turn with the injection of radical Islam in the mid-1990s, at its heart, it is fueled by historical grievance and unaddressed trauma.

Due largely to Vladimir Putin’s stranglehold on Russian media, emblematized by Anna Politkovskaya’s untimely death (which was, ironically, blamed on Chechen terrorists, but the likely culprit presents a much more chilling picture), the Russo-Chechen conflict has been broadly portrayed as a classic “good versus evil” story. This is a dangerous simplification and neglects crucial historical facts that must be acknowledged if we hope to end the devastating conflict.

Twenty years ago, in the post-communist ideological vacuum, Chechens saw an opportunity to attain independence after a legacy of brutal Russian domination. What began as a separatist movement became, with the import of radical Islam as a mobilizing factor, part of the global “war on terror.” This allows Russia to present its atrocities in Chechnya as a legitimate response to the plague of Islamic fundamentalism.

For Chechens, Islam injects a degree of global community and financial support in their quest for independence. Radical Islam places the separatist cause under the aegis of virulent Arab jihadists alien to the Chechen historical experience.
For Russia and its supporters, Islam symbolizes Chechnya’s identification with the “evil” side of the global war on terror. This has been a particularly popular narrative in the wake of September 11 and one that has been profoundly galvanizing for Putin. Monday’s bombings will surely only entrench this view of the conflict and fuel Putin’s probable drive to reclaim the presidency in 2012.

In light of the bombings, it is worth reflecting on the 2004 Beslan school crisis, which killed at least 334 people (including more than 150 children) and solidified Moscow’s demonizing narrative of Chechnya as “evil” and Russia as “defensiveness victim.” Thanks to media framing, undoubtedly spurred by Putin, historic Chechen “wolves” had been transformed into “Islamic terrorists.” Although Beslan was an unspeakable horror, with society’s most innocent among the carnage, this incident alone cannot displace hundreds of years of Chechen subjugation at the hands of Russia.

The Kremlin was all too glad, however, to extrapolate responsibility for Beslan onto the entire Chechen republic and to vastly escalate its demonizing rhetoric against the Chechen population. This serves only to compound Chechen radicalism and completely casts aside ordinary Chechens’ historical trauma, including the 1944 Stalinist deportations, which killed between one-half and one-quarter of the Chechen population. The lingering traumatic effects strongly inform Chechen collective memory and amplify its commitment to independence at any cost.

The first Chechen war in 1994-1996 claimed as many as 100,000 Chechen lives, primarily civilians. The second war, from 1999-2000, was also marked by massive civilian casualties and human rights violations. Pro-Moscow President Kadyrov has been commended for reducing overt violence in Chechnya, but its population is fiercely divided, living conditions are horrendous, bursts of violence continue, and corruption is spiraling out of control.

In a globalized world, we can no longer afford to reduce distant “ancient ethnic hatreds” to an irresolvable “clash of civilizations” narrative and we must not let the North Caucasus fall off our radar. It is high time to abandon the lassitude of “good versus evil” interpretations of the world. Putin promises to “dredge the terrorists from the sewers” and we have no reason to doubt his commitment.

But if the global community has any interest in de-escalating the conflict before it infects the entire North Caucasus region, which is already dreadfully instable, it could encourage Russia acknowledge its historical atrocities in Chechnya and to curb its polarizing rhetoric that places all Chechens firmly in the terrorist camp. By appealing to moderate Chechens disgusted by terrorist tactics and abandoning demonization narratives that only deepen grievances and facilitate terrorist recruitment, Russia could direct the conflict toward a less destructive future.

Elise Crane is a graduate student at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, where she focuses on conflict resolution and international communication. She has lived in Russia and conducted research on instability in the North Caucasus, and is particularly interested in media reporting on conflict and post-conflict environments.